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Lobov Discusses Changes in Warsaw Pact Armies

LD3007113190 Moscow TASS in English 1124 GMT 30 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Oled Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow July 30 TASS—"The Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) will soon be less 'militarised' and its military agencies will be reduced to a minimum. Subsequently the WTO will serve a purely consultative function," General Vladimir Lobov, chief of staff of the Warsaw Treaty joint armed forces, told TASS today.

The complex and varied processes taking place in Warsaw Treaty countries have a strong influence on their armed forces, Lobov said.

"Most countries are elaborating and implementing new laws on defence. New defence concepts are being adopted on the strength of those laws. Tables of troops organisation are changing with an emphasis on qualitative parameters.

"The task now is to secure that the WTO armed forces, geared to a level of defence sufficiency, can successfully perform their functions."

According to Lobov, the number of military exercises in the Warsaw Treaty will be cut, placing more demands on the level of their organisation.

"In view of the democratisation of military service, the principles of relationships in military collectives are changing in WTO armies.

"The texts of military oaths and all-arms regulations are also being changed to correspond to the new constitutions that have been adopted in a number of member states.

"There is tendency towards reducing the term of military service. In the Polish army, young people will be drafted for a term of 18 months and in the Hungarian Army—for 12 months," Lobov said.

Moscow Withdraws From CEMA Payment Agreements

LD3107110690 Moscow TASS in English 1059 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—The Soviet Union has handed in a document to withdraw from the system of agreements on nontrade payments with other CMEA [CEMA] countries to the secretariat of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). An official statement was circulated here today.

The withdrawal was prompted by the transition of the CMEA countries to hard currency in mutual settlements on July 27.

The document covers an agreement on the application of a list of nontrade payments and the coefficient to evaluate nontrade payments in transferrable rubles, signed on July 28, 1971 and an agreement on applying clarified discounts on the official exchange rates of national currencies for nontrade payments, signed on December 28, 1974.

Katushev Reviews Changes in CEMA Relations

OW0108094290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Report on interview with K.F. Katushev, minister of foreign economic relations by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given; from the "120 Minutes" program]

[Text] Here is some economic news as outlined in an interview with our correspondent by the USSR Minister of Foreign Economic Relations. [Video shows Soviet TV correspondent talking to Katushev across a green felt-topped table]

[Begin recording] [Katushev] The presidential decree establishes the procedure for foreign economic relations with foreign states, with CEMA member countries, and developing countries. It emphasizes that the Union Government drafts proposals while the final decision on the scope and direction of these relations, particularly in those areas where state commercial credits are used, is adopted by our legislative organ—the Supreme Soviet and the president.

Now as to the first point. This point determines the change to the new system of settlements and payments with CEMA member countries. The way for this decision, which has now been legally postulated by the presidential decree, was paved by the entire previous course of events in our relations with the CEMA member countries and by those proposals that were drafted by the government and proposed by Comrade Ryzhkov for discussion and adoption by the CEMA member countries at the January session in Sofia, and by the talks on the change to this system of settlements and payments which, on instructions from the government, we have already introduced with all countries.

In principle, all of our partners in the CEMA member countries are ready for this, because they understand that this is objectively essential. Our existing procedure of settlements and payments on the basis of what is now recognized to be an artificially created system within the framework of CEMA...

[Correspondent, interrupting] On the basis of a nonexistent transferable ruble.

[Katushev] Well, at one time the transferable ruble existed as a means for settlements, but it was not a means for payments. And this acted as a brake on the development of trade and in the development of economic cooperation. This has become particularly evident now when all countries are building economies that are receptive to ties with other foreign countries and are open to the international division of labor.

[Correspondent] What will this change to settlements, in terms of world prices in freely convertible currency, give the people or the country?

[Katushev] You and I, as ordinary consumers, will first of all get an opportunity to receive quality goods from all foreign countries. The previously existing system of relations based on a price system existing only within the framework of CEMA created artificial relations in which our CEMA member partners were more interested in selling better quality goods for hard currencies. A situation developed both here and among our CEMA member partners in which the producer, in actually existing conditions, was more interested in selling his products for freely convertible currencies than in selling his goods for a transferable ruble for which he could not buy what he needed and where he wanted. Now the change to (?fixed) settlements at world prices creates these conditions for the producers.

[Correspondent] Could it turn out that we will lose our markets in the CEMA countries or will we begin to lose our positions there?

[Katushev] Well, first of all our prices on goods, particularly consumer goods, within the framework of relations between CEMA countries were not lower but higher than the prices on other markets. Herein lies one of the elements of the artificial nature of the price formation system of which we are divesting ourselves. That is the first point. Second, a certain category of mutually balanced goods deliveries has taken shape here, and apparently it will continue to function between the CEMA member countries. However, the opportunity will now exist, of course, to reject your partner's substandard products.

[Correspondent] The second point of the presidential decree talks about economic assistance rendered by the Soviet Union. It says here that in rendering this assistance our country's practical means must be taken into consideration. Well, it is no secret and the press has written much about it, that often our assistance was not effective. Now does this mean, first of all, that we will now begin cutting our assistance to countries, say, in Africa or Asia, or some other countries, and how will we provide it in general?

[Katushev] We must now stop confusing assistance with cooperation. In those areas where it is deemed necessary to render assistance today, it must be rendered within the framework of those norms and rules that exist within international relations.

[Correspondent] Could it be said then that economic assistance will now be somehow separated from political considerations?

[Katushev] Well, you know one must be realistic. It is possible that when developing any ties there will always be an attendant political consideration, rational political considerations. But nevertheless, and I am drawing my conclusion from the presidential decree, preeminence will be given to ensuring the effectiveness of our cooperation, our trade, and our economic cooperation. Mutual benefit for both participating partners will invariably be considered, and naturally the state and national interests of the Soviet side must be ensured. [end recording]

TASS Reports on Gremitskikh's 31 Jul Briefing

Soviet-Japanese Talks

LD3107143690 Moscow TASS in English 1426 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—The two-day Soviet-Japanese working consultations are winding up in Moscow today, Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, told a briefing in Moscow today.

The Soviet delegation is led by Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev, and the Japanese by Deputy Foreign Minister Hisashi Owda.

Gremitskikh said the delegations yesterday discussed international issues and today bilateral relations.

Rogachev and Owada will also head delegations of the two countries at the August 1 meeting of the Soviet-Japanese working group on a peace treaty.

CEMA Currency Switch

LD3107144290 Moscow TASS in English 1427 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—The Soviet Union handed in a document to withdraw from the system of agreements on nontrade payments with other CMEA countries to the Secretariat of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) on July 27, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told a briefing here today.

The document covers an agreement on the application of a list of nontrade payments and the coefficient to evaluate nontrade payments in transferrable rubles and an agreement on applying clarified discounts on the official exchange rates of national currencies for nontrade payments.

Gremitskikh said that the withdrawal had been prompted by the transition of the CMEA countries to hard currency in mutual settlements.

Armaments, Soviet Citizenship

LD3107144990 Moscow TASS in English 1430 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—Rumours that, according to "some resolution," Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan who received visas to enter the United States are losing their Soviet citizenship, are groundless, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told a briefing here today. He said "the loss of Soviet citizenship is possible only through a citizen's personal application" and "there is no discrimination against Armenians."

Quoting information, received from the Department of Visas and Registration of the Soviet Interior Ministry, Gremitskikh said Armenians who were forced to leave their permanent residence in Azerbaijan, then turned for visas to enter the United States for permanent domicile and received such visas, "may lose Soviet citizenship, in compliance with the rules applied to all other people leaving the country."

Afghan Situation

LD3107161190 Moscow TASS in English 1559 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow July 31, TASS—"President Najibullah has arrived in the Soviet Union, specifically to undergo a medical examination," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told a briefing here today, confirming reports by the BAKHTAR News Agency and other mass media.

Speaking of the meeting of foreign minister of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, beginning today in Cairo, Gremitskikh said the forum has aroused great interest in Afghanistan, where Islam is particularly important.

He said President Najibullah today sent a message to leaders of many Islamic countries, stressing that Afghanistan is an inalienable part of the Islamic world and needs help and support. Najibullah explained the Afghan Government's approaches to the settlement of foreign and domestic aspects of the Afghan conflict and asked for help to restore Afghanistan's legitimate participation in the Islamic conference.

Gremitskikh told correspondents of Afghanistan's recent international contacts and its leadership's measures aimed at the national reconciliation.

Recalling that on July 27 new Afghan Ambassador to the Soviet Union Mohammad Daud Razmyar presented his credentials to President Mikhail Gorbachev, Gremitskikh said the new ambassador is a prominent state and party figure. "We hope he will actively work to develop multilateral Soviet-Afghan relations," he said.

Shevardnadze-Baker Talks

LD3107171790 Moscow TASS in English 1531 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—The forthcoming meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker promises "interesting results," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told a briefing here today.

"Of course, all the important subjects will be taken up," he said, pointing first of all to Soviet-American dialogue and bilateral relations in every field, including trade and the economy.

He spoke positively of shifts in the sides' positions on the Cambodian and Afghan problems, bringing them closer together.

Gremitskikh said that Shevardnadze and Baker are to have a one- on-one meeting Wednesday morning. Then, during lunch, they will meet again, in the presence of officials accompanying them.

Shevardnadze and Baker will continue their talks on Thursday morning and give a joint news conference for Soviet and foreign reporters on that day at 10:00 local time [0100 GMT].

Salvadoran Government Talks

LD3107172790 Moscow TASS in English 1721 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—The signing of a human rights agreement by the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front is the "main practical result" of talks between them, held in Costa Rica, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told a briefing here today.

The agreement envisages the setting up of a UN mission to control the observance of human rights. The mission is expected to enter upon its duties after ceasefire agreements are signed, he said.

Gremitskikh said the human rights agreement is the first important accord that could lead to a political settlement in Salvador, and it was welcomed all over the world.

The Soviet side believes the armed forces' reorganisation is particularly important, as it could help end the civil war and reach national reconciliation in Salvador, Gremitskikh said.

Noting the "remaining serious differences" on the issue, Gremitskikh said "both sides intention to pay particular attention to the issue during the next round of talks in Costa Rica between August 17-22, is a positive movement."

"The talks between the conflicting sides are entering an important stage when a realistic and constructive approach to complicated problems can ensure a serious breakthrough towards national reconciliation," Gremitskikh said.

He called on both sides to "direct their efforts at maximum use of political means, searching for ways to resolve the conflict."

Israel's Chemical Weapons

LD3107175190 Moscow TASS in English 1447 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—The explosive situation in the Middle East calls for a vigorous effort to improve the political climate in the region rather than for swapping threats, a Soviet spokesman told a Moscow briefing today.

Yuriy Gremiskikh, first deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, commented on the recent statement by Israeli minister for science, technology and energy Yuval Neeman that Israel possesses chemical weapons and a capacity to use it.

Gremitskikh said such statements were "regretful" and "only further whipped up tensions in the Middle East, hampering the attainment of an Arab-Israeli settlement."

In this context, Gremitskikh drew attention of Soviet and foreign journalists to the Soviet ideas on "the peaceful remaking" of the Middle East, including "creating zones free from nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, setting up a regional centre for diminished military threat, reducing missile weapons."

Shevardnadze Receives Ambassadors 28 Jul

PM3107123590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Ambassadors Received"]

[Text] On 28 July USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze received Ts. Gurbadam, J. Bremer, and V.G. Turner, the ambassadors of the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic], the United Mexican States, and Canada respectively, in connection with the completion of their mission and their upcoming final departure for home.

E.A. Shevardnadze and Ts. Gurbadam confirmed the sides' firm intention to actively promote the deepening and broadening of Soviet-Mongolian cooperation in various spheres for the good of the two countries' peoples and the strengthening of peace and international security. Emphasis was placed on the special significance for the development of bilateral relations of the accords reached during the recent visit to the Soviet Union of P. Ochirbat, chairman of the MPR People's Great Hural Presidium, and G. Ochirbat, chairman of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee.

In the conversation with the Mexican ambassador the mutual conviction was expressed that the USSR and Mexico have at their disposal everything necessary to further deepen constructive cooperation along the lines of the new political thinking in the interests of resolving cardinal problems of the present day. Noting with satisfaction the high level of development of friendly Soviet-Mexican relations, the sides confirmed the political will of the two countries' peoples and governments to promote in every possible way the strengthening of bilateral ties in all spheres.

E.A. Shevardnadze and the Canadian ambassador spoke with satisfaction about the level reached in Soviet-Canadian relations and the atmosphere of trust and good-neighborliness that has evolved in them. A qualitatively new stage in their development was initiated by the Soviet-Canadian political declaration and other bilateral documents signed in November 1989. The accords reached during the state visit to Canada of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev in May this year are geared to the further enrichment of mutual cooperation. On the whole, Soviet-Canadian cooperation has assumed significance as an important constituent of the efforts to improve the international situation and to impart the nature of irreversible changes to this process.

The ambassadors expressed gratitude for the assistance given them in fulfilling their mission in the Soviet Union.

On the same day E.A. Shevardnadze received J. Cuenca, Spain's ambassador.

There was an exchange of opinions on some urgent questions of the development of the situation in Europe, including cooperation between the USSR and Spain in the interests of deepening the all-European process. The prospects for Soviet-Spanish relations were also discussed.

Sports Ministry To Stage Goodwill Games

LD3107130690 Moscow TASS in English 1254 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Seattle July 31 TASS—Soviet sport officials have no second thoughts about staging the goodwill games in Moscow and Leningrad in 1994, despite financial losses suffered by the games' 1990 organisers in Seattle.

A. Kolesov, deputy head of the Soviet sport ministry Goskomsport [State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports], told correspondents here that the games in the USSR will be bankrolled by the self-financing ministry out of its own funds and not a kopeck will be spent from the federal budget.

Ted Turner's TBS involvement will be limited to television coverage and a hard-currency contribution, which is still to be agreed upon and will pay for tickets for athletes invited from various countries, he said.

Their accommodation, meals and on-site transportation will be fully covered by Goskomsport, Kolesov said. The same arrangements were in effect during the inaugural games in 1986 and acquitted themselves perfectly well, he added.

"I believe in the future of goodwill games. They are needed by the world," Kolesov said.

TASS Analyst on 'Encouraging' Signs in Europe

LD3007164490 Moscow TASS in English 1553 GMT 30 Jul 90

[By TASS political analyst Albert Balebanov]

[Text] The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe was held in Helsinki 15 years ago. It was prompted by the need to jointly sum up the political results of the Second World War and chart ways and methods to create new interstate relations.

The conference was an unprecedented meeting of the heads of states of 35 European countries, the United States and Canada. It made a substantial contribution to strengthening peace on the continent, initiated the process of detente and arms reduction. It marked the end of East-West confrontation and the beginning of equitable cooperation between them.

The Final Act adopted in Helsinki laid down new principles of state behaviour in the international arena. The act became a code of rules which the participants in the conference promised to observe undeviatingly.

Unfortunately, both the East and the West understood the accords reached in Helsinki in their own specific ways. As a result many provisions of the Helsinki Final Act remained on paper.

A new impulse to act was imparted by new thinking and perestroyka in the Soviet Union which led to radical changes in East European countries.

As a result, the Helsinki process began to acquire new practical meaning only after the Vienna meeting of representatives of the 35 countries which had participated in the Helsinki Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

However, it would be unfair to say that the preceding European conferences in Belgrade and Madrid, devoted to the Final Act's main basket—European security—yielded no results. Nevertheless, the truly essential contributions to the development of the Helsinki process were made by the gatherings in Vienna, Bonn and Copenhagen.

The Final Act, I trust, facilitated the creation of preconditions for perestroyka in the Soviet Union and the emergence of the idea to build a common European home.

The 15th anniversary of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe coincided with the preparations

for the convocation of a new similar summit conference in Paris in November 1990.

The new conference is expected to tackle major tasks—to establish a new type of relationships between member-countries, create new European security structures to replace with time the two military-political allliances—the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

These structures are expected to create a basis for consummating German unification and boosting disarmament talks. The conference will also discuss the institutionalization of the Helsinki process and the creation of a CSCE centre.

Hope is evoked by the fact that CSCE partners are now sharing a common understanding of the need to speed up decision-making on this score.

The Paris meeting preparatory committee's first session has revealed the desire to make the agenda brimful of meaningful items so as to enable the final document to reflect all major political issues of pressing importance to Europe.

It is noteworthy that Albania, the only European country that did not participate in the Helsinki conference and did not recognise its results, agreed to participate in the forthcoming summit, although only as an observer.

All these are encouraging signs, testifying to the advancement of this continent towards a desired goal—the building of a common European home, the doors of which will be open to all.

'Rossiya' Leaves for North Pole With Tourists

LD3107130590 Moscow TASS in English 1220 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS special correspondent Vasiliy Belousov]

[Text] Arctic Ocean July 31 TASS—The Soviet nuclear ice-breaker Rossiya set off today carrying tourists to the North Pole.

The opportunity to make the fascinating voyage was accorded to 41 citizens of the United States, West Germany, Canada, France and Saudi Arabia. The journey signals the beginning of a peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation in the arctic, for which President Mikhail Gorbachev called in his speech in Murmansk.

Only the Soviet Union has ships capable of negotiating ice of any thickness to reach the Pole. The partners in the deal—the Murmansk Sea Shipping Line and West Germany's mediation firm Polar Schiffahrt Consulting GMBH—chose one such ship to organise the maiden cruise.

Anatoliy Lamekhov, an eminent polar captain and hero of socialist labour, the top civilian award in this country, is navigating the ship to the pole. The crew has vast experience in Arctic navigation as well.

"Specialists estimate that the journey to the Pole will take two weeks," cruise director Anatoliy Lazutkin says. "Although the ice-breaker is not designed to transport passengers.

"The wardroom was turned into a restaurant, all necessary amenities were created into a restaurant for the time being. At the tourists' disposal is a bar and the best cabins, which are specially equipped for a journey to the Pole," Lazutkin says.

"A gymnasium, swimming-pool, sauna and concert hall are at the service of the passengers. There are two helicopters on board the ship, which can be used to make a flight over the desert Arctic ice and around the Pole," Lamekhov goes on.

Certainly, the prestigious cruise runs at a high cost, which was reflected in the vouchers' cost. Each of the participants paid 35,000 German marks.

The ice-breaker is now running in pure water. Tourists are looking forward impatiently for their encounter with Arctic ice. The ship is already approaching it—a pack of ice has been sited off Novaya Zemlya, which the Rossiya is approaching.

New International Convention on Hijacking Urged

PM0108100790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Reader's letter signed by G.A. Arbatov under the general heading "From the International Sections' Mailbag"]

[Text] **I Have a Proposal**

The increasing frequency of hijackings of our aircraft cannot but cause concern. The problem can, of course, be viewed as a symptom of more serious phenomena and processes taking place in society. Most serious attention should be focused on them. I am referring above all to the need to remove the causes which prompt, more and more noticeably, a considerable number of people to leave the country. And also the delays in the adoption of the law on entry and exit. Certain people are pushed toward crime by the rejection of their applications to leave the country (this in no way justifies their conduct, of course). Incidentally, the increase in the number of people who wish to leave the country is itself a warning. And finally, airport security is badly organized and this does not give the aircraft crew confidence that none of the passengers has brought weapons or explosives on board.

However, combatting the root causes will take a certain amount of time. Meanwhile hijackings spell danger for hundreds of lives right now. Arming the crews or having a guard on each individual aircraft is not a convincing answer. It could spell even greater danger.

It seems to me that the best solution would be a new international convention on combatting hijackings (or

adding another section to the existing one). The convention which is currently in force was drawn up and adopted at a time when the "cold war" made it impossible to agree on many things. It was at a time when someone who was regarded as a "freedom fighter" in one country was regarded as a terrorist in another, and vice versa, of course.

The situation has radically changed now. It has become easier to reach agreement. The danger of international terrorism is recognized better than ever before by virtually everyone, no matter what motives are used to justify it (hijacking an aircraft under the threat of using weapons is terrorism). This opens up new opportunities for achieving a much more effective agreement.

I believe that it should, in particular, incorporate a pledge on the part of all the signatories to extradite hijackers without delay to the country from which the aircraft was hijacked. If this pledge is violated, sanctions would follow automatically—a boycott, a disruption of air communications with the state which has violated the pledge by all the other countries which have signed the treaty. Today no country can tolerate being cut off from the world as a result of a disruption of air communications.

The adoption of such a convention, a highly publicized one at that, of which the broadest strata of the public would be notified, would ensure the inevitability of the hijacker's punishment and would thus become a very effective measure to combat this type of dangerous crime.

[Signed] G.A. Arbatov, Moscow.

United States & Canada

Baker, Shevardnadze Open Talks in Irkutsk

Summit Plans Noted

LD3107151590 Moscow TASS in English 1456 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS special correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow-Irkutsk (on board of Ilyushin-62) July 31 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze flew to the Siberian city of Irkutsk today for a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, which, he said, will focus on preparations for another Soviet-American summit, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process, bilateral cooperation and regional problems.

Speaking to reporters on the way to Siberia on board his Ilyushin-62 plane, he said that Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush had agreed on another summit back during their Malta meeting and that the summit should take place before the end of the year. This was why, he explained, there was extremely little time left to prepare for the new summit.

Commenting on the German reunification issue, Shevardnadze said that after Gorbachev and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, meeting recently in Stavropol in southern Russia, had achieved a "breakthrough", the sides believed that the next "two-plus-four" meeting in Moscow in mid-September should be "the concluding one" and only some aspects of the issue (the form of related documents, etc.) remained to be settled.

Shevardnadze said the Irkutsk meeting would make it possible "to discuss more thoroughly such regional problems as Afghan and Cambodian settlements and the situations in the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula and the Horn of Africa".

Speaking of the Afghanistan issue, he said that the sides' positions on it had lately been definitely coming closer together and that, as compared with recent past, "the issue of a settlement is now being posed differently".

In light of the U.S. Administration's latest statement on the change in its posture on Cambodia, it is essential, Shevardnadze said, "to strengthen the sides' mutual understanding" and map out a programme for further action.

Asked by reporters about the choice of Irkutsk for the working meeting with Baker, Shevardnadze explained that such venues were very convenient: "Less time is wasted on protocol and there are enough time and the conditions for a truly working atmosphere".

He compared the Irkutsk meting to last September's meeting in Wyoming in the United States, describing the latter as a "model" from the standpoint of conveniences and conditions for talks.

Agenda Prepared

LD0108071990 Moscow TASS in English 0655 GMT 1 Aug 90

[By TASS special correspondents Konstantin Voitsekhovich, Vladimir Khodiy, and Georgiy Shmelyov]

[Text] Irkutsk August 1 TASS—Although there is no definite agenda for talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, preparations for another Soviet-American summit will be high on the priority list, the two leaders told reporters before retreating to the Retro mansion in downtown Irkutsk today.

According to tradition, Baker and Shevardnadze paused for a photo session at the entrance to the mansion. On meeting Baker, Shevardnadze asked him how he was doing after the long flight to the Siberian city from Jakarta, via Hong Kong. Baker arrived in Irkutsk late on Tuesday.

Speaking to a bunch of Soviet and foreign reporters, allowed to attend the opening of the talks, Baker said although there is no definite list of issues to be discussed, he would be surprised if they left out preparations for the new Soviet-American summit, its date and place.

He also said the two will discuss disarmament issues, including conventional arms cuts, bilateral cooperation and regional issues.

Asked by reporters if Afghan president Najibullah's stay in the Soviet Union will have an impact on the discussion about Afghanistan, Shevardnadze said Najibullah was vacationing in the Soviet Union, and his presence in the country will have no effect on talks about regional issues.

As for "new proposals" on a settlement in Afghanistan, "we have a lot to talk about" in Irkutsk, Shevardnadze said.

Mutual Goals Examined

LD0108083290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 1 Aug 90

[Excerpts] A working meeting between Foreign Minister Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, and U.S,. Secretary of State James Baker began in Irkutsk today. Our special diplomatic correspondent Viktor Levin is on the line. Good morning.

[Levin] Good morning. According to the schedule, the first meeting was to end at 0800 Moscow time or 1300 Irkutsk time, but just 10 minutes ago when I was to leave the Retro Mansion, where the talks are taking place, the conversation was still in progress. Thus, I have no news yet. One can be consoled by the fact that it is planned to have altogether three one-on-one conversations today and tomorrow. [passage omitted]

Our foreign minister told journalists why the meeting is taking place in Irkutsk, noting that less time is wasted on protocols and one can work in a more fruitful way in locations away from capitals. [passage omitted]

Back to the talks. What is discussed in the first place? For example, the issue relating to Afghanistan is on the agenda. American journalists pay special attention to it. Based on their questions to Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze and James Baker before the beginning of the meeting, it is clear that they expect a sensation. Comrade Shevardnadze, in his talk with Soviet journalists on board the plane—we also asked him about it—said that it was difficult to say, but the reproachment of positions is present. Americans previously did not want to hear about Najibullah's government, and now they have a different position.

There is enough to discuss on concluding a treaty on limitation of strategic offensive weapons. You know that a summit is planned for the end of the year. In the course of this summit a treaty to this effect must be signed, but in the meantime the talks are held as a routine, and it is necessary to give it an impulse in order for the treaty to be drawn up by the time of the summit. There are unsolved issues at the Vienna talks on limitation of conventional weapons and Armed Forces. They are also attached to the meeting of the leaders of the states and governments of 35 countries, which is planned to take place in Paris in the second half of November. Aviation and determination of the strength of troops, when taking into account the unification of the two German states, remain a stumbling block there.

The German question—all agreements, including April ones, have to be properly documented. I have an impression that it is hardly possible that all the questions will be dealt with at this meeting in Irkutsk. There will be a new meeting in September. We are expecting Baker in Moscow. The meeting of ministers under two-plus-four formula will take place there, and there is hope that Baker will stay longer to have separate talks.

But even this will not be enough. That's why in Irkutsk, as we have learned from authorized sources, a schedule of forthcoming meetings between the leaders of foreign policy departments of the two countries will be worked out. It is the 16th time the ministers are meeting in the past two years. [passage omitted]

Scientific, Cultural Ties Noted

LD0108081990 Moscow TASS in English 0812 GMT 1 Aug 90

[By TASS special correspondents Konstantin Voitsekhovich, Vladimir Khodi, and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] The first round of the Soviet-American talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker has just concluded in the Retro Mansion.

During a three-hour one-on-one conversation, the sides started a detailed analysis of the disarmament process and bilateral relations. The ministers stated their thoughts regarding prospects for the further development of Soviet-American contacts in various areas.

They, specifically, discussed the possibility of signing appropriate agreements on such matters as mutual encouragement and protection of capital investments, the avoidance of double taxation and the settlement of mutual financial and property claims.

They also discussed terms of an arrangement on cooperation in the area of fuel and energy supply, in tourism, forestry and cooperation in housing construction, prediction of natural calamities and elimination of their aftermaths.

A quest for new forms and projects of interaction continues in such areas as science, technology and medicine. A number of projects are related to peaceful uses of outer space—possible cooperation in the exploration of the moon and Mars, the creation of an international service to protect the earth from space by monitoring natural and artificial space bodies, the creation of a unified means of rescue in space, ensurance of security on space flights and a number of other projects.

In the cultural area it is envisaged to implement an agreement to set up cultural and information centres for the Soviet Union and the United States in Washington and Moscow, a Soviet centre of culture and technology in Chicago, as well as an international children's camp in Soviet Georgia.

Special attention will be given to initiatives in the area of transnational problems—environmental protection, the fight against terrorism and narcotics trafficking, and initiatives in the area of international law.

As regards administrative and consular matters, the two statesmen discussed settling the issue of new office buildings for the embassies of the Soviet Union and the United States in Washington and Moscow, opening the consulates-general of the USSR and the U.S. in New York and in Kiev and setting up a permanent working group on these matters.

Then a luncheon was given in honour of James Baker on behalf of Shevardnadze. After that the ministers went on board the Voskhod motorship to Angarskiye Khutora, on the banks of the Angara River. The two statesmen will continue negotiations there.

White House Spokesman on Year-End Summit Plans

LD0108081390 Moscow TASS in English 0717 GMT 1 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Igor Borisenko and Aleksandr Korolev]

[Text] Washington August 1 TASS—White House Spokesman Alixe Glenn did not rule out this possibility of a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in November this year.

"Planning is currently underway for a CSCE summit in Paris in November, if there is a CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] agreement," Glenn told a briefing on Tuesday. "If a CSCE summit is held, President Bush would attend. If President Gorbachev attends, both presidents would, of course, meet at the session of the summit and possibly meet bilaterally outside the context of the CSCE summit."

"Well, we've already stated that we expect another summit, that it would be likely to be held in Moscow and again likely in 1991," Glenn continued. Asked if the United States thinks the START treaty could be signed at this meeting, the White House spokesman said: "We hope to have a treaty this year, as the president has said, but we want a good treaty, so we're not going to set any artificial deadlines." She noted that everything depends on whether there is a treaty this year". [quotation marks as received]

Roman Popadiuk, White House deputy press secretary said "There are two avenues in terms of a possibility for a meeting, and we don't need to go through both of them—the one for CSCE summit, the other one would be the Moscow summit. Any one of those is a possibility," he said.

Having recalled the President's words about the desirability of elaborating the Soviet-U.S. START treaty this year, [passage indistinct] a number of things that still have to be settled in the START negotiations." [quotation marks as received]

U.S. Needs Caution on Republics' Autonomy Issue

PM0108104790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Aug 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "'No Specific Pledges'"]

[Text] Washington, 31 Jul—"The United States has an interest in the success of President Gorbachev and his policy of perestroyka and glasnost," a statement on Soviet-U.S. relations issued by the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress reads. We wish the Soviet Union's ongoing progress toward multiparty democracy and a market economy to continue, the statement reads. We wish for new arms control agreements and further cooperation with the USSR in settling regional conflicts. However, resurgent nationalism in the USSR could jeopardize the attainment of these goals.

The United States must take a cautious approach to the nationalities question in the USSR in order to avoid interference in the USSR's internal affairs and a cooling of East-West relations. We sympathize with the wishes of the peoples of the Baltic republics and other nationalities to achieve self-determination, but at the same time we must admit that the United States has a greater interest in the success of the political and economic reform in the Soviet Union.

Latvian Premier Speaks in Washington on Ties

PM3107100790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by TASS correspondent: "Statement by Head of Latvian Government"]

[Text] Washington, 25 Jul—I. Godmanis, chairman of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, who is on a private visit here, spoke at a news conference at the National Press Club Monday. He recalled that on 4 May this year the Latvian Supreme Soviet declared that "our objective is the achievement and restoration of the independence of the republic, our independent state, the restoration of our place in a united Europe, and the reinstitution of Latvia's membership of the United Nations." However we are very well aware, the head of the Latvian Government continued, that during this transitional period, pending the start of talks with the Soviet Government, we cannot take action to "break the profound economic and political relations linking us with the union republics."

In the course of the news conference Godmanis touched on the question of work on the preparation of a Union treaty and expressed the hope that as a result of negotiations it will prove possible to create "some form of association and possibly alliance" within the framework of the USSR. Although in political terms we intend in the future to become an "independent state," Godmanis said, we want the Soviet Union to remain our "good neighbor" and are very interested in preserving and maintaining good economic relations with it."

The head of the Latvian Government expressed the hope that on his return to Moscow he would meet with USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and brief him on the results of his visit.

Cut of U.S. Round-the-Clock Air Patrol Viewed

PM0108100190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jul 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Round-the-Clock Flights Abolished"]

[Text] Washington, 28 Jul—The G. Bush administration has adopted a decision to abolish round-the-clock patrolling by special EC-135 aircraft which fulfill the role of "airborne command posts." These aircraft were designed to control the country's Armed Forces in the event of a nuclear war. At least one of these "command posts" has been permanently on alert duty in the skies since 3 February 1961.

Pentagon spokesman P. Williams reported on Friday that the last EC-135 to carry out a flight over the continental United States on the round-the-clock schedule landed at Offutt AFB (Nebraska) on Tuesday. On board was General J. Chain, commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). According to the possible nuclear war scenario worked out by the Pentagon, Chain

himself or one of the other SAC generals must be permanently in flight in order to ensure continuous control of U.S. nuclear forces. In the event of the death of the President, the vice president, and the defense secretary, or in a situation where they were physically unable to exercise their military authority, and also in the event of the destruction of the SAC underground command center, the order to launch MX and "Minuteman" ICBM's could be given from the "airborne command post."

As THE WASHINGTON POST notes, the Bush Administration has decided to suspend the round-the-clock patrol "because of the budget deficit crisis and as a result of the thaw in relations with the Soviet Union." Administration spokesmen stressed that the significant reduction in the number of flights by the EC-135's, which are modified Boeing-707's, will make it possible to save $18 million and $23 million in 1991 and 1992 respectively.

According to Williams, EC-135's will make infrequent flights over U.S. territory, and the rest of the time they will be in a state of heightened readiness on the ground so as to be able to take off in a matter of minutes if necessary.

U.S. Military Policy 'Contradictions' Noted

PM3007142790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jul 90 First Edition p 3

[Article under the rubric "World Today: Problems and Verdicts" by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA commentator Manki Ponomarev: "Recurrence of the Past or Course for the Future?"]

[Text] The conviction that war can no longer be an instrument of policy, that reliance on military strength is futile, and that the world is entering the postconfrontational era is dominating our consciousness increasingly powerfully. No, this is certainly not complacency or an ostrich-like attempt to bury one's head in the sand but the result of a sober analysis of the state and prospects for the development of the military-political situation in the international arena. An analysis which at the same time leads to the indisputable conclusion that there is still no guarantee that the positive changes are irreversible and that although the war danger has diminished it still exists.

That fact that is actually so is demonstrated in particular by the news agency reports arriving these days from the United States. The reports on the U.S. President's tour of the country and his speeches in Wyoming and Virginia have attracted special attention.

As the U.S. press writes, this trip was basically a preelection one. This is because all 435 representatives and one-third of senators are up for reelection in November. At present the Democrats hold the majority in Congress. Naturally a Republican president would like to change that situation very much. That is why in his speeches Bush did not stint on the charges that his political opponents are undermining his foreign policy, especially in Central America, and are causing the budget problems which have beset the country. But that was not enough for him, apparently, and the President, acting as Republicans have constantly done before him, used arguments about policy "from a position of strength" as a trump card in the preelection game.

This was essentially the main theme of his speeches during the trip. But it was expressed particularly clearly during the visit to the Francis E. Warren military base in Wyoming, where 50 MX ICBMs targeted on the Soviet Union are deployed, and at the launch ceremony for the nuclear aircraft carrier George Washington at Newport News (Virginia).

I do not know what impression those speeches made on the Republicans' rivals in the forthcoming elections. But to Soviet people they were redolent of the icy spirit of the past. "American might is still the ultimate force for peace," the President said. "We must pursue a policy of opposition," he went on. "We have a good track record at home and abroad and we are proud of it. And that is the consequence of our policy from a position of strength," G. Bush asserted.

Alarmed readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA bombarded the editorial office with a barrage of telephone calls: What do these statements mean? What is this—a recurrence of the past? A course for the future? Or perhaps just empty rhetoric?

These are not easy questions to answer. Rhetoric designed for purely domestic consumption was present in the speeches of the White House head. Well, why not flex your muscles, especially when you've really got some? This kind of game fits perfectly into the norms of U.S. political life. And after all, that is why he is President, to envisage the effect that his foreign policy speeches will have. Especially since at the NATO Council session in London recently, Bush took it upon himself to initiate a revision of some of the North Atlantic alliance's outmoded political and military concepts in favor of greater realism. It was he who said that NATO is no longer a threat to the Soviet Union and that it would be wrong to view the end of the cold war in terms of winners and losers. "There are no losers. Everyone's a winner," he said.

Does that conflict with his words in Wyoming or Virginia two weeks later? Undoubtedly. And this is absolutely no accident. The innovation that occurred in London is finding it difficult to gain acceptance. By its very essence, U.S. military policy still has a hegemonist thrust and has the aim not only of retaining but of increasing the influence of U.S. military might in the world arena. Its inherent contradiction is shown not only in the speeches of particular people but also in practical decisions.

In fact, in January the administration presented to Congress the draft federal budget for fiscal 1991, which allocates almost $307 billion on military aims. After lengthy debates, the Senate Armed Services Committee shaved $18 billion off that amount.

Well, that decision was influenced by an understanding of the present-day situation. However, at a recent meeting with congressional leaders, President Bush insisted on the need to keep the Pentagon's appropriations at the level that the administration requested. He spoke in favor of continuing the modernization of the U.S. strategic forces, asserting: "We must remember that the Soviet strategic forces have changed little. On the contrary, they are continuing to be modernized. To sum up, if we want to preserve the ability to defend our interests we must have an effective military potential."

After the meeting with congressional leaders there was a briefing at the White House where M. Fitzwater, the President's press spokesman, was asked how Bush's statements are to be interpreted and whether the United States considers that the USSR is still the enemy. The answer was concise and very expressive: "Yes, it is."

How can one not draw attention once more here to the contradiction in Washington's course? It should be remembered that the Defense Department itself recently published a five-year plan to reduce the Armed Forces by 25 percent. It is planned to reduce the number of regular and reserve Army and Marine divisions from 32 to 22, to reduce four strategic bomber squadrons at the expense of the outmoded B-52, to cut 11 of the 36 tactical air wings, to leave 455 of the 549 naval ships in formation, and to cut the number of personnel on active service by 442,000 men.

All this may make it possible to reduce U.S. military spending by 10 percent by 1997. But as THE NEW YORK TIMES remarked, "the plan still allows a considerable increase in spending on the ABM defense program, on acquiring new strategic nuclear arms systems, and on buying new conventional weapons, and considerable spending on scientific research and experimental design work."

Here, too, one can see the contradiction of U.S. military policy. On the one hand the President lavished praise on Defense Secretary Cheney and his armed forces reduction plan, then on the other takes part personally in the ceremonial launching of the latest aircraft carrier where he recalled George Washington's own words: "Be prepared for war—it is one of the most effective means of preserving peace," or, as THE WASHINGTON POST writes, he visits an MX missile base to underline the need for a "strong America" having switched the emphasis from attempts to convince the Soviet Union that the United States and its allies do not represent a military threat.

The U.S. Energy Department's "Complex-21" master plan for the future development of nuclear weapons production which recently came to the public's notice is also part of this. This plan envisages stepping up the activity of a network of enterprises and reactors in order to "maintain the strategic deterrence means" right through to the mid-21st century.

Therefore, many of the contradictions apparent in U.S. military policy are less real, even though they cannot be completely denied, than imaginary. In essence, this policy is designed to make the United States the number one power in the world and the only superpower. But the means of attaining that aim, like the views of them, can vary.

That is the dialectic. The policy of the balance of forces, on which relations between states have been built until now, is becoming a thing of the past, albeit reluctantly. It does not want to yield to the policy of a balance of correctly perceived interests. And that is sure to cause alarm. That is why, I think, the conclusion from the 28th CPSU Congress resolution "On the Basic Guidelines of the Party's Military Policy at the present stage" is so relevant now. This document clearly states that "the fulfillment of constitutional obligations in protecting the socialist fatherland and strengthening and maintaining the country's defense capability and security at the level of proper and reasonable sufficiency was and remains one of the most important tasks facing the whole people, the party, and the state."

Yakovlev Receives Canadian Ambassador Turner

LD3107192690 Moscow TASS in English 1824 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—Member of the Soviet Presidential Council Aleksandr Yakovlev today received Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Turner at the latter's request.

They discussed Soviet-Canadian cooperation in the light of the changes under way in the Soviet Union and in the world.

Northeast Asia

Japan Launches First Antisubmarine Vessel

LD2707114290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] The Japanese Navy has been reinforced by a modern electronic antisubmarine reconnaissance vessel. A grand launching ceremony was held tody at the Tamano shipyards. This is the first vessel of that type in the Japanese Navy. It will soon be sailing to the coast of the United States, where it will be fitted out with U.S. electronic equipment.

NEW TIMES Reports on Japan, Kuril Islands

PM3107135090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 30, 24-30 Jul 90 pp 30-31

[Feature under the rubric "Polemics" comprising letter from V.M. Vinogradov and rejoinder from NEW TIMES editors: "About Complacent Ministers And Frivolous Journalists"]

[Text] **A Letter to the Editor-in-Chief**

NEW TIMES recently carried Leonid Mlechin's article, "Four Islands and the Sovereignty of Russia." In the spirit

of the latest fashion, the author, with a light-mindedness not characteristic of your sedate magazine, comments on a serious issue in Soviet-Japanese relations: sovereignty over the Kuril Islands. In the Soviet Union, he asserts, "Japan was regarded as diplomatic wasteland."

I wonder who treated Japan in this way and what kind of diplomacy is implied. The author does not seem to know about the numerous Soviet-Japanese high-level contacts and agreements which settled almost all vital issues of bilateral relations. The two countries re-established a state of peace between them and restored diplomatic relations. The volume of trade increased substantially. Issues of fishing are regulated. Air service was opened and later expanded. There is broad cultural cooperation, with contacts maintained between the public organizations of the two countries. Cooperation is being organized between local government bodies. Stable parliamentary contacts have been established, too, and cooperation between sister cities is developing. Many other steps are being taken in this direction. All this goes to show the extent of ties between the Soviet Union and Japan.

Only a man who does not know the real state of affairs could write so flippantly: "Soviet diplomacy had four decades during which to make a good partner out of a former enemy. Our Foreign Ministry failed to accomplish that." I wonder what contribution NEW TIMES has made to this cause?

The author does not seem to know history either. "Over the subsequent four-odd decades," he complains, "historians have not been able to arrive at a consensus on whether it was the bomb or the Soviet army that had compelled Tokyo to surrender." In vain does Leonid Mlechin complain about this. He should have read more about the last war, and then he would learn where the crack units of Kwantung Army and the peaceful civilians of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were at the time of Japan's surrender.

Without the slightest doubt, the author directly links the victory of the people's revolutions in China and North Korea with the acquisition of the Soviet Union's jurisdiction over the Kuril Islands. It was indeed breathtaking to read the following passage: "Stalin requested Truman's consent to a Soviet troop landing on Hokkaido. Truman said no." A stunning discovery!

The author should have read the San Francisco Peace Treaty more carefully. It must be admitted that he wrote his article with the aim of proving the need to transfer the Kuril Islands to Japan. But he "overlooked" an important article of the treaty, which deprives Tokyo of **all rights to Kuril islands. It will be recalled that the treaty was signed by Japan.** This fact alone shows that the demands of Japan (and the author) on the Soviet Union are groundless. I am not going to cite here historical, political, geographic, ethnographic and many other facts.

I cannot but note another unjust charge. Mlechin claims that the Soviet Union unilaterally violated the "intergovernment agreement" with Japan. There simply was no such fact. The author reproaches Moscow for its refusal to fulfil the declaration of 1956. The point is, however, that the declaration was fulfilled by the Soviet Union, and it is prepared to hold talks, whereas Tokyo sets its **terms** for the conclusion of a peace treaty.

In short, the author seems to have drawn his arguments from sources unfriendly to the Soviet Union. This is strange, but it is a fact. Mlechin's recipe for the settlement of the "territorial question" is not very convincing. He proposes that the four islands—which, incidentally, have never been valuable for Japan from the economic point of view—be made "a zone of joint economic activity, with both sides enjoying equal rights." Any activity has its economic substantiation, but the author does not seem to know that.

The impasse over the four Kuril Islands has been created by Japan artificially. Were it not for the question of the islands, some other pretext would have been invented to justify Tokyo's military alliance with the United States. A section of the Japanese ruling circles needed the "image of an enemy" in the north.

A way out of the impasse lies in a broad expansion of mutually advantageous ties with our country, in the promotion of friendship and extensive economic, scientific and cultural and other relations with the Soviet Union. The "islands issue" will then become unimportant in finding a mutually acceptable settlement.

It is a promising and mutually beneficial way advantageous to both sides. A different way leads to an impasse. Mlechin's article does not help to overcome the deadlock. One should know well the subject one is writing about.

V.M. Vinogradov [Vinogradov letter ends]

From the Editors

It is surprising that such a painful issue as the territorial dispute between the Soviet Union and Japan evokes deep interest among our readers. After the magazine published Mlechin's article, it received letters either approving his stand, or disagreeing with it, or containing other proposals. Of all the comments, to be examined by us later, we picked out one signed by V.M. Vinogradov, because it had been written on an official form and sent to the editorial office with a cover letter, and also because its language and reasoning clearly reflect the way of thinking of those readers who are convinced that the Soviet policy in the Far East has always been infallible and there is no need to revise it.

The list of various forms of Soviet-Japanese cooperation mentioned by our knowledgeable reader in his letter would be convincing were it not for one "trifle": the sluggish trade, the "peace ships" that visited ports of the two countries in the past, and even the brilliant success of the Soviet circus and ballet in Japan have not changed the main thing - 45 years after the war the Soviet Union

and Japan have no peace treaty and therefore normal relations between them do not exist. What does this mean in practice?

Anti-Soviet sentiments are entertained not only by a small group of politicians. They have struck deep roots even among the people. Tokyo blocks the expansion of bilateral trade and economic cooperation and the Soviet Union's integration in the incipient Pacific economic community. At the latest summit of major Western powers, only Japan categorically opposed any aid to the USSR.

Military tension has lessened all along the Soviet border except the Far East. Our generals could say better how much the Soviet Union's confrontation with Japan costs, what is the price of keeping a large army and fleet in Primorski Territory.

Why did it happen? Was it explained by the hostile attitude of the former Soviet foreign minister towards Japan, the arrogant confidence that the once routed Japan did not play a significant role in the present-day world, or the reluctance to deal with a "difficult case?" Instead of bold and clever diplomacy, a whole set of banalities was adopted for service: "there are no unsolved problems, the territorial question does not exist, we must live as friends and cooperate, and everything will turn out all right in the end."

There was, however, no policy behind these banalities, first of all because without a settlement of disputed issues, Tokyo refused to cooperate on a wide scale, and even more so, to be friends. The result of substituting banalities for a real policy is known: there has been no improvement in relations over the past decades.

What is proposed in this situation by our principled reader, V. Vinogradov? "Expand... promote... extend..." The Soviet Union has practically nothing to sell to Japan. It could buy many goods. But for political reasons, Tokyo does not extend credits and does not guarantee credits that could be given by commercial banks. What, then, remains of the pompous language of our reader? The readiness to leave everything as it is, to incur losses and compel the Soviet taxpayers to compensate for the past mistakes of diplomacy?

NEW TIMES is not ready for such generosity at the expense of others. Our curious reader asked what contribution our magazine has made to Soviet-Japanese relations. The press does not direct diplomacy. It has another role to play—to tell readers the truth. Our magazine was one of the first to fill in the "blanks" in the history of Soviet-Japanese relations, including the question of "northern territories." This enables people to judge curorent events independently and not to take someone's statements for granted.

Our reader concluded that the author "proves the need to hand the Kuril Islands over to Japan." In fact, the article says that the transfer is impossible because neither the parliament nor public opinion will approve such a move. The author had something different in mind, namely, a reasonable compromise that does not impair the dignity of any party. Vinogradov does not like the idea of a jointly used free economic zone. There are already other proposals. For instance, the newspaper PRAVDA suggests placing the four islands under UN trusteeship.

Our reader tries to show that NEW TIMES is mistaken. Anyone can take the text of the Soviet-Japanese declaration of 1956, find a point about Moscow's promise to hand two islands (Habomai and Shikotan) over to Japan, and see who does not fulfill his commitments. More, the matter is not so simple with the San Francisco peace conference. Japan did renounce its claims to the Kuril Islands. However, it asserts that the "northern territories" (four islands) are not geographically included in the Kuril Islands chain. One can endlessly argue with Tokyo now. It would have been better, however, to demarcate the frontiers clearly in 1951. There would be no cause for argument today.

Vinogradov advised the author to read more. This advice could be accepted with gratitude only if our enlightened reader did the same. He would agree then that historians did not reach a unanimous conclusion on whether the atom bomb or the Soviet Union's entry in the war compelled Tokyo to surrender. No wonder that Soviet military historians wrote more than a few books to expose bourgeois falsifications on this subject.

Vinogradov would not be surprised, then, on reading in NEW TIMES that Stalin wanted to land troops on Hokkaido in 1945. This question is discussed on pp. 263-265 of the second volume of correspondence between Stalin and Roosevelt, Churchill and Truman (the 1957 edition). If there is no edition in the library of the Russian Federation's Foreign Ministry, where Vinogradov worked as a minister until recently, he can find it in the NEW TIMES library.

The parliament of the Russian Federation is now approving candidates for the future government of the republic. The foreign minister of Russia is to become a real figure in the new conditions. We would like to see in this post not a complacent advocate of former calls for "an all-round improvement and expansion," but a politician of a new formation, like those who help Eduard Shevardnadze advance successfully in the priority directions of Soviet foreign policy in which our relations with Japan have not, unfortunately, been included so far.

Comparison of Ministry Statement on Korea

PM3107123190

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian on 30 July 1990 in its Morning Edition on page 3 carries an unattributed TASS report on the Foreign Ministry's statement on North and South Korea entitled "USSR Foreign Ministry Spokesman's Statement." The IZVESTIYA item has been compared with the Moscow TASS English version published under the headline "Foreign Ministry Responds" in the 30 July Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 11, revealing the following variations:

Page 11, column one, paragraph seven, only sentence of IZVESTIYA item begins: [Text] The Soviet Union... (deleting dateline)

Same paragraph, only sentence reads: ...the Korean peninsula. Hopeful news has.... (deleting phrase)

Same column, final paragraph, only sentence reads: ...and foremost, by the DPRK.

It has been.... (substituting "the DPRK" for "democratic Korea")

Column two, paragraph one, only sentence reads: ...into a nuclear-free peace zone.

The proposals.... (adding the word "peace")

Same column, paragraph two, only sentence reads: ...detente in Korea.

Pyongyang has come up.... (substituting "Pyongyang" for "Democratic Korea")

Paragraph three, only sentence reads: ...the demarcation line.

It should be pointed out that these proposals by Pyongyang draw a positive.... (adding passage, substituting "Pyongyang" for "the DPRK")

Paragraph four, last sentence reads: ...reciprocated by launching a number of its own ideas.

Our country welcomes the latest.... (adding "a number of," substituting "Our country" for "The USSR")

Last paragraph of item, sentence one reads: ...to this process in every possible way. (adding "in every possible way," omitting final sentence)

Near East & South Asia

Afghan Leader To Present Settlement Plan

LD3107154490 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] President Najibullah of Afghanistan is in the Soviet Union to present his plan for an Afghan settlement, on the eve of the Irkutsk meeting of Shevardnadze and Baker. Newsmen were told that in Kabul on Tuesday by the acting president, 'Abdul Rahim Hatif, who also expressed the hope that the meeting would be of decisive importance to ending the 12-year civil war and achieving a final settlement in Afghanistan.

U.S., USSR Appealed To End to Afghan War

LD3107193190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1830 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] The constituent meeting of a new public organization, the jirgah of the Nomadic Tribes of Afghanistan, has taken place in Kabul. It represents the 1.5 million-strong nomadic population of more than 60 tribes living in 11 provinces.

Those attending the forum issued an appeal to USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State Baker on the eve of their meeting in Irkutsk.

Twelve years of war, the document emphasizes, have inflicted irreparable losses on the whole population of Afghanistan. The appeal contains a call to use the international authority of the USSR and the United States to put an end to the fratricidal war on Afghan soil and to promote the return of the Afghan refugees to their own homes.

Shevardnadze, Baker Eye Afghanistan Withdrawal

OW0108061290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Commentary by M. Osokin from the "120 Minutes" program]

[Text] Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, will arrive in Irkutsk today. James Baker, the U.S. secretary of state, should arrive here late this evening for talks. In connection with their latest meeting, the international press is publishing a great many forecasts and conjectures, and many of the articles mention Afghanistan. [video shows M. Osokin in the studio, interspersed with shots of a montage showing scenes of fighting in Afghanistan] Here is what our commentator has to say on the subject:

[Osokin] It is possible that the most important step since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan at the beginning of last year will be taken at the meeting. This has been forecast by the U.S. ABC Television Company, which notes that Moscow and Washington have already arrived at an agreement, an agreement they may reveal in Irkutsk. According to this plan, they will announce an end to the delivery of arms supplies to the opposing groups in Afghanistan. These groups are continuing to fight and new film shot in Afghanistan continues to repeat the same old scenes.

The civil war there has been going on for 11 years. The Soviet Union supports the government of President Najibullah while the United States helps the mujahidin, who are trying to overthrow this government. And now, according to reports from New York, the United States and the Soviet Union have decided at least to end their participation in this war. These reports cite details of other points on which agreement has reportedly been reached. Moscow and Washington will call for a cease-fire and the staging of elections under UN supervision within a period of six months. The United States will drop its demand that Najibullah resign before the elections. However, he will be asked to surrender partial control over the Army and police to a committee which will include representatives of the mujahidin.

But there is a problem here. I want to draw your attention to the latest film. Let us take another look. [video shows a film taken by a night vision device of a column of military vehicles and Afghan Government troops moving along a road at night] These are not ordinary shots. The mujahidin filmed the government positions at night with the help of special equipment. It is another reminder of the kind of modern equipment that the mujahidin have received, including special equipment and means of communications and weapons such as rocket launchers.

Now let us take a look at what Kabul is getting. [video shows an armored vehicle and various weapons] Among this equipment also are missiles, tanks, and aircraft. So, in general, both the government and the opposition have accumulated enormous arsenals. Even if Moscow and Washington stop their deliveries, the warring sides in Afghanistan can continue massive operations for a long time to come if they so desire.

It is true, however, that at a news conference President Najibullah has already said that he agrees to the idea of elections and the transfer of some of the functions of the Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs to an electoral commission. But according to REUTER, it would require considerable effort on the part of the United States to bring its mujahidin allies to agreement. There are parties who have been fighting for a long time not only against the government but against one another as well.

Efforts To Release POW's in Afghanistan Continue

PM0108095590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by TASS correspondent Yu. Tyssovskiy specially for IZVESTIYA: "Following Afghan Captivity"]

[Text] Kabul—At a recent news conference President Najibullah of the Republic of Afghanistan stated in reply to my question that thanks to the efforts of the Afghan State Security organs, making use of all the available opportunities, a total of eight Soviet citizens, former servicemen of the 40th Army, have been released by detachments of the armed opposition where they had been held captive. Four of them have been released this year alone. I met them all and talked to them for a long time....

No one's road to freedom had been strewn with roses. One, choosing his moment, fled from the mujahidin detachment by night and, traveling along mountain paths, reached an area controlled by government forces. Another fought his way out of the camp of the fighters of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan with a machine gun, which, admittedly, had only one cartridge left, and under cover of darkness, through guile and resourcefulness, made his way past guard posts to the road where the power of the rebels ended. A third was taken to such a road by the detachment's commander himself, who said to him on parting: "God is your judge, I will pray for you...." There was a simple explanation for his noble deed, though: He received no less than half a pood [8 kg] of banknotes worth 1,000 Afghani each for freeing the Soviet POW. The fourth did not force events, he waited for his chance in the knowledge that work was underway in secret to secure his return home. And his time came.

The stories of the four men have much in common. They all arrived in Afghanistan after being drafted into the Army, they were what is known in the Army parlance as "greenhorns"— inexperienced servicemen who had not yet found their feet. Characteristically, they were generally treated well while in captivity.

Today Aleksey Tikhonov, Nurmomad Khadimuradov, Ilyas Saatov, and Archil Kopadze are already back at home, trying to settle down and adapt to the new situation in which they find themselves after long years of captivity. We wish them luck, the Afghan saga has ended for them and their families. But this is by no means true of many others....

According to our Afghan friends' information, there are still between 60 and 70 Soviet people in Afghanistan. It has been established that there are some in Pakistan too, but as to specifically who and where, remains a secret. Let's be frank, not all of them can claim POW status. Many, and this includes not just Uzbeks and Tajiks but also Russians, Ukrainians, and Moldavians, have adapted to life in Afghan society after five to six years abroad, taken up business, or are working in their profession in areas controlled by the mujahidin. Some have converted to Islam and acquired families. I believe that these people have burned their bridges and will never return home now. Especially since detachment commanders have forced some of them to "sully their reputation" by making them take part in combat operations against Soviet troops, and some of them even did it deliberately. No wonder that the fighters of the opposition refer to them half-respectfully and half-contemptuously as "Soviet mujahidin." I could name many of them. Their surnames appear from time to time in the Western press, some of them we know from operational bulletins. But why should I?

We must all be made clearly aware of one thing: The situation in Afghanistan is changeable, and those who would not dream about returning today, may take a diametrically opposite decision tomorrow. If we disclose prematurely what we know about specific people, this might put them in danger. After all, the way of thinking of the rebel leaders is inscrutable, as are their aims in respect of the Soviet people in their control, although there is no doubt about the fact that in Peshawar these people are regarded as political hostages. I do not want to enter into polemics with certain Soviet press organs, but it remains a fact that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan the leaders of the opposition based in Peshawar, and specifically Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the head of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan who can be accused of everything except charity, have released only two Soviet POWs—Andrey Lopukh and Valeriy Prokopchuk. And that, clearly, for political motives. All the others found their way to freedom thanks to Kabul's efforts.

I have had many conversations with representatives of the Republic of Afghanistan State Security organs "tied up," as it were, with the noble work to return Soviet prisoners to their families. Substantial forces are involved in this work—apart from the special organs themselves, representatives of local authorities, the public, and tribal authorities and elders.

At the aforementioned news conference the Afghan head of state left us in no doubt that these efforts will be continued.

India's Singh Interviewed on Ties, Security

LD3107134690 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 30, 24-30 Jul 90 pp 23-24

[Unattributed interview with Indian Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh: "Vishwanath Pratap Singh: I Am a Firm Believer in Consensus-Based Politics"—place and date not given]

[Text] [NEW TIMES] India and the USSR have been following the principles of the Delhi Declaration. What, in your view, is bringing us closer to, and what is moving us further away from, achievement of the goals proclaimed in the Delhi Declaration?

[Vishwanath Pratap Singh] The Delhi Declaration incorporates principles that have universal validity. The goal that our two countries set for humanity to establish a nuclear weapon-free and non-violent world remains the vast important goal worth striving for in our times.

Since the Delhi Declaration was presented to the world in 1986, humanity has moved some important steps closer to that goal. There has been encouraging progress towards nuclear disarmament. But we are concerned that the momentum should not be allowed to slow down or reach a plateau. The world is now awash in arms that suddenly the superpowers do not want. A significant part is flooding the black market and being bought by fundamentalist and guerrilla groups of all kinds. The first targets of these groups are innocent civilians.

We fear that a new type of warfare may be around the corner in which civilians, far from being exempted, will be the deliberate first targets of the insurrectionists. We have no legal code and no international law to deal with such warfare. Yet more and more countries are being affected.

There has also been disappointingly little progress towards the establishment of a more just economic order. There is a disturbing insensitivity to issues affecting the vital needs of developing countries, who constitute the majority of humankind. For a safer and more stable world, these problems have to be addressed without further delay. The World Bank president pointed out a few days ago that a ten percent reduction in arms spending by the industrialized countries will make it possible to double aid to the developing countries. But although defence cuts have already begun, very few leaders in the industrial world are talking about unveiling more funds to the developing nations. I hope this is only a temporary oversight.

[NEW TIMES] It's evident that as a result of ending the cold war, due to the superpower detente, and normalization of relations between the USSR and China, political situation in the world has changed drastically. It's also quite clear, that the role of the Indo- Soviet relations which has always been a major factor in geopolitics can't remain invariable. How can you describe this role in the present international situation?

[Singh] India welcomes the changes on the global scene, including the improvement of the Soviet Union's relations with USA, other Western countries and China.

Indo-Soviet cooperation has been a stabilizing factor in our region and the world. It has developed steadily, unaffected by the ups and downs in the international situation over the decades. In fact, as the Soviet Union's relations with other countries have improved, Indo-Soviet relation too have acquired a new momentum. Like the Soviet Union, India's relations with almost all our neighbours in South Asia, China, Japan, USA and countries in Europe have improved.

I see great possibilities for the further development of close cooperation and interaction in the international arena, in the future too. Our two countries have a common approach on the key issues before mankind. Reduced tensions and growing trust and cooperation have created favourable conditions for tackling the real problems before humanity outlined in the Delhi Declaration, namely, economic development, environmental degradation, illiteracy and population growth.

[NEW TIMES] How, from your point of view, is perestroyka in the Soviet Union influencing the dynamics and prospects of the relations between our two countries?

[Singh] We welcome perestroyka. We fully support and applaud your leaders' and peoples' efforts to create a more dynamic and progressive Soviet society. Relations between countries, as between human beings, do not remain static. With the passage of time, friendship evolves and matures. There is sufficient vigour in Indo-Soviet relations to keep pace with and profit from change. In my view, the success of perestroyka would lead to even better opportunities for Indo-Soviet trade and economic cooperation, as well as a much more enhanced level of people-to-people contacts. Politically, too, Indo-Soviet relations are in harmony with the new atmosphere in the world.

[NEW TIMES] It may be presumed that with the military rivalry between the two superpowers in the Indian Ocean coming to an end, the problems of peace and stability there will increasingly become a matter of the states that border on the ocean. What is the role of India in South Asia in this new context?

[Singh] Much as we would like to see this happen, there is no evidence so far that the problems of peace and

security in the Indian Ocean are indeed becoming more and more a matter of the littoral and hinterland states only. India supports the implementation of the 1971 UN Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, which calls for the elimination of greatpower military presence from the Indian Ocean.

As a country strategically located in the Indian Ocean, with a long coastline to defend, India cannot but view with concern the continued presence and activities of foreign naval powers in its vicinity. India visualizes a role for itself in the Indian Ocean region in the context of its legitimate interests as a littoral state to have a peaceful environment for development in cooperation with the countries of the region.

[NEW TIMES] During the last USSR-U.S. summit, President Gorbachev confirmed once again his adherence to the Asian-Pacific policy expounded in his speeches in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk. What, in your opinion, is a real practical contribution of India and the USSR in the promotion of an effective cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region?

[Singh] The problems of security in Asia are complex, rooted as they are in centuries of poverty, ethnic conflict, economic imbalances and the legacy of colonialism. Parts of the region are also areas of high growth, tremendous potential and dynamic and expanding economies. Hence great patience and persistence is needed to tackle the problem of how to bring durable security to Asia. Only a groundwork of political trust and a framework of economic interdependence can underpin security among Asian states. India is trying to build such cooperation in South Asia, bilaterally, through the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] and in a pan-Asian framework. We have settled all our differences with Nepal on terms that are very favourable to our land-locked neighbour. Where there once was suspicion and distrust, genuine friendship has emerged. We were able to do this by not insisting on the principle of reciprocity in our relations, and giving far more economic concessions to Nepal than it can afford to offer us. I want our relations to be a wonderful relations not only within SAARC, but also with other neighbours like Burma and Afghanistan.

We hope that such regional initiatives throughout Asia would increase our interactions with one another. This could form the basis of an enduring mechanism for security and cooperation, in the region as a whole.

India and the USSR could think of expanding and extending their existing cooperation for the development of the Soviet Far East.

[NEW TIMES] Solving the vital problems of the contemporary world on the principle of consensus has become an order of our time and is entering more and more practical politics. It's generally recognized that as the Prime Minister of India, you are capable of bringing the representatives of polar political convictions into the ranks of your supporters. What, from your point of view, can ensure the success of such a policy?

[Singh] I am a firm believer in consensus-based politics. While the will of the majority has to prevail in any democratic policy, the majority for its part must take into account the basic interests of the other groups. If the fundamental objectives of different political forces are not contradictory, then a common approach can be evolved. This would inevitably involve following a policy of cosensus. A confrontationist or exclusive approach would only create tensions, bitterness, land divisions, thereby making the solution of the real problems before a country more difficult.

In India, my experience has been that if personal ambition can be set aside, there is a remarkable similarity in the policies and programmes of all parties across the political spectrum. An overriding commitment to the promotion of the well-being of the people and the interests of the nation helps to sink various differences in approach and perception. In the long run, wisdom lies in having a spirit of give-and-take and a sincerity of purpose. My government, and its consensus-based approach to policymaking reflects the mandate of the people. After all, they did not give a clear majority to any one party.

[NEW TIMES] On behalf of our readership, I would like to thank you for granting us this interview.

Israeli Cabinet Secretary Holds Talks in Moscow

LD3107190590 Moscow TASS in English 1456 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told a briefing here today that Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov met in Moscow on Monday to his request Israeli Cabinet Secretary Elyakhim Rubinstein, who was in the Soviet Union on a private visit.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the two officials had exchanged views on the Middle East situation and bilateral relations between the two countries.

The Soviet official expressed his country's serious concern over the lack of shifts in arranging the peace process and the exacerbation of the situation in that region of the world.

The attention of the Israeli official was specifically drawn to the inadmissibility of changes in the demographic situation on Israeli occupied Arab territories, including by settling people leaving the Soviet Union there.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Liberian Rebel Leader Makes Radio Address

PM3107151190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by A. Nikanorov: "Liberia: Transfer of Power"]

[Text] Something that many international commentators had been predicting for several weeks has happened: There has been a transfer of power in Liberia.

The government has been overthrown. Just a couple of ministers are left in Monrovia, the rest having fled long ago, including the government's official delegation to the unsuccessful talks in Sierra Leone, where until recently attempts were being made in the U.S. Embassy building to extinguish the conflict. The reins of government have been taken up by the opposition NPF [National Patriotic Front] headed by C. Taylor—a man who, according to REUTER, has undergone military training in Libya. His advisers say that he prefers free enterprise and is opposed to socialism.

In an address to the nation broadcast by the rebel radio, Elwa C. Taylor urged all Liberians and foreign citizens to keep calm. The NPF has acceded to power, "since the government of S. Doe has proved incapable of giving the people an opportunity to elect their representatives freely and fairly and has constantly shown total disregard for the well-being of Liberia and its people. We urge all members of the Armed Forces to lay down their arms and join the NPF Army in order to create a new structured economic order in the country." C. Taylor declared that all banks and also the air and sea gateways to the country have been closed pending special instructions from the government.

At the same time another cable from the British news agency said that the NPF headed by Taylor has not promulgated a single political document since the partisans took up arms and mounted the struggle against the Doe government last December. Taylor himself avoids speeches devoted to any specific political pledges. The rebel front has no political organization outside its own military command structure. It is aided by a small and badly equipped secretariat, which is mainly made up of former students of secondary educational institutions. The foreign owners of Liberia's iron ore mines, rubber plantations, and wood processing concessions are voicing concern that Taylor will encounter serious difficulties in the sphere of management as soon as the combat operations end.

At the height of the uprising Taylor declared: What we want, above all, is the president's head. But the president, who acceded to power as the result of a military coup 10 years ago, in no way wished to part with the leading post which he had seized. A member of the Krahn ethnic group, he has surrounded himself with his own fellow-tribesmen and brutally crushed all attempts by the Gio and Mano ethnic groups to defend their own interests. There is no doubt that the Liberian crisis has been nurtured exclusively by intertribal enmity. The U.S. Marines who have recently been sailing up and down the Liberian coast have not fired a single shot despite the fact that this West African country has long been considered Washington's traditional partner by virtue of historical circumstances. True, the Monrovia government, drowning in a storm of passions, accused Colonel David Staley, head of the U.S. military mission, of having "links with the rebels" (which the U.S. Department of State denied), compelling him to leave the country. Nevertheless, not one news organ cites any evidence of "external interference." A purely internal matter. And the question arises: What now? Will a dictatorship of the Gio and the Mano take the place of the despotism of the Krahn? In this connection I recall the words of Pope John Paul II, head of the Roman Catholic Church: "We urge the Lord to enlighten the minds of those who hold the country's destiny in their hands."

But, for the time being, as a high-ranking official of the Liberian Mining Company—the corporation which hitherto has managed the iron ore mines and belongs to the Americans—gloomily put it: "Everything to which legs could be attached is no longer here." According to reports from the neighboring Ivory Coast, the country is being filled with refugees from Liberia, primarily of the Krahn ethnic group, to which former President S. Doe belongs. The chairman of the national committee for coordinating aid for refugees reported in Abidjan that up to 1,000 people are crossing the Ivorian border every day. There are now already almost 110,000 Liberian refugees in the country.

In Geneva a spokesman for the UN high commissioner for refugees pointed out that 375,000 Liberians have collected in African countries, fleeing from violence and tribal enmity. Nothing is known yet about the fate of S. Doe.

Somali Envoy Assesses Killing, Other Incidents

EA3107122890 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Excerpts] The world media have presented news on the killing incident that happened at Mogadishu stadium on 6 July in various different ways. In the same way, Somali nationals living abroad have had differing feelings on this. The incident resulted in a student demonstration in front of the Somali Embassy in Moscow. We asked Mr. Abdullahi Egal Nur, the Somali ambassador to the Soviet Union, to kindly address us on the killing incident at Mogadishu stadium, and the general security situation in Somalia.

Speaking on the incident, the ambassador said that those people who were at the embassy were not Somali student? but rather foreign students. Only seven were Somalis, so that cannot be called a demonstration by Somali students, he added. The Somali National Movement was behind the student demonstration held as a result of the Mogadishu incident.

It is the custom for provincial football matches to be held every year. It is the prime minister or the president who

opens the match. This time it was the president who opened the match. After the president finished his opening speech, there was a heated argument between soccer fans. The security men fired shots to scare off the fans. This created confusion among the spectators. In the ensuing confusion, confrontation broke out between the spectators and the security officers. The security men opened fire on the troublespots. Many people were killed and others injured. Seven people were killed and 18 others were injured.

The incident was caused by unruly people at the stadium. Many incidents of great magnitude have occurred in many parts of the world. This was simply a similar case. The world media benefited most from the incident. It is unfortunate that some media tend to create confusion in commenting on our problems. They benefit from this sort of action. They are closely associated with troublemakers who are bent on destabilization by sowing seeds of tribalism.

Concerning the security of the country, the situation is normal. There are certainly financial and political problems in Somalia, which have affected the masses. [passage omitted]

On a question asked by our reporter on the Soviet Union's role in bringing about an end to Somalia's problems, the ambassador answered: The Soviet Union is a major power with which we have cordial relations. In many aspects, its support for a just solution is beneficial. The Soviet Union played an important role in the agreement reached by Ethiopia and Somalia. We were sure that without the Soviet Union's efforts there would not have been this agreement, considering the relations between the two countries then. Ethiopia and Somalia, too, played an important role in that peace. [passage omitted]

The Soviet Union could urge the opposition to come to roundtable peace talks with the Somali Government without any preconditions. The Soviet Union could do much on this matter. [passage omitted]

Somali 'Rebels' Still Hold Trawler, Crew

LD3107135290 Moscow TASS in English 1333 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent David Gefter]

[Text] Riga July 31 TASS—Armed rebels of the Somalia National Movement continue to hold the Soviet fishing trawler "Kaff", a TASS correspondent was told at the Association of Fisheries in the western basin, which owns the vessel.

The trawler, with a 27-strong crew was fishing in the gulf of Aden under the licence issued by the Somalia Government when it was captured on July 18 by armed terrorists. Sixteen crew are still being held on shore.

The trawler Geranta with representatives of the Soviet Embassy is heading for the captured vessel. Geranta's captain Sergey Zarubin said by radio today: "The rebels have returned four fishermen from the shore to the vessel. The vessel is guarded by a group of armed terrorists. According to them, talks between representatives of the Soviet Embassy and opposition in Aden have been delayed. The Yemen radio announcement that the sides have agreed to set the trawlerfree was premature. Weather has worsened and there is a strong gale in the area of the trawler. Tensions are high aboard the trawler. According to the captain, the armed terrorists use the vessel and personal belongings of the crew as their own property."

Obstruction of UN Aid to Ethiopia Deplored

PM3107144590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 90 First Edition p 5

[PRAVDA: "Statement by USSR Foreign Ministry Spokesman"]

[Text] According to incoming reports, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which is active in northern Ethiopia, has refused to allow a world food program technical mission sent on a ship flying the UN flag to enter the port of Massawa, which the EPLF captured in February this year. The mission's objective was to survey the port's suitability for taking delivery of international humanitarian aid to famine victims in northern Ethiopia, primarily Eritrea.

These actions by the EPLF leadership, which originally tried itself to get this port used for the delivery of food to famine victims, testify that it is playing an unsavory political game putting hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of Eritrea at risk of death from starvation. Such a stance cannot fail to provoke indignation and condemnation.

We hope that nevertheless realism will gain the upper hand in the minds of the leaders of this organization and they will revise their decision, which threatens disastrous consequences for the people of Eritrea.

South Africa's Botha, Mandela Remark on Events

PM3107141790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Part five of "IZVESTIYA Reportage. Two Weeks in the Republic of South Africa" series by special correspondents I. Golembiovskiy and B. Pilyatskin: "Between the Past and the Future"]

[Excerpts] Cape Town-Johannesburg—Perhaps only FRG Foreign Minister Genscher has been in his post longer than the head of the RSA [Republic of South Africa] foreign policy department—Roelof Botha took office in April 1977 at the age of 45. [passage omitted]

We interviewed Roelof Botha for around two hours in his Cape Town office and will attempt to convey to readers a condensed version of our interlocutor's basic ideas. The foreign minister began by touching on the results of the long foreign tour made by the president, who visited nine

European and two African countries. This was a kind of breakout from the ring of international isolation in which the RSA found itself for many years.

"One of our objectives was to get the European governments to understand that the process begun in South Africa is irreversible. In this sense it is possible to draw a definite parallel with the Soviet Union. After all, at the beginning there were also doubts in the West about whether the Gorbachev reforms were really of a fundamental nature. I believe that we managed to convince our interlocutors of the seriousness of our intentions. There has been a change of attitude toward us in Europe. The fact that a South African head of state visited France for the first time since Field Marshal Jan Smuts visited in 1946 in itself testifies that my government is trusted. The same applies to Greece, and the visit to Spain was the first at such a level in the history of our countries' mutual relations.

"Yes, we pursued a policy of apartheid, there's no getting away from that. The whites were afraid that the Africans would overwhelm them by force of numbers. We are making an agonizing break with our misconceptions and learning the bitter truth, but we know for sure that there must be no going back to the past. This is why it is necessary to start discussing as soon as possible a draft new constitution in which there will be no place for racial discrimination. Following the repeal of the 'Public Areas Separate Use Act,' two fundamental pillars of apartheid remain: the 'Group Areas Act' and the 'Population Registration Act.' The first regulates questions of ownership and leasing depending on skin color, while the other relates to electoral rights and constitutional arrangements. But since it is part of the fabric of the current constitution it can only disappear after a new one is adopted. Otherwise there will be a power vacuum, chaos, and anarchy, and the country will collapse.

"We are passing through a complex transitional period," the minister concluded, "but we are in control of the situation. Only one thing can stop the reform process—if the government loses power to the right. This is why the president needs recognition both in our own country and in the eyes of the world community for what has already been done."

Another of our interlocutors was one of South Africa's best-known political figures, Nelson Mandela. We met at the private Park Lane clinic in one of the most prestigious districts of Johannesburg. He had undergone minor surgery and was under observation by doctors but did not cancel his promise to meet with IZVESTIYA correspondents. [passage omitted]

"A feature of the moment," Nelson Mandela told us, "is that the ANC [African National Congress] and the Nationalist Party are on the threshold of talks about the future state setup in the country. We face enormous difficulties. We appreciate President de Klerk's sincerity and believe him when he says he wants to build a new South Africa. But ANC strategy cannot be built on one man's honesty. Our objective is the final destruction of apartheid, and until the changes become irreversible, until the country gets a nonracial government, we will not abandon the armed struggle or the demand for economic sanctions against the RSA. The repressive policy continues, the police are shooting our people, as yet little has changed. Thirty years ago I did not have the right to vote in elections, and I still don't have it now...." [passage omitted]

General Moiseyev Welcomes Angolan Ministers

PM3107114790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jul 90 p 3

[Unattributed report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] A delegation of leading political workers of the People's Republic of Angola Armed Forces headed by Colonel J. Lourenco, Angolan deputy defense minister and chief of the FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] National Political Directorate, was in the Soviet Union from 19-26 July at the invitation of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

The delegation was received by Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister.

Conversations were held with Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. The conversations were conducted in a businesslike, friendly atmosphere. Colonel Lourenco addressed generals and other officers of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

The guests from Angola visited the V.I. Lenin Military-Political Academy and stayed in the Leningrad Military District, where they learned about the combat and political training of servicemen of one of the district's units and a higher military training institution.

The Angolan political workers laid wreaths at the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin Wall.

East Europe

Resumption of Ties With Albania Examined

Past, Future Relations Viewed

AU3107164890 Moscow International Service in Albanian 1500 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] In Albania, one says that distances are measured in time, not kilometers, the special correspondent of Soviet radio and television in Tirana, (?Dimitriy Golovanov), reports from Tirana. He continues:

[Begin correspondent's recording in Russian, with Albanian superimposed] We might say that the road, or more precisely the lack of a road, which continued almost 30

years in the relations between our countries is approaching its end, (?Dimitriy Golovanov) says. Almost three decades ago, diplomatic and all other ties between Moscow and Tirana were broken off. This happened at a time when our ideological divergences were extended to the political sphere and to interstate relations. More than 100 economic cooperation projects were simply put in mothballs. Our aircraft no longer appeared in Albanian skies, our ships no longer dropped anchor in Albania's ports, and the very name of the Soviet Union was even removed from telephone directories. Now, this report which I am sending from Tirana is perhaps the first to be carried by telephone in 30 years, (?Dimitriy Golovanov) says.

As signs recalling the past, concrete bunkers rise by the sea, on the sides of mountains, and in fields, whose hollow eyes peer in vain for a possible enemy. How they deface the delightful landscape of the land of the Albanians, the brave and proud Albanians who fought for centuries against Rome, Byzantium, the Ottoman hordes, and the onslaughts of Italo-German Fascism. Perhaps the fatal power of inertia and distrust in their own neighbors led to the construction of such expensive and senseless lines of defense.

However, what has happened has happened. Now, Albania is beginning to open slightly to the world. It seems to me that its economic backwardness will be difficult to overcome by relying on Albania's own resources. Large capital investment is necessary for the development of Albania's traditional industries such as mineral extraction and for new steps in such fields as tourism and others. Albania can obtain investment. An important day has been recorded in Albania's modern history. Late yesterday evening, the Soviet Union's representative, Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, and his Albanian colleague Sokrat Plaka put their signatures to the document on the normalization of bilateral relations and the resumption within a short time of the work of our two countries' embassies. They told me, (?Dimitriy Golovanov) concludes, that the doors of our embassy in Tirana will open before the end of this year.

'New Opportunities' Created

AU3107175290 Moscow International Service in Albanian 1500 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Commentary by German Mitkevich from "The World Today" program—read by announcer]

[Text] Now, dear listeners, you will hear the views of our commentator, German Mitkevich:

The reports of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Albania have been warmly received in the Soviet Union. Finally, the obstacles between our two states, created almost three decades ago by the then Soviet and Albanian leaders, have been removed. Both the Albanians and the Soviets, who had previously had relations of good friendship, paid dearly for this now well-known policy. After the reestablishment of Soviet- Albanian diplomatic relations, new opportunities for the development of friendly ties between our countries will be created on the basis of complete equality, respect for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, noninterference in each other's affairs, and mutual benefit.

The warm welcome accorded in May and July this year by Albanian officials and the population to Soviet journalists best shows the desire of the Albanian people to develop relations with the Soviet Union. One issue of primary importance to the question of creating a favorable situation in relations between our two countries would be correct information for the people about the changes which have taken place in Albania and the Soviet Union in recent years, because our peoples have not known anything about each other for almost three whole decades, or have received distorted information.

It can be realized with how much interest the Soviet people welcomed the articles of their journalists who visited Albania and the programs broadcast on central television.

A better awareness of life in our two countries would also be helped by mutual exchanges of writers and personalities in culture, science, and art, and exchanges of cinema films and television programs, without mentioning sports, a field in which there are major opportunities. It is enough to recall, for instance, the successes of the Moscow Spartak soccer players, who visited your country twice. It must be said that in recent years Albanian sports have also taken great steps forward in their development, and have reached world levels in particular games, something which will enable our two peoples to get to know each other better.

Steps forward can be also taken in developing economic and trading cooperation between our countries. Albania has many products which are of interest to the Soviet Union. For its part, our country could supply Albania with products it requires. In the future, joint enterprises could be created, a subject about which Albanian economists have also recently begun to talk. However, other forms of cooperation of interest to both sides will also be discussed.

The changes taking place in Albania which aim at renewing the country's life are being followed with interest in the Soviet Union. The decisions of the recent plenums of the Albanian Workers Party Central Committee and the May session of the country's People's Assembly show Albania's aim to actively join the general European process and to adapt the country's policy to the changes taking place in the world. A further sign of such a stance are the talks in Tirana and the signing of documents for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Polish Border Policy 'Surpassed Expectations'

LD3107212690 Warsaw PAP in English 2018 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By PAP correspondent Zdzislaw Raczynski]

[Text] Moscow, July 31—The results of talks in Moscow between a delegation of the Polish chief customs office and the Soviet customs authorities have surpassed our expectations, Chairman of the Chief customs Office Tomasz Bartoszewicz told PAP after negotiations with Soviet partners.

He signed here an inter-governmental agreement on opening three new border crossings in Grodno, Jagodin and Rawa Ruska in September. Two more crossings will open by the end of the year.

West Europe

Sweden Urged Not To Extradite Hijacker

PM3007091990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jul 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent M. Odinets: "Deputies Demand: Do Not Extradite the Hijacker!"]

[Text] Kiev—It seems that not only in the West but in our country too certain circles are using hijackings for their own politician ends. Ever since Anatoliy Mikhaylenko, flying from Lvov to Riga, forced the crew to land in Stockholm and was arrested as a reult, certain people have started concocting intrigues around him—and not just anyone, but a group of Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet people's deputies. They wrote a letter signed by 16 people, including V. Chernovil, Ye. Gryniv, and Ya. Kendzor, and sent it to Stockholm appealing to the Swedish authorities to institute rigorous legal proceedings against the hijacker, but to do so under Swedish law and on Swedish territory.

RABOCHAYA GAZETA asked the above deputies the reasons which prompted them to send this letter. This, in particular, is what they replied: "...We in no way condone Mikhaylenko's action, nor, incidentally, any other act of airborne terrorism. But we would like to recall that the crime was prompted by panic about serving in the Soviet Army...."

Compromise Seen in Conflict With Norway

PM3107112890 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Jul 90 p 16

[Report on interview with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy by Morten Fyhn; place and date of interview not given: "Soviet Demarche on Demarcation Line"]

[Text] "The new political climate in Europe makes it easier to find a solution in the Barents Sea," Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy told AFTENPOSTEN.

He confirmed Moscow's willingness to find a compromise in the 20-year conflict. Since the end of the 1970's Norway has demonstrated a willingness to compromise. Finally the Soviet Union is catching up.

In an explicit reference to the new political winds, Petrovskiy also admitted that in the past the Soviet Union saw the demarcation line more in the context of East-West relations than as a purely Norwegian-Soviet issue.

Petrovskiy was unwilling to go into detail. He leaves it to Norwegian and Soviet experts to propose a "mutually acceptable compromise" which can then be submitted for decision at a high political level. A meeting of experts will take place in September. Petrovskiy also expects a meeting to take place in New York at about the same time between Foreign Ministers Eduard Shevardnadze and Kjell Magne Bondevik in connection with the opening of the UN session.

"We have formed the impression that there is a political will in the Soviet Union to find a solution," Knut Vollebaek, under secretary of state at the Foreign Ministry, told AFTENPOSTEN.

The new Soviet foreign policy takes many forms. One of these is a sudden interest in the UN peace-keeping forces. Norway has long experience here, and the Soviet Union has now been invited to share it.

As a result, several Soviet military experts will be present when a new Norwegian group of UN soldiers destined for Lebanon attend a preparatory course in November.

Petrovskiy also responded positively to a Norwegian invitation for Soviet participation in a meeting in Oslo on human rights. Several other East European countries have been invited.

The Soviet deputy foreign minister is an enthusiastic advocate of significantly strengthening both in breadth and depth Norwegian-Soviet contacts. At all levels—from the political on down to the level of individual local authorities, companies, and schools—he sees close cooperation in the years to come.

"All doors must be opened," Petrovskiy said, adding an additional good word for student exchanges. "It is simply up to universities and high schools to make direct contact with each other," he said.

"We are neighbors, and now there are real possibilities for everyone who wants to take an initiative," the deputy foreign minister said, clearly addressing Norwegian industry and commerce.

But how can he say this, when Soviet enterprises already owe Norwegian customers over 100 million kroner?

Petrovskiy admitted the problem. In the past the government paid promptly. Now this is left to individual Soviet enterprises.

He would like to cooperate with Norway to resolve the environmental problems on the Kola peninsula, as proposed recently by a Norwegian delegation in Moscow. Petrovskiy also said that he is interested in a Norwegian idea for a concept of security in the north which embraces both military and environmental concerns.

The recent Soviet transfer of modern combat aircraft from Hungary to the Kola peninsula has attracted attention in Norway. The Soviet Embassy in Oslo has explained this to the Foreign Ministry as a practical solution to a deployment problem, and given assurances that the aircraft should in no way be seen as intended for use against Norway.

According to the deputy foreign minister, there will be a reduction as soon as an East-West agreement on naval forces is reached.

Latin America & Caribbean

Gorbachev, Colombian President Exchange Cables

LD3007211390 Moscow TASS in English 1939 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 30 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev has sent a telegram of greetings to President Elect Cesar Gaviria of Colombia and noted he hoped friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Colombia will develop in the interest of the two countries, peace and cooperation in the world.

In a reply telegram, Gaviria thanked for the greetings, noted President Mikhail Gorbachev's esteem in the world and shared his opinion that Soviet-Colombian relations will develop in conditions of peace and international cooperation.

Moscow Radio Links With Chile, Invites Others

LD3107170190 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] A link-up was established on Monday between Radio Moscow and Radio Chilena, a Catholic radio station in Chile. For two hours people in various parts of that country were offered to ask questions and hear answers about the processes taking place in the Soviet Union.

Senator Ricardo Nunez, who took part in the link-up on the Chilean side, summed up his countrymen's interest in Soviet developments by observering that the policy of perestroyka was having a tangible effect on the dynamics of international development today.

Radio Moscow is inviting other radio stations to organize similar link-ups, which stir considerable interest on the part of listeners.

Future of Trade, Economic Ties With Cuba Probed

90UF0335A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Kamorin: "A Word Game, or What Future Soviet-Cuban Economic Relations Will Be Like"]

[Text] Havana—Over the last 30 years Soviet-Cuban economic relations have only been mentioned on anniversary dates. Now they have become the subject of heated discussion on the pages of the press and at parliamentary tribunals.

True, it is a somewhat strange debate: Some people angrily proclaim, "As long as necessary!" but do not propose anything specific. Others try their best to refute the first group, again stopping before anything specific is said. They all talk about the past, but not a word is said about the future. The debates are quite unique: It is as though the opponents express themselves in different languages, giving different meanings to the same words. This is not an accident. The very subject of the argument is such that over three decades it has obliged all who have participated in it to conduct a strange "word game" from which no one emerges the winner. In the meantime, at the background of this word play the real Soviet-Cuban ties proceed according to the principle of "day by day, today like yesterday" awaiting some sort of political solution.

To start with, let us talk about terms. The first element of the game is the word "cooperation." This is a quite difficult concept, within the bounds of which we try year after year to reconcile our political goals with our economic interests.

The USSR's first step at the beginning of the sixties was to provide credits and purchase sugar in a country with which until then we had had practically no ties—it was a political step. And it went from there. It moved along so briskly that today we say that the economic dependence of Cuba is also a concept which is more political than anything else, because the island depends on our deliveries to a greater degree than it depended on American deliveries before the revolution. Of course it also may be said that we conduct ourselves differently than the Yankees did, but that has no relation to commerce.

The widely debated and seemingly economic question of the price of Cuban sugar is also a close relative of that same game. At a certain stage when, under conditions of the U.S. blockade, the USSR was compelled to supply Cuba with an ever wider assortment of goods and the republic had nothing to pay with, it was decided to raise the price on Cuban products simply so as not to put endless zeros on the debt totals (this again was uncomfortably political).

And so the price went up, having nothing in common with either the prices on the world market (which Fidel Castro calls "the world sugar dump") or with sugar in general. Each ton of sugar arriving in the USSR, strictly speaking, represents an automatically satisfied request

for economic aid. And there is nothing uncommon in this. Many developed countries act this way.

But what does this lead to? Cuba's demands have grown, and our deliveries have increased as well. As a result we have raised the "sugar plank" so high that the republic no longer even settles accounts with us using its own sugar. It borrows the sugar from a French firm, and the USSR guarantees this debt, subjecting itself to the risk of paying for the very same sugar twice over: To Cuba with oil, and to France with hard currency. From a commercial point of view this is completely absurd, although I might be mistaken because such an outstanding economist as L.I. Abalkin considers such operations "common practice"....

The confusion of politics with economics has become a genuine curse for numerous facilities built on the island with our technical assistance. I cannot remember when even one of them, at least among the largest, was built or brought up to working capacity on time, even though it is not necessary to be an economist to understand that each day of delay means losses. Why? There are a number of technical reasons, but basically there is only one—the firm conviction of all the participants in the construction that at the end of the contractual period financing will not stop and the facility will not come to a standstill like a frozen frame, but will be finished at any price because that iron political "It must be done!" has been pronounced. So why hurry?

All this is only a few brush strokes on the portrait of the phenomenon called "cooperation." Further enumeration would be specialized and tiresome. But it is worth discussing one more term which plays a part in the game—about how our economies are "mutually complimentary."

This concept is usually accompanied by an illustration: One-third of the sugar and half of the oranges used in the USSR are from Cuba. This is true, we do depend on Cuba in this sense. But Cuba depends on us to an incomparably greater degree, and today this dependence is growing. More than 70 percent of Cuba's foreign trade is with the Soviet Union. A significant share of the remaining portion is with other CEMA partners. And Cuba's relations with them are not simple. The pragmatic course of the new authorities of the East European states, together with ideological frictions leading, contrary to physics, to a cooling in political relations, are giving rise to gaps in the CEMA mechanism.

For instance it turns out that the GDR, delivering goods to the Cuban market that are in very great demand here, cannot "take" anything from the island now. It has already been calculated that a united Germany will supply itself with 120 percent of its sugar needs. Citrus fruits from Cuba do not get past EEC customs barriers which defend European producers—Spain, France, and Italy. Baby food—the GDR was receiving it from a plant built with its aid on the island—will not "pass" the sanitary norms of the European Community.

Hungary does not need Cuban sugar, and the Hungarians have thought up an adroit trick: Selecting their own quota in exchange for annual deliveries (the East European countries have renounced the five-year principle for planning cooperation), they immediately sell it for hard currency... to the Cubans at the prices of that same "world dump," and the latter use it to cover their obligations in commodity trade with other countries.

It is true that Bulgaria depends 70 percent on sugar deliveries from the island, but here the situation is reversed. For various reasons, including political ones (Bulgaria voted against Cuba in the UN Commission on Human Rights), the Cubans have stopped deliveries to that country. For now it is not clear what will happen in the future.

So, the countries are growing more "mutually complimentary." But what form has this taken? Over the last 30 years the USSR has taken part in the construction and reconstruction in Cuba of dozens of sugar factories. Development of our own native capacity has been frozen. If you consider that these factories send all their production to our country, then it turns out that we have created a whole sector of our food industry 10,000 km beyond our own borders.

Why, when there is talk of reducing deliveries from the island, is this represented as though we will slowly be left without sugar? Sugar is not an exotic fruit, and it is not made out of sugar cane alone. Maybe it is worth returning to our own reserves. This would allow Cuba to be relieved of the impossible burden of supplying us, and it would perhaps free us of part of the burden of supplying the Cubans. Today we purchase a great quantity of goods in third countries for the island. In the meantime many specialists agree that if the area under cultivation to sugar cane were reduced, Cuba could achieve a significantly greater degree of self-sufficiency in the provision of food goods.

And finally there is one more, perhaps the strangest, element in the word game. I am speaking about the appeals that are repeated from one year to the next for an "increase in the efficiency" of our cooperation and for making it more mutually advantageous. Indeed, Soviet aid is often used in Cuba with a very small coefficient of useful activity. There were and are great numbers of "unfinished projects," huge piles of uninstalled equipment which became outdated even before it was used, and a fascination with huge projects which does not even take into account the scale and the demands of the island. Most often the responsibility for shortcomings can be placed to an equal degree on both parties. However even the complete elimination of these technical problems will not solve the fundamental contradiction between the political goals and economic interests of our ties.

Can they be efficient in principle? I am sure that they can. It is only a question of what kind they should be. Let aid remain aid—such is the clearly expressed political will of our country. But let it not be half-hidden like it is now, but open and public instead. What are we ashamed of? Let the Supreme Soviet determine its size, and the

government will decide how it should be granted: As a gift, in credit, or at preferential prices. And let everything else become pure commerce.

True, it will be difficult and painful to break the old mechanism. And we must begin, appreciating the 30-year tradition, with political steps.

Here are a few examples. In the course of an official visit by M.S. Gorbachev to Cuba, that country was promised comprehensive help from the Soviet Union. As a general declaration, that sounds very good. Unfortunately it seems that the rest of our leaders understood the word "comprehensive" as "unlimited and unconditional."

When the question of the French firm's sugar loans was last raised, our specialists refused to give a guarantee—the financial risk had already become too great. A contradiction arose which, with peaceful discussion, could have led to significant changes in bilateral trade. But a CEMA session took place at this point in Sofia, and N.I. Ryzhkov with one wave of his hand gave the Cuban representative the guarantee he sought.

Our trade people in Cuba, working on the problem of "increasing efficiency," did a great deal of work in a number of directions. It included difficult negotiations, but compromise was reached on a number of positions. Then in Havana an intergovernmental commission began work, this time headed by L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who with a diplomatic smile "surrendered" to his partners all the positions that had already been won.

The impression is being created that our leaders are simply unable to talk with their Cuban colleagues about themes which might turn out to be unpleasant for the latter. As a result, long-term plans still mention such "projects of the century" conceived during the period of "grandiose plans" as a second nuclear power plant (they should figure out how to finish the first!) and a Havana metro. Everyone understands that this will never be within our power, but no one has decided to mention that.

What does this lead to? Recently a working group headed by the ministers in charge of foreign trade for the two countries met in the capital of Cuba with the mission of restructuring our economic ties. The first meeting ended with the signing of a record of proceedings containing more differences than points of agreement. Of course the main part of the work is still to come, but imagine what our specialist must feel when, at the very moment that solution of a contentious question seems so close, he hears from the other side of the table, "Yes, but what about the promises of your leadership?" Can the expert, a trade representative or even a minister, disavow a prime minister or a president? I am convinced that until our politicians quit putting our trade representatives in such an ambiguous position there will be no restructuring of bilateral relations.

It is also quite important at the political level to raise the question of the USSR's real access to economic activities on Cuban territory. This sounds paradoxical against the background of the scope of our trade and the huge volumes of technical aid, but a problem exists. The introduction of bilateral contacts for new forms of work comes up against taciturn but resolute resistance on the Cuban side. Not one of the projects to create joint enterprises has yet been realized although, for instance, joint tourist projects with Spain, Mexico, and Argentina grow at Cuban resorts like mushrooms. Why could we not be included here as a third party? I am sure that we would find the means to contribute our share. And not just "useful" hard currency, but the useful experience of an organization of high-quality international tourism, which is also worth much.

There are many opportunities on the island for commerce freed from the political burden. It is too bad, for instance, that with our shortages Soviet women are completely unfamiliar with Cuban cosmetics. True, not so much of it is produced and almost all of it goes to the "dollar zone." But if funds are contributed for broadening production? Our money against Cuban raw materials (and tropical flowers are inexhaustible) and formulas?

I suppose that many of the new participants in foreign trade ties as well as those enterprises that have had dealings with Cuba for many years are prepared to contribute money, equipment, and experience to prospective enterprises. But only, of course, if this will be a mutually profitable transaction and not the former "cooperation."

Almost unlimited reserves for the development of bilateral ties exist along this line, and I suppose that our Cuban friends will understand this type of transaction. Politically oriented aid is good. But no one will renounce a profitable business even when political priorities waver.

True, I should say that for the time being such prospects are nothing more than idealistic dreams. There are many "ifs" to be overcome. But our qualified Cuba specialists are working precisely in order to turn the "ifs" into reality. The creation of the working group which I mentioned earlier is, of course, a step forward. At the center of its attention is the decision of the 45th CMEA session, at which the members of the Council agreed upon a quick transition to mutual relations at world prices and freely convertible currency. Under conditions of Soviet-Cuban ties, such a transition means dealing with God knows how many unknowns. Perhaps this difficult task will lead both parties to an understanding of the impossibility of conducting business in the previous manner. But that will depend to a great degree upon how much latitude the group has to decide not only purely technical questions but also questions connected to political problems.

Foreign Ministry Official Views Cuban Relations

PY0108024890 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 0200 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Interview with Yuriy Pavlov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Latin America Department, by unidentified reporter; place and date not given—read by announcer]

[Text] [Words indistinct] Yuriy Pavlov, chief of the Latin America Department at the USSR Foreign Ministry, evaluating the level of Soviet-Cuban cooperation. He said:

[Pavlov] Current Soviet-Cuban relations are characterized by the broad cooperation [words indistinct] of the foreign policy, just like the other problems. Relations of confidence have long existed between our countries, and they were further developed in April last year, during the visit to Cuba by Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the Soviet Union, when a friendship and cooperation treaty was signed. It should be understood that [words indistinct] some amendments in some kind of cooperation or another. It can be said, though, that as years go by, cooperation gains in strength and efficiency.

[Reporter] The [words indistinct] that are known in the USSR elicit the [word indistinct] response in Cuba. How can this be reshaped to develop bilateral links?

[Pavlov] It would be wrong to think that the process taking place in the Soviet Union—the measures adopted to restructure our political system and economy—are not understood in Cuba. Fidel Castro clearly spoke about this during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Cuba, stressing that Cubans hope for perestroyka to succeed and that the future of bilateral cooperation depends on its success. The more successful the restructuring of the Soviet economy, the quicker an efficient economic system can be built and the more prosperous our cooperation with other countries can become.

Important changes are also taking place in Cuba under the name of rectification.

[Reporter] Taking into account the difficulties being experienced in the Soviet Union, how do you see prospects for economic cooperation between the two countries?

[Pavlov] The prospects for our cooperation with Cuba are good in terms of quality, although not in terms of volume. The Soviet and Cuban [words indistinct] cooperation on the basis of mutual progress, on a sound economic basis. [Words indistinct] In sum, the new links that will replace the centralized [words indistinct].

This was a presentation from the Latin American (?Press) Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

Cuba's Castro Makes Commemorative Speech

PM3107121590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jul 90 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch by PRAVDA correspondent A. Moiseyev: "Meeting in Havana"]

[Text] Havana, 27 Jul—The Cuban capital has celebrated the 37th anniversary of the storming of the Moncada barracks.

Hundreds of thousands of Cubans gathered for a meeting in the capital's Revolution Square where Fidel Castro delivered a long speech.

Today, he noted, the country is working as never before. The republic is doing more with fewer resources. This is caused by the exceptional international situation. Who could have thought that the socialist community would collapse and that even the Soviet Union would have the difficulties and problems it is now experiencing. We must be realists. We are working under extraordinarily complex conditions, under conditions of a great shortage of basic resources. But we do not complain about the Soviet Union because we know that despite its own objective economic difficulties the USSR is doing everything possible to fulfill its commitments to Cuba.

If we have to sacrifice our social development plans, the Cuban leader stated, then we must be prepared for it. But what we cannot sacrifice is the country's economic development. I think that in this hard time our people are learning a lot and perhaps the day will come when we will be grateful for the situation in which we have found ourselves now.

Political and Social

Politburo Issues Resolution on CPSU Congress

LD3107182790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Politburo has examined questions connected with the results of the 28th CPSU Congress and tasks for fulfillment of its decisions. The resolution [postanouleniye] of the CPSU Central Committee Poltiburo on this question notes that the decisions adopted by the 28th CPSU Congress create the necessary conditions for the broad cooperation of public forces in the name of perestroyka.

The congress defined the basic lines of party policy in all the main spheres of life in Soviet society. It stressed the party's adherence to the socialist choice. In the economic sphere the central task is the transition to regulated market relations and the working-out of a set of measures for the social protection of the population. The congress expressed the CPSU's firm intention to complete the political reform, to do everything to promote the process of transferring all power to the local soviets of people's deputies. Support for full power for the soviets is defined as a major political task of the party committees. They are called upon to organize cooperation with them, to assist their emergence as bodies of real power, and to promote the fastest possible transition of the soviets to effective, full-fledged activity.

The congress showed, the resolution says, that the CPSU remains the vanguard political force in the struggle for the renewal of society and has worked out the principles and ways of consolidating all democratic forces. It resolutely spoke in favor of overcoming the party organizations' and party committees' lagging behind the dynamic social processes that have arisen and of organizing lively, daily communication with labor collectives. The congress set the task of creating conditions for each communist to take part in drafting and implementing party policy.

The Politburo notes the important political significance, for the activity of the party organizations of all levels, of the congress's conclusion regarding the development of the CPSU's cooperation and interaction with the broad circle of sociopolitical organizations and movements that are taking shape and that stand on positions of socialist choice and democracy.

The resolution notes the foreign policy course supported by the 28th CPSU Congress is in keeping with the fundamental interests of the Soviet people and creates favorable conditions for tackling internal tasks. Questions of military policy and concern for servicemen and their families should always be in the party's field of vision. The openness, frankness, and high degree of exactingness that disinguished the work of the congress are in keeping with the new character of relations in the party and should become the hallmark of party life.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo considers it extremely important to undertake broad propaganda of the results of the congress without delay, to reveal the fundamental importance of its documents for the stabilization of the political situation in the country. In the course of frank conversations with workers and collective farmers, with the participation of communists working in trade union and other mass public organizations, party committees of all levels should try to find realistic solutions and answers to questions which arise.

The Central Committees of the communist parties of the Union republics and all party organizations, people's deputies, and members of the CPSU are called on to use political methods and legislative initiative to achieve implementation of the congress' program tasks on the ethnic question, to carry out insistent work for instilling standards of interethnic relations, and to resolutely denounce any form of violence.

In accordance with the instruction given by the congress, the services of all delegates of the 28th CPSU Congress are being enlisted in propagating and elucidating its decisions. It has been deemed important to provide in a systematic way speeches by members of the Politburo, and secretaries and members of the CPSU Central Committee in the press, on radio and television, as well as reports on their visits and meetings in labor collectives and primary party organizations.

A decision has been adopted to hold a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in September-October 1990 at which tasks arising from the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress will be examined, in particular proposals will be discussed on perfecting the methods and forms of the activities of the newly elected Central Committee and commissions of the CPSU Central Committee on the basic directions of domestic and foreign policy.

In the resolution, the party committees' attention has been drawn particularly to the need for the organized completion before November 1990 of the report-back and election campaign in the party. It is important to achieve a situation whereby congresses and conferences promote perestroyka and the activities of party organizations on the basis of the new CPSU rules and the congress' program statement, and the true endorsement by the CPSU of the new democratic norms of inner-party life.

Communists working in bodies of state power, in the USSR Council of Ministers, scientific establishments, and the mass media are instructed to step up elucidatory work connected with the transfer to the market and the stages of its implementation, and to strive to ensure that each unclear question is thoroughly clarified.

The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat has been presented with the task of organizing work on the fulfillment of the resolutions adopted by the 28th CPSU Congress on questions of economic, agrarian, youth and

military policy, education, science and culture, interethnic relations, and the mass media of the CPSU. It has been deemed necessary to officially bring to the notice of the corresponding state and economic bodies the position of the congress as set out in these documents. It has been deemed necessary to commence work without delay on the preparation of the new CPSU program.

Democratic Platform Debates Party Exit

90UN2377A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by I. Kosarev: "A Position Is Being Worked Out"]

[Text] Yes, this was a representative conference: 877 delegates with the right of a deciding vote from many cities and republics of the country, and altogether more than 1,200 participants, are impressive figures that speak for themselves. Conference participants discussed not only the political situation in the country and the party on the eve of the Russian Party Conference and the 28th CPSU Congress, but they also adopted a number of documents, or as it is customary to say now, a package of documents, with which representatives of the platform intend to come out in these two forums of communists—of the republic and of the country.

The package includes a "Supplementary Report of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU at the Russian Party Conference," drafts of the "Program Statement of the All-Russian Party Conference," and the "Program Statement of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU for the 28th Party Congress," and other documents.

As was stated by V. Bogatov, a member of the coordinating council of the Democratic Platform, the main ideas that platform supporters will fight for are the liquidation of the totalitarian system of authority both in state and in party spheres, real pluralism in the forms of property, and to a significant degree the denationalization of the economy, the abolition of democratic centralism as an organizational principle of building the party, and, finally, rejection of the communist idea and outlook.

Reform, and also possibly the construction of a new party, is being conceived on the basis of the priority of universal human values, individual rights and freedoms, broad intraparty pluralism, and the supremacy of law and the will of the voters.

V. Lysenko, V. Shostakovskiy, and I. Chubays spoke to the conference participants. Ideas were voiced that were also set forth at the recent Moscow regional conference of the Democratic Platform. Their gist briefly is that the CPSU is virtually a party that cannot be reformed, having stagnated in sins and vices. But some representatives of the Democratic Platform believe it is necessary to leave the party immediately and to set about organizing a new one. Others believe it is necessary to see what the decisions of the congress will be: If there are those on which the supporters of the Democratic Platform insist, then they should remain in the party, if not—then they should pull out. There is, however, a group of communists that is disposed first to achieving the democratization of the party and its renewal, and which is trying to unify all healthy forces. Some indication of what the breakdown is here is given in a questionnaire distributed to conference participants. Here is how opinions were divided in answer to the question, "your future position": future struggle for the democratization of the CPSU regardless of the decisions of the congress—21 percent; remain in the CPSU only in the event the congress adopts the basic principles of the provisions of the Democratic Platform—54 percent, and secession from the CPSU regardless of the decisions of the congress—25 percent.

Of course, this breakdown can be accepted only with reservations and amendments that the opinions of the conference delegates do not by far always reflect the attitudes of the entire body of Democratic Platform supporters. But one way or another, a pluralism of opinions, as they say, exists. At the same time, it is also clear that the problems of consolidation are by no means alien to movement supporters.

Democratic Platform's Congress Tactics Assailed

PM3007111990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jul 90 Second Edition p 3

["Publicist's Notes" by Aleksandr Ilin under the rubric "Discussion Sheet 52": "Were the Classics Pulling a Fast One?"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] For many years they assured us that our fatherland's real history did not begin until 1917, that the post-October path was a straight and steady ascent, and that Lenin's party "leads us from victory to victory." Now we know that history cannot be rewritten to suit our whims, so to speak, as has often happened until now. We know that we should not disown any of the things that happened or that the people lived through and experienced in the pre-October era. But why do we sometimes forget that in exactly the same way it is unworthy to casually nullify the history of the party and the people in the Soviet years by seeing only the deformations and blemishes in it? There may have been tragedies, deviations, and dangerous developments along our path. Nevertheless, we should not indiscriminately blame millions of communists, the majority of whom lived one life inseparable from their people, and we should share with them both the joys of victory—and indeed there were joys!—and the grief of loss and cruel defeats.

The desire so characteristic of many of today's "dominant influences" to separate the CPSU from the people and put it in the humiliating position of being to blame for all our ills, while still clinging to the levers of totalitarianism, also has its own history, and it can teach us a great deal if we study it honestly and without prejudice. It can teach us, for example, that a far from

happy fate awaited those who were so eager to quickly put Lenin in the dock—be they malevolent foreigners, with their perpetual hatred of everything Soviet; or Stalin, who made short work of Lenin's legacy and perpetrated essentially an act of violence against the logic of the October Revolution and the people who trusted the Bolsheviks and followed them.

History suggests that even the slogan "Soviets without communists," now proclaimed by some as virtually the only way out of the crisis situation, is not new either, nor is it as harmless as the new-wave "democrats" would have us believe.

I was thinking about that when, together with the hushed audience in the hall of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, I listened to B.N. Yeltsin announcing his resignation from the CPSU. Party membership, the statement said, will hinder the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in the performance of his duties as head of the republic's legislature and in the expression and consideration of its peoples' interests.

I am not going to pass sweeping judgment on an action which was the result of long reflection: In a recent interview with a PRAVDA correspondent, Boris Nikolayevich talked about how hard it was to make a final decision.... I also appreciate the fact that his statement contained no disparaging words about the CPSU—something which, incidentally, you cannot say about the speeches before and after him. Nor do I see any harm in the fact that the Russian parliament will be headed by a non-party man—ultimately it is not membership of a particular party but work in the interests of the peoples of our largest republic that will be the main criterion for millions of people.

Nevertheless, why was it necessary to wait almost until the final day of the 28th CPSU Congress to announce such a crucial decision right here before a packed hall in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses? I picture myself in the place of the Sverdlovsk delegates who, after long reflection and debate, had just nominated Yeltsin for the new Central Committee and were now watching along with everyone else as he left the party congress hall alone and forever.... Were they aware of his intentions? It is more logical to suppose that the Sverdlovsk communists were pinning their hopes on Yeltsin for the acceleration of the processes of democratization and party renewal—processes which only someone who has completely fallen behind our current life and times can really not want today.

If there were some people who perhaps did expect such a step from Yeltsin, they were most probably the representatives of the Democratic Platform [DP], who even before the congress did not hide their intentions to create an even greater fuss. They needed Yeltsin as a man who is popular in the country and an extraordinary individual capable of bestowing on their group "withdrawal" from the CPSU the significance of a major event.

You can call the majority of delegates to the 28th congress anything you like; when it comes to pinning scathing labels on people we really are the "world leader." I myself have no intention of using a solitary epithet to describe the people gathered in the congress hall. They went there bringing with them all the feelings which no doubt trouble our society: confusion in the face of the economic disorders, anxiety over the future of a USSR rent by explosions of interethnic strife, depression at the direct attacks on the CPSU which until quite recently was beyond criticism.... Some people probably also felt a nostalgia for the past and for the monopoly of power slipping right from their hands, and thus also the undoubtedly durable occupancy of the leadership chair. Nor should concern at events in the East European countries be discounted.... There was also the slow handclapping of unpopular speakers, the noise in the hall which prevented people from speaking and hearing, and the malicious rejoinders aimed at political leaders which, of course, was both incomprehensible and, even worse, unpardonable.

But as a journalist who was in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses throughout the party forum's work, I can testify to the unquestionable desire of a great many delegates, including those from far-off places and from the backwoods, to really get to grips with what is going on and to hear out and try to understand the unofficial and non-traditional viewpoints. The Marxist Platform, one of whose leaders, Moscow State University's A.V. Buzgalin, was elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee, won quite a few supporters at the congress. The audience also reacted excitedly to the far from uniform speeches of the representatives of the Russian Communist Party's Leningrad Initiative Group—the reaction was mixed, too: from clamorous applause in support to unconcealed indignation. The congress platform was also given to the Democratic Platform, and no seismograph could have registered the particular emotional outbursts at that time, unlike when they tried to howl down L.I. Abalkin and M.A. Ulyanov.

The Democratic Platform group, on whose behalf a statement was read out announcing the division of the CPSU and the intention to create a "new democratic parliamentary party," was clearly hoping to intensify the "Yeltsin effect." In my view, the opposite effect was achieved—this declaration containing an indictment of the congress created an impression of farce, a theatrical "gunshot," which, in the classical tradition, was meant to go off at the end of the final act. The declaration was no surprise: Both the comments in the press before and during the congress and the conduct of certain delegates sporting "DP" badges in the Kremlin Palace, especially after V.N. Lysenko's attempt to urge the delegates to support the demands of the miners' political strike for the government's resignation, enabled us to glean some idea of the demarche that was being prepared.

In reports from the congress we have already described how the "democrats" who signed the statement were conscientiously following a prearranged "scenario" and

seeking a convenient pretext for an effective denouement. Subsequent events showed their reluctance to note the congress' evolution toward democratization: when it became known that some of them were refusing to recognize its decisions or pay their membership subscriptions and intended to agitate for the formation of a new party based on the Democratic Platform without issuing party cards. It is possible that "DP" emissaries will soon appear in many places and try to register supporters. I should like to believe that their verbal trickery will not dupe communists and that the attempt to split the party will not work.

G.Kh. Popov and A.A. Sobchak timed their statement on leaving the CPSU to coincide with the end of the congress. It is the personal affair of the chairmen of the soviets of the capital and the city on the Neva whether they remain in the party or not. But the motives... "The 28th CPSU Congress," they write, "on which so many hopes were pinned both within the party and among the people, has demonstrated the CPSU's complete inability to offer the country a realistic program for effecting the transfer to a new society."

I will cut short the quotation for a brief commentary. Popov was not at the congress, and he was also absent when the statement was proclaimed—on his behalf—at the Moscow City Soviet. Sobchak, however, as a delegate, had the opportunity to actively defend the democratic changes in the party and society. But he pursued his activity mainly in the corridors, giving numerous interviews, and it seems that he was not at all eager to mount the rostrum. When you recall his dynamism at congresses of USSR people's deputies and in the country's Supreme Soviet, this was unlike Sobchak. It turns out it was all planned.

Subsequently, after the statement, both authors commented on their "move" on Moscow and Leningrad television. Yes, Popov acknowledged, the congress was a big step in the CPSU's development. Gorbachev had neutralized the conservatives in masterly fashion.... OK, a half-acknowledgment at least. But what was said in the statement proclaimed before even the congress was completely over? "Most congress delegates have refused to support what is already supported by the people: the abandonment of class hostility; the priority of common human values; the switch to a market economy and a variety of forms of ownership, including private ownership by citizens; resolute democratization of the party; the abandonment of the CPSU's monopoly of the mass media; the transfer of all power to the soviets; and the transfer of the bulk of state property and party property to citizens."

But come now, come now, where, in which documents of the 28th CPSU Congress could Popov and Sobchak have discovered all this? You will find nothing like it in any of the congress' **majority** decisions. There was no reliance on class enmity—openly urged by not a single speaker—or disparagement of the priority of common human values. This was clearly stated in the congress Program Statement.

True, there was discussion of the CPSU's taking account of and defending the interests of working people and their social protection. After keen discussion and a contest among various views the congress did approve the transition to a market economy, varied forms of ownership, and so forth, and so forth. A warning against trusting in the market is reflected in the minutes precisely as the standpoint of the **minority**. If you peruse the Resolution on the CPSU Central Committee Political Report, the 28th congress Program Statement, or the new party Statutes—everywhere you will find the course of democratization is not just proclaimed but the mechanism to ensure the power of the party masses, albeit not yet fully refined, incorporated. And the resolution on the CPSU mass media is devoted solely to the party press and not in any way to all the press organs currently existing in the country—where is the monopoly here? There is no need to talk about the transfer of full power to the soviets; this is the foundation of perestroyka and was begun back in April 1985. And everything that has been done in this regard to strengthen the power of the people has been done, not despite, but thanks to perestroyka forces in the party—forces which now, after the congress, are launching work designed to further renew the CPSU and establish mutually beneficial cooperation with soviet organs at the center and at local level.

Questions concerning the budget and the property of the CPSU and the use of the party resources built up by generations of communists were discussed in detail, and for the first time, at the congress. And decisions which take objective account of modern realities and the place and role of the CPSU in today's political structure were taken on this score.

Can one honestly speak of the CPSU's inability to renew? After all, the congress essentially began the process of its revival in a new form as a party of ideas capable of becoming the leading ideological and political force of society in its movement toward humane, democratic socialism.

The more you think about the "phenomenon" of the "two mayors," the stronger the sensation you get that we are dealing here with a kind of "escape hatch" devised in case the congress failed and the conservative trends won. From this standpoint the congress failed to "justify" the hopes of those who pursued the previously arranged line of splitting the party. Although the fact is that the "democrats" would not have minded if things had gone worse for the congress. It makes no difference, they claimed: Staying in the party is tantamount to leaving the people with the illusion that the party can do something.

Our contradictory history—let us return to it—teaches us that setting off the party against the soviets promises no good. Neither in the past, when the party organs

supplanted the soviets, depriving them of real power, nor now, when according to the "opposite extreme" principle some "elected representatives" are seeking to remove the CPSU from the political arena. The new diktat is no better than the old, outmoded one. Joint constructive work is what is needed. And it is encouraging that, despite the cold winds of confrontation, such an approach is discernible in both Moscow and Leningrad, and wherever commonsense prevails over emotion.

The last thing I want to say in concluding these comments is as follows: The American columnist Michael Davidow wrote bitterly in PRAVDA about the phenomena of anticommunism which he encountered—to his extreme surprise—in the USSR. A series of recent rallies-cum-demonstrations with slogans "Down with the CPSU!" and other extremist statements by speakers, including recent communists, shows how serious this danger is. Particularly in a society where the socioeconomic atmosphere is already extremely tense, where the shelves in the stores are depleted, and interethnic conflict and ecological "outrages" exasperate people and make them susceptible to every kind of rash appeal.

This surely issues a most grave warning to those who cannot see the forest through the trees and those who are prepared to put everything at stake for the sake of their political ambitions. This includes those who spare neither our history, mercilessly distorting it to fit the new fashion, nor our present, which it is time all of us understood in a calm and thorough manner without holding back or pinning the blame on one another. We must understand our present situation to find a desirable way out of the crisis and occupy a worthy place among the ranks of the truly civilized and prosperous states. Let us remember, however, that the future springs from the present.

That was also said, it seems, by the classic thinkers, who can in no way be accused of trickery....

Moscow TV Interviews Gidaspov at Congress

LD3107174290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1115 GMT on 31 July carries a 45-minute program entitled "Dramatis Personae at the 28th CPSU Congress," which was prepared by the youth programs editor and consists of a series of interviews with delegates at the 28th CPSU Congress (2-13 July 1990), apparently conducted in the foyer during breaks in the proceedings, representing a broad range of views on the work of the congress, the role of the party in society, and media coverage of events.

One of those interviewed is B.V. Gidaspov, first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast party committee and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The interviewer says: "I have an interesting and, it seems to us, very important question. You say that you are neither right-wing nor left-wing, that you have your own viewpoint." Gidaspov replies: "There is no right or left. Try to understand this. It all depends on the issue."

The interview continues as follows:

"[Interviewer] A question actually regarding this. Can a person be in the party who has his own viewpoint and as a result won't submit to one or another of the party's decisions if his viewpoint doesn't coincide with it?

"[Gidaspov] I think that if he's an honest man then he should leave that party immediately.

"[Interviewer] Then what should one do about one's own viewpoint?

"[Gidaspov] Defend it, try to put it across.

"[Interviewer] And if he can't get it across, then he should leave the party?

"[Gidaspov] If he can't get it across, and he feels that this party doesn't suit him, he should seek a party where his viewpoint will be accepted.

"[Interviewer] I don't have in mind necessarily the CPSU, but any party in general.

"[Gidaspov] I understood all that very well. If you have a viewpoint that is, well, let's be blunt, anticommunist, why be in the CPSU? Well, why?

"[Interviewer] I am not necessarily talking about the CPSU, but any party. How will you...?

"[Gidaspov] Any party, any party. How will I go, say, if I am an Orthodox—speaking hypothetically, although I am a nonbeliever—why should I go to the Muslims, why? I understand that I won't convince them, I won't manage to convince them. This is a purely academic conversation.

"[Unidentified speaker, interrupting] But aren't you frightened by the situation in which, it would appear, an insignificant episode, Yeltsin has left the party, and Shostakovskiy...?

"[Gidaspov] It frightens me, it frightens me, but precisely from chauvinist positions. [passage indistinct: exchanges with man and interviewer]

"[Interviewer] Because they are Russians?

"[Gidaspov] We are saying Russia, the whole time, Russia, Russia above everything, and the republics [passage indistinct: exchange with man] Yeltsin acted honorably, I believe: I don't agree with your position; here's your answer; here you are; take my party card, I'm off! He acted according to his conscience.

"[Interviewer] Boris Veniaminovich, many of the mass media are calling the congress conservative. But whoever a journalist approaches here, no one says he's a conservative.

"[Gidaspov] Why conservative?

"[Interviewer] Conservative, at least, regarding the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, of which you are a deputy.

"[Gidaspov] Listen, you are arguing about how many angels you can get on a pinhead. This question doesn't arise, in principle. Say, some say, take the market economy. I am in favor of a market economy. It was clear in my speech that I do not reject private property. Am I a conservative? A radical? What am I? I just expressed my point of view. In other situations, say,—I'm a radical here, am I?—in other situations, I am told, we have to reject the principle of democratic centralism, and I say, no way. what am I here? A conservative, eh? [passage indistinct as several speak at once]

"[Interviewer] By your logic you would have to leave the party if you didn't accept a market economy.

"[Gidaspov] Maybe that's so. That is, I will defend it, and if they try to tell me that we can return to the times of neo-Stalinism and introduce a rigidly centralized system, with which—praise the Lord—I have gone grey from the struggle, then of course I would have to take a different view of everything, what else?

"[Interviewer] You would leave the party?

"[Gidaspov] If I am an honest man. I will defend my point of view.

"[Interviewer] And if you don't succeed?

"[Gidaspov] I will! I have faith in myself! [he laughs] I will! I will! Don't worry!"

Later in the program the interviewer tries to interview Colonel General I.N. Rodionov, who refuses.

An interview with a delegate from Saratov criticizing the media is followed by an interview with L.P. Kravchenko, director general of TASS and member of the CPSU Central Committee.

Kravchenko says: "It has become almost fashionable to blame the press and the mass media for all of the really pressing, overdue problems of society: the crisis in the socioeconomic system, the major difficulties which all of us can see as soon we go out to the store, the crisis in the consumer market, and in the political system, too, things are not going so smoothly, instead of looking more deeply at the roots of the shortcomings, moreover, shortcomings and mistakes which have been generated during the years of perestroyka. It was noticeable at this congress that our political leadership, party leadership, did not conceal that such mistakes had been made. In this sense the delegates were right who said that we should nôt keep looking back, seeking answers only in the Stalinist system, but we should look at what we ourselves have now been doing wrongly. Nevertheless, as head of the comission on links with the mass media, I have, during these days of the work of the congress, been compelled to analyze very carefully how we are actually working. We have given considerable cause for a number of delegates to draw a justified conclusion: some media have been conducting one-sided coverage of the congress."

Paper Says Congress 'Produced Scant Results'

PM3107103190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jul 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by Pavel Voshchanov, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's observer and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress: "But Everything Ails in Our Country... Reflections on the Results of the 28th CPSU Congress"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] If the mistakes made on the road we have traveled are not acknowledged, it is impossible to renew in any tangible way the actual makeup of the party. From this standpoint the 28th CPSU Congress produced scant results. It confirmed the democratic wing's fears in the key area—the party is unreformable. I foresee objections: The Program Statement and the new CPSU statutes contain many innovations which one would not even have dared contemplate a short while ago. That is so. But it is insufficient, ultimately, if we want to keep up with the headlong development of the political situation in the country.

The congress proved incapable of radical reform. It angrily rejected the proposal that the CPSU transform itself into a parliamentary-type party. It was unable to abandon the—in our times—alien idea of class struggle and a class-based party and adopted Ye.K. Ligachev's appeal "We will not abandon class-based approaches!" It preserved the principle of democratic centralism (it transpires that, like everything else, it was distorted, but now, just imagine, it will be "the real thing"!). It failed altogether to lift the ban on factional activity. It defended the principle of the apparatus running life inside the party. The democratic wing's proposal that party property be transferred to the soviets and, via them, to the people was described by the congress as an attempt to "demolish the party and remove it from power".... The list can be continued, but that is not the crux of it. The party adopted virtually no new ideas. And what remains paramount is the same old communist future, the essence of which, I am certain, many delegate colleagues would be unable to explain. And this is not at all because they are poorly grounded in theory—although there are such people, I think. The reason is different, namely that this future is so far away from us that it seems more like a mirage than reality. What, then, are we counting on? Can we really be counting on a tired people refusing to agree to exchange this tedious tale about a happy life for real happiness and "high ideals" for a mundane prosperity? It is highly doubtful that it will be like that. Soviet people are fed up with living for the sake of future generations: They want to be clothed, shod, and well fed and have a reliable roof over their head, and they will follow any party that persuades them that it can do it. And not in 100 years' time.

Regarding the crisis in the CPSU, it must be borne in mind that this is above all a crisis of confidence. To

dismiss this and see it as mere intrigue on the part of some is a tragic error. Unfortunately, that is what the congress did. Consumed by self-admiration—"the people love their party!"—it misconstrued the obvious fact that anticommunist feelings are noticeably on the increase in the country. The whole paradox here is that they often stem from the social stratum whose interests, as many delegates sought to persuade us, are expressed by the CPSU; from the workers. Here is the opinion of just one representative of that class, N. Miroshnikova, a worker from Kiev, who sent the editorial office a letter in which she makes an appeal to the country's communists. I will quote just a few lines: "I think that the working people do not need the Communist Party. It has brought the country to ruin, having created a fat life for itself..." The person who wrote this no longer expects anything from the CPSU and has no faith in it. One may object that such serious generalizations cannot be drawn on the basis of just one letter. Without claiming that, I would nevertheless observe that hundreds of such letters and telegrams were received during the congress and have been received since. I am ready to show them to the doubters whenever and wherever they wish.

It seemed to me that the position within the party was so serious that delegates could only hold their heads in their hands. How is the party to be reformed and made more appealing in terms of ideas and structure? How is the people's trust to be won? There was probably no more important task for the congress than to find answers to these questions. But did it start engaging in that quest? In my opinion, far less time was spent on this than on discussion of how Moscow's Arbat district allegedly makes a mockery of the party and communism. At times what happened bore no resemblance at all to a political congress, being sometimes a forum of agriculturalists, sometimes a conference of economists. It only needed someone to press on sensitive parts of the party organism for an immediate rent to occur. Din, applause, stamping of feet... Again one had the woes of the rural inhabitants, environmental crisis, the market economy. In short, everything that ails us. And everything in our country ails us.

It is not surprising that the results of the congress disappointed those delegates who had gone there with a desire for radical changes. It is perhaps the one thing that has united the so-called democratic wing in recent days. A popular television commentator assessed the situation at the congress this way: The democrats predicted a split in the CPSU, but it occured among the democrats themselves. True, but only partially so. A split in the party could not occur because the delegates are not yet the whole party. But if one is objective, it has to be acknowledged that in recent days the exodus from the CPSU has begun to "gather momentum." Surely this is acknowledgment of a split? I think that these are the first harbingers of it. The 28th congress and in particular the Russian congress have not solved and may have intensified the crisis existing between the two most important components of the party: the all-powerful party apparatus, and the powerless rank-and-file members. As far as the democratic wing is concerned, a split has also occurred within it. And the cause is clear: One section believes that the party can still make some changes for the better and therefore remains in it and will fight for it; the other has already forsaken that hope and does not therefore consider it acceptable to remain within the ranks of the CPSU. I do not want to make forecasts, but I am almost certain that before too long the two sections of the democratic wing will reunite, because no substantial ideological disagreements exist between them. But will it be possible to "glue together" a split CPSU? The task is more difficult, and moreover there are many unknowns here. The two congresses resulted in one big dispersal. This is becoming increasingly obvious, and this reality cannot be dismissed, although some people are trying to dismiss it. Out of habit, clearly...

The 28th congress is now presented almost like a fairytale: The delegates assembled, expressed the interests of the whole party, consolidated on a principled basis, and took historic decisions which were enthusiastically received by all communists and the whole Soviet people. There was no struggle of ideas or standpoints, it transpires. There was no bitter acknowledgment by A.N. Yakovlev that "the political struggle at the congress is assuming disgusting forms!" But if there was a struggle, there had to be winners and losers. Who are they? The more I think about it, the more I come to the conclusion that the paradox of the congress is that everyone won. The conservative wing, having consolidated itself, could demonstrate to Gorbachev and those to his left that the supporters of the CPSU apparatus are a force to be reckoned with. The center, headed by Gorbachev, won because it managed to defend the bridgehead it had previously established and not give up a single principle of perestroyka. And the left, the democratic wing? Did it really not lose? Strangely, no. The upshot was that its future—the course of separation from the CPSU and the formation of a new political party—became more defined.

A very great deal can be written about the two party forums. But just a few final words here. Of a personal nature. We—both the correspondents in the hall and those in the press center—had been describing the events taking place in the party for more than a month. Perhaps we did not always show enough professionalism. Sometimes we worked literally on the move—which was also reflected in the quality of the articles. But we endeavored to do our work honestly, in good conscience, without hypocrisy, and without seeking to play up to anyone.

...The congress is over, and many people are left in a spiritual vacuum because it simply failed to give an answer to the agonizing question of how life is to go on. With or without the CPSU? This question is now faced by many communists. It cannot be brushed aside. A time of difficult choice is coming. It will have to be made by everyone. Without pressure or prompting from anyone's side. This is matter of personal convictions, which people must learn to respect. But I am convinced that, if

we do not make this choice, we will ultimately suffocate in an atmosphere of half-truth.

Article Views Depoliticization Issues

PM0108102990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jul 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by N. Ashenkampf and A. Kochetkov: "Who Does It Benefit?"]

[Text] Moscow—During the precongress discussions the opinion was repeatedly heard from the pages of the periodical press that under the conditions of the formation of the rule-of-law state the employees of the law enforcement organs should almost immediately lay down their party cards. And even after the congress this topic was not exhausted. It is said that membership in political organizations with their internal party discipline impedes these employees' fulfillment of their professional duties. In brief, the question of the depoliticization and deideologization of the law enforcement organs is being raised.

As is well known, at the 28th congress this question was not resolved in favor of this opinion. The Policy Statement says: "The Congress does not consider it correct to deprive communists in the Army, KGB, and Ministry of Internal Affairs of the right to belong to a party and create party organizations..."

The question would seem to be exhausted. But... After all in the past the decisions of party congresses had the force of law. But today, under the conditions of the pluralism of opinions and the multiparty system which has virtually been established in the country, congress decisions not only may remain unfulfilled—they may even be disputed. Especially as the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet is actively discussing the question of the depoliticization and deideologization of the Army and law enforcement organs.

In this connection we should like to express our opinions on this subject. First of all the idea of the depoliticization and deideologization of the law enforcement organs is of itself naive and utopian because by virtue of their place in society these organs are already involved in politics. As long as the state exists they cannot be different. Second, the supporters of this idea fail to consider the new trends in the party. We realize that this problem has not arisen from nothing; it was obviously born under the influence of our society's totalitarianism. We would agree in cases where it is necessary to halt the party committees' interference in the professional activity of people who must obey only the law. The practice of "telephone law" and other "influences" has not only deformed and is continuing to deform legal values but also corrupts the servants of the law and creates preconditions for tyranny and the gross flouting of the law by the party and state apparatus. A negative role here is also played by cadres policy, which is based on specific advantages for party members when they take up a job and for promotion in their careers.

The way out of this situation seems very simple to some people: the elimination of political organs and the halting of party organizations' activity in law enforcement organs. But here is what the authors of this concept fail to consider. Recently the party has begun markedly to free itself of its old functions of replacing the state. It has begun to overcome "telephone law" and to seek ways of developing a mechanism for the administrative and even criminal prosecution of those who try to put pressure on employees of the law enforcement organs in the process of fulfillment of their professional duties. There will also be a change in cadres policy, whose main and sole criterion will be the level of an employee's competence and morality and not his political sympathies.

These democratic trends were also reflected in the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress. Look: "A CPSU member has the right to choose the primary organization—production, territorial, or both—in which he will work. Freedom is ensured for the creation and activity of horizontal structures—party clubs, councils of party organization secretaries, and other associations based on special, professional, or other interests." As we can see, there is no longer any strict dependence of a person's career on party membership. Freedom to choose the form of party activity has also appeared.

So under these absolutely new conditions is it sensible to make such drastic demands on the law enforcement organs, right up to the complete elimination of party organizations in them? Especially as substantial changes are also taking place in the ideological sphere. Dogmatism and utopianism are gradually giving way, albeit slowly, to Marxist dialectics. Ideology purged of dogmatism will not only generate ideological keenness but will also make it possible to gain a deeper understanding of the developing socioeconomic and political processes taking place in society and consequently to promote more effectively the fulfillment of their direct professional duties by employees of the law enforcement organs.

Is it necessary to retain the party organizations under the conditions of political pluralism, and how many party committees will there be in a single collective—these and other questions are being raised and viewed today as an argument in favor of disbanding all political organizations in the law enforcement organs. But even if the legislators embark on this measure there still remains the question of each individual person's freedom of conscience. How is it possible to deprive a person of the opportunity to realize his political interest and ideological predilections at least in his off-duty time!

Incidentally, Article 11 of the "International Pact on Civil and Political Rights" recognizes each person's right to freedom of association with other people, including those of the same political persuasion. It is true that this article nonetheless considers the special position of people belonging to the Armed Forces and police and

suggests to each country, in accordance with local features and traditions, that it introduce some legally (!) stipulated restrictions on the use of this right. But without depriving people of this right completely!

We believe that it is not depoliticization but real public control that must be introduced into the practice of the law enforcement organs' work. We must create a mechanism of glasnost which until now has been replaced, at the lowest possible level, by the party organizations. But while nothing has been created to take their place, it is dangerous to eliminate the party organs.

PRAVDA Views Anti-Gorbachev Demonstration

PM0108090390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jul 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Gennadiy Seleznev: "Everything Is 'Down With' But What Is 'Long Live?'"]

[Text] The rain poured down all day. It seemed that nature itself was opposed to this action. But people have lost the ability to react to its signs. Ready to believe in soothsayers, sorcerers, extraterrestrials, and horoscopes, they have followed those who fiercely shout "Down with!" and "Bring them to account!" People first opened their umbrellas and then their mouths.

Then the press reports that the meeting on the 50th anniversary of October Square (Manezhnaya Square among the people) amassed 50,000 people. That figure will not please the organizers and members of the Moscow voters association organizational committee, and they will say it has been deliberately understated. According to them, the action was necessary for the responsible politicians to learn people's true reactions to the results of the 28th CPSU Congress. And this whole show was described as the Muscovites' movement in support of democratic transformations.

It turns out that the fatherland has its own prophets who shamelessly arrogate the right to speak in the name of the whole capital. Never mind the capital, they are prepared to speak on behalf of all Russia's democratic forces.

How many champions of my motherland's fate have appeared recently? Yet after all the majority of today's populists only 18-24 months ago did not utter the word Russia. At the time it was not in the vocabulary of their programs. They needed the country but, realizing that the country as a whole had no very great need of them and their ideas, and it was a nuisance anyway, they suddenly remembered mother Russia, the greatest of powers, who has given all human civilization so many geniuses and humanist thinkers.

And it would have been all right if the new wave politicians had been continuers of the traditions of Russian culture, continuers of our intellectuals' eternal desire to lay their lives on the altar of enlightenment and selfless devotion for the sake of their people. But no. It looks as though they are spiritually more akin to the traditions of the Paris Commune: reaching freedom, equality, and brotherhood through blood, hatred, and suffering.

Try to take to task the self-styled prophets of the slogans "down with Gorbachev" and "down with the CPSU," uttered in our name. At best you will immediately be called a conservative, at worst moral terrorism will be organized.

You have to keep a sharp eye on these "democrats." They are not that naive, they have learned to cheat people, speculating on their feelings and playing on the strings of a sick economy. Do not think they have forgotten who is the author of the perestroyka plan. They deliberately and methodically instill in the public awareness their own base little idea: It is possible to change horses in midstream, to replace party leaders with nonparty ones. You do not have to be a futurologist to predict what will begin in the fall. To judge by today's rehearsals, we can suppose that at the forthcoming Russian Congress of Soviets a deputy will rise on behalf of all his voters, of course, to demand that an article on the need to have a nonparty president in Russia be introduced into the Constitution. Applause will be heard and on the same evening G. Popov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, in the studio of the "Good Evening, Moscow!" television program, will refuse to answer the mundane questions of his press attache, B. Notkin, and will urge television viewers to talk about the fate of Russia and its future president. The next day A. Sobchak, his counterpart from the Leningrad City Soviet, will say the same thing to his press attache when addressing the Leningraders. Then it will be the turn of several youth newspapers and the scourge of a noisy campaign will sweep the country's expanses, mixing truth with lies.

The anticommunist meeting on Manezhnaya Square in Moscow showed that the enthusiasts from among the party members are prepared to close their ranks. Although it is understandable that gathering the people for a meeting is far easier than organizing the people to help villagers bring in the harvest.

To the credit of Moscow's communists they do not preach the principle of "an eye for an eye" but you can imagine how many thousands of people would have come out onto the square had they, for instance, issued a call to defend their oppressed citizens whom the Moscow deputies, unabashed at being on television, are calling nothing other than outside workers.

From one speech to the next CPSU leader M. Gorbachev speaks words of tolerance, common sense, the consolidation of society on the platform of building a humane, democratic socialism, and the ending of interethnic reprisals. He is sincerely seeking ways of boosting the culture and degree of education of the people and of the younger generation.

His opponents from Manezhnaya Square shout: "Down with!" Then you ask: What about "Long live?" That

slogan applies to the continuing chaos of the lawless state, the rampaging of corruption and racketeering, the flourishing of boorishness, the split of the country and Russia into separate principality-states, social nihilism, the triumph of the principles of "money doesn't smell" and "the end justifies the means?"

And that is in the people's name? Hardly.

Fortunately, state television did not transmit directly from Manezhnaya Square. People there obviously think more frequently of youthful susceptibility to all kinds of transmissions.

Abalkin Outlines Path Toward 'Regulated Market'

AU3107072290 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 30 Jul 90 p 2

[Report on interview with USSR Deputy Premier Leonid Abalkin by Franz Thoma in Munich on 29 July: "Three Stages to the 'Regulated Market'"]

[Text] By 1995 the USSR intends to have converted its economy from a planned one to a "regulated market economy" in three stages. "The crucial moment" will already have come with the price and tax reforms in early 1991. This was stated by Professor Leonid Abalkin, deputy premier and chairman of the economic reform commission of the USSR, in an interview with SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG on the occasion of an experts' meeting in Munich. Abalkin, a resolute reformer, believes that the ruble will become convertible, that is, freely exchangeable, only in the middle of 1995.

After more than 70 years of a state command economy, it will be difficult for the people in the USSR to adapt to a "regulated market," that is, to change their way of thinking. Asked about this, Abalkin in his interview with SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG stated that this change is "really one of the most important and difficult problems of our perestroyka." Yet this does not only have negative aspects but positive ones as well. In his meetings with people from the cooperatives, that is, the new economic organizations of the USSR, he was very surprised at how many people there were who are thinking along new lines and who are full of initiatives, he said. "They can cope excellently with the new economic situation." Without becoming overly emotional, one could speak of the talents of the Russian people. This has already been confirmed by the "USSR's commercial life."

Abalkin, (who also advocates the idea of special economic zones), said it was very important that the people get money with purchasing power as soon as possible. Nevertheless, one must not spend this money on consumer goods alone, but also on industrial and commercial projects. This "entire money problem will, however, be solved through the transition to the market economy."

Abalkin described as "a most controversial process" the fact that, following the most recent decisions, in the USSR today anybody may have dollars and spend them wherever he likes. The use of two currencies in the USSR might deform the market. Losses are inevitable in this connection; yet this will also bring the USSR closer to ruble convertibility. Thus there are more advantages than disadvantages.

Abalkin does not find it easy to give a date for ruble convertibility. A special project, a kind of competition, refers to a scientific study on this topic, he said. Some 600 studies from 20 countries were submitted, and the works were evaluated by a jury of USSR and U.S. experts. Meanwhile, the six best studies have been selected, and they will now be examined by the government. "We will prepare a special program for the transition to a convertible currency." However, without a market economy one cannot introduce convertibility, Abalkin said. The third stage of the Soviet reform program provides for a convertible currency. "This will be in about 1995." As of 1 January 1991, CEMA will change over to world market prices and settle accounts in hard currencies. Abalkin expects that this will improve the USSR's position as far as foreign currency is concerned, although not dramatically. The USSR's foreign economic relations with other socialist countries are now being carefully discussed, "particularly with the GDR." It is not altogether certain that relations here will remain very close and good "in all spheres, particularly in the field of technology," he said. There is mutual interest in preserving these relations. That is why one must try to achieve compromises in this sphere. "We must not dramatically improve our own situation to keep the situation of our partners from getting worse."

For example, the CSFR is expecting an oil price shock, which it was spared in the seventies. Asked about this, Abalkin said that the USSR is selling normal products such as crude oil and other raw materials, whereas its partners do not supply very competitive goods in return. "If we do not buy these goods these countries will get into a most difficult situation. That is why we must seek compromises."

Abalkin is considered to be a determined economic reformer—with a sense of proportion. It is impossible to continue life as in the past, he said at the German-Soviet economic meeting in Munich. It is true that at the beginning of perestroyka one did not have a very specific idea of the great number of problems. Gradually, Soviet society is showing an understanding for the necessity of transition to the regulated market. For 1991 Abalkin announced a "tight budget" with big cuts, particularly in administrative and defense spending.

Bakatin Reviews Data on 'Illegal Formations'

PM3107154990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jul 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by Colonel R. Makushin: "Decisive Measures Are Needed"]

[Text] A press conference on the theme "The USSR President's Decree 'On Banning Armed Groups Not Provided for Under USSR Legislation and on the Confiscation of Weapons Held Illegally'" took place at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center 27 July. V. Bakatin, USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, and A. Maslennikov, the USSR president's press secretary, answered questions from Soviet and foreign journalists.

It was stressed at the press conference that the presidential decree is to be implemented above all by republican organs. The USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] is to render assistance to them, if the need arises. On 26 July an order was circulated in the MVD which defines the operational procedure for personnel in these circumstances. Acting jointly with republican organs of power, the USSR MVD is capable of resolving this task, V. Bakatin said. But precisely—acting jointly.

According to the latest data, illegal formations exist in the Baltic republics, Moldavia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. They are relatively few in number, and all these formations deny that they possess weapons. MVD information, nonetheless, testifies to the contrary. As for Armenia, the position of the republic leadership, including party leadership, is currently at variance with the Constitution and at variance with common sense. Unlawful armed formations operate almost legally in the republic, bandit armed operations are almost a daily occurrence since a considerable number of criminals have joined these formations, and the offenders are organizing operations to capture arms with the connivance of the MVD, the KGB, and the prosecutor's office. In the current year they have seized 6,700 weapons in Armenia, including 1,200 automatic weapons.

Impressive figures relating to weapons "that have gone astray" in the country were cited at the press conference. According to USSR MVD information a total of 4.7 million weapons have been issued (to hunters, the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy], schools, and so forth). The militia is searching for 11,686 weapons which have been seized. Last year in areas with a complex operational situation 164,313 weapons were confiscated by the militia or surrendered, including 24,280 rifles. These are the gloomy statistics.

In reply to journalists' questions on how, in his opinion, events will develop further, the minister of internal affairs refused to make predictions but noted that intensive work lay ahead.

PRAVDA Outlines Responses to Weapons Decree

PM0108103590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Aug 90 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Roundup by O. Kuzmin and G. Ovcharenko under the "Stop the Press" rubric: "How Is the Decree Being Implemented?"—first two paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Fifteen days—this is the deadline that was set in the 26 July 1990 USSR presidential decree on armed formations not provided for under legislation to disband and for illegally held weapons to be voluntarily surrendered.

How has the presidential decree been received in society? How is its implementation progressing? In order to answer these questions we telephoned PRAVDA's correspondents in a number of the country's regions yesterday.

Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]

"The situation in the republic remains complex, in my opinion," our Baku correspondent Zaur Kadymbekov told us, "especially in areas bordering the Armenian SSR. Therefore most of my compatriots have welcomed the president's decree."

[PRAVDA] Zaur Kemalevich, could you cite the opinion of a specific person?

[Kadymbekov] Yes, literally today I spoke to Akhad Gasanov, head of the Kazakhskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department. In his opinion, such a decree should have been issued long ago. He told me that since the decree was published, three villages in his rayon have come under fire from Idzhevanskiy Rayon in Armenia. That means that illegal armed formations in Armenia continue to exacerbate the situation.

[PRAVDA] But after all, it is no secret that formations of fighters are operating in Azerbaijan too....

[Kadymbekov] According to what I was told by Akif Rafiyev, republican deputy minister of internal affairs, who, incidentally, heads the staff for coordinating operations and implementing the stipulations of the USSR president's decree, no illegal armed formations have been identified in Azerbaijan to date. The deputy minister said: The Azerbaijan SSR has introduced unilateral emergency measures. Along the border with Armenia a 5km zone has been established where the people's security is safeguarded by USSR and republican MVD [Ministry of Interior] subunit posts rather than any kind of national armed formations. Unfortunately, our neighbors have rejected such measures.

[PRAVDA] Nonetheless, judging by the same operational information, there are quite a lot of weapons in the republic. Are they being voluntarily surrendered?

[Kadymbekov] I have no information to this effect at my disposal.

Armenian SSR

"Since the publication of the USSR presidential decree on 26 July," Aram Sarkisyan, our colleague in Yerevan, told us, "not a day has passed when the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet has not discussed the operational situation in the republic. And, as everyone knows, the situation is alarming. The presence of "uncontrolled" armed

formations, and especially of bandit groups posing as volunteer militia, is causing serious concern among the people. Local clashes on the border and thefts of motor vehicles continue.

[PRAVDA] Nonetheless, we are told that the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet has, for all intents and purpose, suspended the application of the presidential decree on the territory of the republic?

[Sarkisyan] Yes, it has been decided to temporarily suspend the implementation of the provisions of the USSR president's decree in the Armenian SSR, including Nagorno-Karabakh. It was decided to assume full control over the establishment of order and to exclude all interference from outside. It was also decided to propose to the USSR president that talks be held between him and a delegation of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet on the said questions.

[PRAVDA] What case did the authors of the resolution make for their proposals?

[Sarkisyan] Commenting on these proposals, deputies said that in the conditions of the tense political situation in the republic, when parliamentary power is only just beginning to be established and old and largely paralyzed power structures are operating, steps to ensure the implementation of the presidential decree could lead to senseless bloodshead and clashes with military units in which servicemen of various nationalities are serving.

[PRAVDA] However, the adopted resolution is at variance with the USSR Constitution....

[Sarkisyan] I talked about this with R. Mnatsakanyan, Armenian people's deputy and first secretary of the Dilizhanskiy party gorkom [city committee]. In his opinion the prevailing situation is such that we must try to resolve the problem exclusively by political methods. It is known that the armed formations in republic were set up during and after the military conflict on the border with the Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] and after the breakdown of the Soviet-Iranian border, across which a large quantity of weapons was brought into Azerbaijan, according to our information. In addition, the people's deputy noted, all the questions connected with the unsolved Nagorno-Karabakh problem are triggering a negative reaction among the population.

The Armenian Supreme Soviet set up a defense council back on 3 May. According to the deputies, all the armed formations operating on the republic's territory must be placed under its jurisdiction. The members of these organizations have to be registered and their weapons put in storage, and then, if necessary, they can be called to the MVD's assistance in combating the criminal element which has armed itself covertly. Any other solution, I was told, could have tragic consequences today.

[PRAVDA] In short, the president's decree is not regarded as a decree in Armenia?

[Sarkisyan] As the deputies explained to me, the republican parliament, while not rejecting the presidential decree in principle, has proposed that talks should precede its implementation while, at the same time, specific measures are taken to establish order in the republic.

Kirghiz SSR

Our correspondent Yuriy Razgulyayev is on the line:

[Razgulyayev] After the well-known tragic events, the situation in the republic is stabilizing. I have talked to F. Kulov, Kirghiz SSR deputy minister of internal affairs. He told me that there are no major legal [as published] formations here. But the population has accumulated quite a few weapons. The work to confiscate them began even before the president's decree with the introduction of the emergency situation in Frunze and Osh Oblast in June. In the republic capital alone, more than 4,000 people have already voluntarily surrendered their illegal "arsenals."

[PRAVDA] Has this been reflected in the crime situation?

[Razgulyayev] Naturally. For instance, according to the deputy minister's information, no serious crime involving the use of weapons has been committed in the republic capital during the past month. But it would be premature to claim that all is well. Therefore people are pinning great hopes on the president's decree.

[PRAVDA] Does this mean that people in the republic have understood this decree correctly, that they have understood that the president is not encroaching on republics' sovereignty but safeguarding the Constitution?

[Razgulyayev] Precisely. Most of the people I have talked to unconditionally support the decree. But it is true, as Yu. Gorbunov, USSR people's deputy and director of the "Oshkpdproyektstroy" association, told me, that people fear that it will not be possible to implement the decree quickly. The sad experience of interethnic clashes has shown that, putting it mildly, the local militia has not always discharged its duty with honor. Therefore, Yu. Gorbunov believes, there is no guarantee that it will actively strive for the implementation of the decree.

Moscow

We telephoned the USSR MVD press center. The call was taken by Aleksandr Rostovtsev, the duty officer, who gave us the latest operational information:

At 0330 hours an armed group consisting of eight people mounted an attack on the Martuninskiy Rayon internal affairs department in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. The criminals seized a Makarov pistol, bulletproof vests, a mine detector, radio transceivers, and sundry ammunition....

On Erebuni Square in Yerevan three armed criminals attacked a vehicle and seized A., who had been arrested for murder, while he was being taken from the Leninskiy Rayon People's Court to a solitary confinement cell at a remand center. An official investigation is under way....

On the morning of 30 July, in a military unit deployed in Kutaisi city, criminals stole keys from the duty officer's safe and carried off 40 Makarov pistols. At 2315 the weapons were found on a garbage heap on the same unit's premises. An investigation is being conducted by the Kutaisi Garrison Military Prosecutor's Office....

The situation in Osh Oblast, Kirghizia is returning to normal. All national economic, communications, trade, and public catering enterprises in the oblast center are working. But an emergency situation arose yesterday. In the area of a brickworks a commandant's post came under fire from a passing vehicle. As a result Soviet Army serviceman Yu. Bykov was wounded and had to be hospitalized.

Deputy Minister Discusses Hijackings

PM3107114190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with M. Timofeyev, deputy minister of civil aviation, by correspondent V. Belikov: "Attention: Air Terrorism!"; place and date of interview not given—first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] This is the first time our civil aviation has encountered such a situation: In the past seven weeks there have been 13 (!) hijackings or thwarted attempted hijackings of Soviet aircraft abroad. Compare this with the fact that in Aeroflot's entire history there have been slightly more than 70 such extraordinary incidents.... What has caused this wave of air piracy, and what is being done to combat these very grave crimes? An IZVESTIYA correspondent talks with M. Timofeyev, deputy minister of civil aviation:

[Timofeyev] The outbreak of the criminal wave on air transport is caused, in the opinion of specialists, by the increasingly complex crime-inducing situation in the country. It cannot be ruled out that the disregard for the law and selfish permissiveness which have recently taken root are pushing people toward the intention of carrying out a hijacking. After all, by their threats to cause an explosion on board and their demands to fly abroad heedless of the consequences caused for the aviation services by a sudden incursion into foreign air space, the hijackers are putting hundreds of lives at risk in the aircraft itself and where it has to land, if it succeeds in doing so....

[Belikov] It is asserted that one reason for hijacking aircraft is the difficulty in leaving the Soviet Union....

[Timofeyev] Undoubtedly the procedure for leaving is still complicated, although much has already been done to eliminate superfluous formalities. In addition it is very difficult to get an airline ticket for the date and foreign flight you want. But you will agree that we cannot allow individual citizens—whatever the reasons and motives they use to justify themselves—to decide questions of their personal emigration by hijacking an aircraft and threatening the lives of totally innocent people.

I very much doubt whether any of the recent hijackers would have set about compiling emigration documents in the proper way, even according to the most simplified procedure. And although it has turned out that in fact they had neither weapons nor explosives, their actions are in international law equal to the most serious law violations.

[Belikov] What international norms exist on this score and do our laws, instructions, and rules comply with them?

[Timofeyev] The Soviet Union, adopting an active stance in the activity of the International Civil Aviation Organization, has become a signatory to all international conventions on preventing acts of illegal interference in the activity of civil aviation. Our legislation and the USSR Air Code have been brought into line with the demands and provisions of these documents, including the Hague convention on combating aircraft hijacking. It was adopted after a veritable barrage of air terrorism in the late sixties (in the United States alone there were 80-90 skyjackings a year!). Now over 130 countries have acceded to the convention.

The states that have signed the convention have assumed undertakings to strictly punish air bandits on their territory or to hand them over to the country to which the specific aircraft belongs. An attempt to commit such a crime or complicity in it are also punishable. For a long time now we have persistently sought the adoption of an international norm on the compulsory handing over of criminals since we are convinced that this is the most effective method of combating piracy in the sky.

[Belikov] What are the rights and duties of the commander of an aircraft in a critical situation?

[Timofeyev] The crew commander is invested with the maximum powers. He bears personal responsibility for ensuring the safety of the aircraft and all people on board. He takes the necessary steps to retain control over the aircraft, guided primarily by his own assessment of the situation, with a consideration for the advice and recommendations he receives from his radio link with the ground. The law violators' demands are fulfilled by him to the degree to which this may accord with safety interests.

[Belikov] Do these rights accord with our country's international commitments?

[Timofeyev] The most important document of civil aviation—the 1963 Tokyo convention—specifically defines the aircraft commander's rights to take steps of coercion with regard to a person who has committed or

is preparing to commit a particular criminal act which threatens passengers, the crew, and the normal execution of the flight.

It is important to stress that in full accordance with this convention the commander and members of his crew, the passengers, and the owner or so-called exploiter of the aircraft do not bear responsibility during any legal investigation with regard to measures to halt criminal actions in flight and to deal with the hijacker.

[Belikov] It is well known that Soviet crews are armed during the flight. How does this comply with international practice?

[Timofeyev] Indeed, Aeroflot is one of the few world airlines that arms its flight personnel, which is envisaged by existing legislation. But the USSR Air Code (on the basis of which pilots are armed) will be reviewed in the very near future....

[Belikov] Well, it is not ruled out that Soviet civilian pilots will again set forth on a flight unarmed. But can "ground control" help in the struggle against air terrorism?

[Timofeyev] Yes, a program has already been elaborated and is starting to be implemented for the creation of a new generation of Soviet surveillance equipment. In terms of their specifications these instruments and equipment comply with the world standard and it is now a question of installing them at as many air terminals as possible as quickly as possible.

[Belikov] In conclusion: How should those who come up directly against a hijacker in the air behave?

[Timofeyev] On receiving the report that an attempt has been made to hijack the aircraft, the crew tries to prevent panic on board and unpredictable actions by the passengers. That is why it is most sensible to comply with the flight attendants' request to take their seats and fasten their belts. Passengers are recommended not to undertake any independent actions to halt a criminal act.

As for the flight attendants—they are women, generally—they go through special training on how to act in extreme situations. A very great deal depends on their behavior, on their ability to conduct conversation in a purely feminine way and to be persuasive at moments when an acute conflict arises. Thanks to these human qualities and professional skills our flight attendants have frequently succeeded in averting a tragic development of events.

Airport Security Shortcomings Revealed

904H0271A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jul 90 p 1

[Article by S. Ilchenko: "Why Don't I Hijack a Plane?"]

[Text] *This is what a journalist from Dnepropetrovsk decided, then he took his F-1 hand grenade and went to the local airport.*

What a simple affair it turned out to be.

I shouldn't even talk about the grenade. Even though the Ukrainian nights are still quiet, it is easier to acquire a hand grenade in the Dnieper region than, say, a pineapple. But then I spent about half an hour trying to think where to hide the thing. Then, without racking my brains any further, I wrapped an old newspaper around it and stuffed it into my "Erika" typewriter. The Erika has never failed me and now the rounded side of the grenade fitted snugly in the curvature of the letter keys.

One: I put the housing back on; two: I snapped the locks of the carrying case shut. I was ready. All I had to do was to settle down "for the journey."

At night the airport was full of passengers, planes, and policemen. It was stuffy there. A number of flights were delayed including the one I wanted: No. 1560 from Dnepropetrovsk to Moscow. Finally, I heard the announcement.

"Are you checking this case or do you want to take it on board?"

"On board, definitely. This is so fragile a thing."

I am subjected to the pre-flight security check. I must admit that I shivered a bit inwardly but as I discovered there was no reason for it.

The special control section. The conveyor belt that is jerking spasmodically with age is carrying my Erika through the X-ray introscope unit "Luch-1". And this masterpiece of our domestic electronics X-rayed the typewriter and presented an indefinite image on its screen. The senior lieutenant was brief: "Open. A typewriter? All right. Close it. Proceed."

Together with a hundred unsuspecting passengers I walk vigorously to the beautiful Yak-43, No. 42-300-21, from the Bykovo air detachment. The plane growled softly as it fueled and revved up. I have the opportunity to make sure that there is enough fuel to take us to Istanbul—no doubt about it.

The flight attendant invites everybody to board. I squeeze in first.

"Where is my seat, 14-D, please?"

"You can take any vacant seat. Wherever you feel more comfortable."

A hijacker feels more comfortable in the back, of course. I am protected from the side by a lady of considerable size; behind me is the storage closet full of bags. The cabin, passengers, doors, hatches—I can see them all right in front of me.

I put my typewriter under the seat, I open it quietly, pull out the hand grenade and... put this drill grenade back. Three hours ago the KGB airport operations officer was told about the coming experiment. Now it is his turn to intercede. Now he must inform the police about "an explosive device on board." A slight disturbance follows. The passengers are watching with great interest as some fellows armed with short-barrelled sub-machine guns escort the "criminal" out onto the airfield. A bit late, guys. I could be airborne now, in fact.

I wished so much that it had been different! Eleven planes have been hijacked—enough, you cannot do it any more. Especially after the Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation M. Timofeyev stated that: "The Ministry of Civil Aviation, in cooperation with other interested agencies, has prepared a state program meant to secure civil aviation against any acts of illegal interference. The program was recently sent to the USSR Council of Ministers." There was one more encouraging fact. According to the results of the departmental inspection, last year security in the Dnepropetrovsk Airport was described as the best in the Ukraine.

Here is a small question now. Why was I able to get on the plane with a hand grenade? Both the policemen and the airport officials were upset as they told me the same thing: The Luch x-ray units are very weak and hard to work with. The arc-shaped "Gvozdika" metal detectors were designed to detect and calculate the amount of metal on prisoners coming back from work. For that reason they cannot cope with the round-the-clock service in passenger airports. In other words, we have an urgent need for foreign-made detection devices and for special training.

But how can lack of any equipment explain the fact that this past summer one of the airport security guards was found dead drunk right on the runway? Another such "guard" asked an old woman who was selling apricots there "to keep an eye on his sub-machine gun while he is having a beer." What prevented the senior lieutenant at the control point from simply looking under the housing of my typewriter?

Suppose we assume, purely hypothetically, that the security in the Dnepropetrovsk Airport is guaranteed; there are still over a dozen airfields in the oblast with agricultural planes parked on them. According to Ukrainian KGB data, they are usually guarded by "unarmed retired people, people known to be alcohol abusers, people who have been in prison, etc." Meanwhile, an AN-2 with full fuel tanks can easily make it from the village of Pyatikhatki to Istanbul and wave its silver wing to the entire air defense system on the way. Thus, we have a system of separate shortcomings that does not allow the prevention of plane hijackings. And it has been said many times: The problem will remain until we have a law on freedom of emigration. It is the only measure that can strip the hijackers of their political aura.

And criminals are extradited by all countries.

TASS Cited on Council of Ministers Decisions

PM3107111990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 2

[TASS report: "At the USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] On 28 July TASS carried several reports on recent decisions adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Good news for working people in culture, health care, social security, and public education: The government has revised earlier adopted decisions and resolved to bring forward the introduction of new terms of labor remuneration for these categories of working people. They will be introduced as of 1 January 1991 instead of 1992-94. Following representations from the USSR ministries and departments concerned and from union republic councils of ministers, the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems has been entrusted, together with the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, with setting new wage rates, salaries, and other terms of labor remuneration for working people in those sectors of the nonproduction sphere for which they have not yet been adopted and with introducing them as of 1 January 1991 also.

The Council of Ministers has adopted a resolution on measures to help the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic to eliminate the aftermath of the earthquake in East Kazakhstan and Semipalatinsk Oblasts. IZVESTIYA has written about the grave situation that developed following that disaster. Tens of thousands of people are still without a roof over their heads. Kazakhstan is being allocated considerable state funds and material and technical resources needed to restore damaged production and sociocultural installations and to construct new ones to replace those destroyed. This Union republic's council of ministers has been entrusted with resolving questions of fully reimbursing the cost of material damages to the population hit by the natural disaster. On the orders of the USSR Government, timber and construction materials, diverse consumer goods for sale to suffering families, and commercial-technological equipment for the educational, trade, and public catering installations under restoration are being sent to Kazakhstan.

Another government decision: In order to reinforce the the USSR Ministry of Railways guard service and galvanize its activity in ensuring the proper protection of freight while being conveyed by rail transport, the USSR Council of Ministers has obliged the Ministry of Railways to elaborate and implement measures to step up the struggle against thefts and other offenses in rail transport. The adopted resolution on reinforcing this ministry's guard service points out that the situation with regard to ensuring the safety of freight remains unsatisfactory.

In order to improve and enhance the efficiency of banking services for enterprises and organizations in the agro-industrial complex, a Council of Ministers decision

has transformed the USSR Agro-industrial Bank into a commercial joint-stock bank. This bank's shareholders can be—on voluntary principles—enterprises, establishments, organizations, banks, and other Soviet corporate bodies and citizens, as well as joint ventures set up on USSR territory with the participation of foreign organizations and firms, foreign banks, and other foreign corporate bodies and citizens. Joint ventures may acquire shares in the Agro-industrial Bank for both Soviet and foreign currency.

Conference on Kurds Concludes in Moscow

PM0108104190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent V. Khovratovich under the rubric "Direct Link": "Conference of Kurds"]

[Text] Moscow—The scientific-practical conference "Kurds of the USSR: History and the Present" has completed its work in Moscow. In actual fact, as many speakers said, it was a congress of the country's Kurdish population—the first in 60 years.

The Kurds, who used to have their own autonomy—Red Kurdistan—and their own schools, newspapers, and theaters, shared the fate of many Caucasian peoples in the thirties and forties: They were expelled from their motherland.

Held under the auspices of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the conference was to be the first real step toward the full restoration of the Kurds' rights. It is known that the Supreme Soviet has adopted a resolution on the rehabilitation of all peoples subjected to repression. Does this also mean their return to their original land? The official document does not answer this question.

What happened in the institute's assembly hall can hardly be called a scientific meeting. At best, it was a "sanctioned rally." It is possible to understand many speakers—this was a cry from the soul which had been held in check by decades of absence of rights and humiliation and which finally burst forth. Even today the position of the Kurds has not improved very much and in some places has even become worse. There are now 18,000 Kurdish refugees in Krasnodar Kray. They live in poverty—they are not allowed residence permits, are not sold accommodation, and are not registered with hospitals; their children are not admitted to schools....

"However," Academician N. Nadirov of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, chairman of the conference organizing committee, pointed out, "surely we are not the only people in such a position? The Crimean Tatars, the Volga Germans, the Meskhetian Turks... And they all want to move back to their original lands. But how is this to be implemented in practice?..."

In my opinion, the most constructive proposal came from the lips of a foreign guest. "The chief task for my Soviet fellow tribesmen today," K. Nezan, director of the Kurdish Institute in Paris, said, "is not national-territorial but national-cultural autonomy where there is now a concentrated population of them. A political solution to the Kurdish problem might drag on, but you can begin a cultural revival immediately."

Soviet Germans Prepare for Congress 'This Year'

LD3007212890 Moscow TASS in English 2012 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 30 TASS—Academician Boris Rauschenbach has been elected chairman of the organising committee to prepare and hold a congress of Soviet Germans this year.

The congress is expected to found an all-union association of Soviet Germans and elect its leading bodies.

It was announced here today that the organising committee comprising thirty members was endorsed at the joint session of the Commission for Nationality Policy and Inter-Ethnic Relations of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Council of Nationalities Chamber and the State Commission for Soviet Germans Affairs.

The organising committee was entrusted with drawing up the congress agenda, defining its date and the procedure for electing delegates and holding the congress. It is also expected to prepare and submit to the state commission for Soviet Germans affairs proposals, to be later considered by the USSR Council of Ministers, concerning the cost of preparing and holding the congress.

The USSR Ministry of Justice and respective research institutes have been instructed to draw up, jointly with the organising committee, proposals concerning the legal status of the all-union association of Soviet Germans, the authority to be vested in its leading bodies, principles of representation in the USSR Supreme Soviet and the supreme soviets of union republics, other bodies of state authority and management, the granting of rights to develop national culture and education, training of specialists, publishing activity, participation in international cooperation and the solution of other problems facing Soviet Germans.

The preparation for the congress is taking pace in keeping with the USSR Supreme Soviet's resolution of November 1989 "On conclusions and proposals of the commissions for the affairs of Soviet Germans and the Crimean Tatar population".

New Press Law Slated To Go Into Effect 1 Aug

LD0108133990 Moscow TASS in English 1313 GMT 1 Aug 90

[By TASS Correspondent Vladimir Isachenkov]

[Text] Moscow August 1 TASS—Five years since the beginning of perestroyka in the USSR glasnost is now under the protection of the law on the press and other

media. The law, adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet in June, goes into effect today.

The law contains guarantees of the freedom of the press and a journalist's rights, abolishes censorship and enables not only organsations but also every citizen to establish a means of information.

The law stipulates the criminal responsibility of officials for interfering with the lawful professional activity of journalists and also for coercing them to circulate or refusing to circulate information and sets out a number of other specific guarantees of a journalist's rights.

A journalist, for instance, has the right to refuse to prepare an item contradicting his views and can also withdraw his by-line if the contents of the item were distorted by editing.

To register a news organisation, it is enough to state the person or organisation establishing it, give its name and address, state how often it will appear, the number of copies and the sources of financing.

Under the law, registration can be denied only to a media outlet the program of which contains calls for the forcible overthrow of the existing state and public system, for national, racial and religious intolerance or propaganda for war, violence and cruelty.

Although the law was throughly formulated by several parliamentary committees over a six month period, it still contains unclear provisions and standards that could be interpreted too broadly.

It was pointed out at a meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on glasnost on July 27 that because the law does not specify punishment for a media outlet that inflicts moral damage, there will inevitably be sharp and not always justified differences in fines imposed by courts.

Deputies instructed the government to finish working out all the acts necessary to implement the law in the weeks ahead.

The law goes into effect at a time when there is an acute shortage of newsprint and printing services. In addition, just when subscriptions are to be received, the USSR Ministry of Communications announced the establishment of higher tariffs for the delivery of printing matte to subscribers.

As a result the price of most newspapers and magazines will at least double, wiping out many publications.

There will surely be a sharp drop in the number of subscribers to literary and artistic magazines, such as NOVY MIR, DRUZHBA NARADOV, NEVA AND ZNAMYA.

In the recent years these magazines were on the frontline of glasnost, publishing works of the previously outlawed authors. Now most of those works have been published, subscription prices will rise, and the magazines may lose a number of their readers.

Yefimov Ousted From State Committee on Press

PM3107123790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jul 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report under the "Diary" rubric]

[Text] USSR President M.S. Gorbachev has released Comrade Nikolay Ivanovich Yefimov from his duties as chairman of the USSR State Committee on the Press in connection with his transfer to other work.

Glavlit Rules Contrary to Press Law To Be Revoked

LD2807083190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Meeting today, the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Glasnost, Citizens' Rights and Appeals discussed the bringing into force beginning 1 August 1990 of the USSR law on the press and other mass information media. The heads of a number of union ministries, state committees, and mass information media were invited.

The participants in the meeting concluded that in rapidly changing economic circumstances, certain points of the law will get bogged down. This is due mainly to the substantial rise in the price of paper beginning next year, the switch to new working conditions in communications enterprises, and the disastrous shortage of paper.

Those assembled were briefed on the revocation of all Glavlit [Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press] provisions and instructions at variance with the law on the press.

Increased Newspaper Prices Detailed

PM3007132190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jul 90 p 1

[V. Arsenyeva feature: "Readers of All Newspapers, Apologies..."]

[Excerpts] Our fears have thus been justified. We are free.

The editorial office has finally obtained the right to decide on its own what KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA will cost. [passage omitted].

Many of our colleagues have been estimating the annual subscription price. The approximate price (with discount) is as follows:

PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA R22.56.
SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA R21.12.
RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA and SELSKAYA ZHIZN R19.08.

Yesterday KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's editorial office, upholding its readers' interests, proposed to its founder—the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League]:

To establish out of future profit a discount of more than 50 percent for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA subscribers and to set the annual subscription rate at R13.80.

In the retail market, to which KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has hitherto been denied access for inexplicable reasons, it will cost the same as other newspapers—10 kopeks. [passage omitted].

Komsomol Plenum Calls for Printing Reforms

90US1113A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jun 90 p 3

[Appeal, Resolution of the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League (Komsomol) published under the general heading "Readers of All Newspapers, the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League Is for You!"]

[Text] **Appeal of the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] to the USSR Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee**

The Central Committee plenum believes that the situation regarding the printing of youth publications that has developed recently is intolerable. The situation is without precedent: Having announced an unlimited subscription campaign and obtained money on credit, the state assumed certain obligations which it has actually repudiated unilaterally by now. On some days, the number of subscribers who fail to receive KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA reaches 5 million. Overall, in June subscribers failed to receive more than 45 million copies of the newspaper. Other publications are facing a similar situation. At issue is not only a considerable amount of money which the state has removed from the pockets of subscribers. In essence, they were deprived of their constitutional right to information.

The government has not responded to all appeals by the people's deputies and the mass media.

The USSR Council of Ministers is not officially refuting information on the increase in prices for newspapers and magazines which are being prepared. The consequences of decisions made in private are predictable: This means additional social tensions, the discrediting of the USSR Law on the Press, and the introduction of a market economy to which they are trying to attribute increasing prices for producing and distributing periodicals, with arbitrary departmental decisions.

The VLKSM Central Committee seconds the assessment of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Issues of Glasnost, Rights, and Appeals of Citizens: The disintegration of the state structures of the press has actually begun. We can state with complete clarity that the situation is virtually no longer under the control of the government.

The VLKSM Central Committee appeals to the government with a demand:

—to take emergency measures to ensure newsprint for the production of planned press runs of newspapers and magazines;

—to prevent the exacerbation of the existing situation due to publishing new newspapers and magazines and increasing the volume of those already in existence at the expense of the stocks earmarked for other periodicals;

—to take into account the fact that higher subscription rates for newspapers and magazines will first of all affect the low-income strata of the populace, including young people, and provide state subsidies for producing large-circulation sociopolitical youth publications and publications for children;

—to prevent the unjustified inflation of prices for newsprint, production, and delivery of newspaper and magazine periodicals which will unavoidably affect the publishing potential of Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], youth, and other sociopolitical organizations.

The VLKSM Central Committee plenum insists that the government respond in a constructive manner and calls on the government to refrain from ill-considered decisions which violate the rights of the young people and are capable of harming the policy of glasnost.

Resolution of the Second Plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee on Some Issues of Subscriptions to VLKSM Publications

The current subscription campaign is going to take place under difficult conditions. Due to the emergence of new political, social, and creative associations, an extensive selection of publications will be offered on the newspaper and magazine market. At the same time, prospects of higher costs are also realistic, including the costs of youth and children's newspapers and magazines of the VLKSM caused by growing prices of newsprint and higher transportation and printing costs. It is easy to see that this will primarily strike a blow at the budgets of young people and will deprive them of many favorite publications, as well as an opportunity to obtain necessary information. The Komsomol budget which is based to a considerable degree on proceeds from publishing operations will also suffer seriously. Many newspapers and magazines which are profitable at present may turn out to be unprofitable tomorrow with all the ensuing consequences.

In conjunction with this, the Second Plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee resolves:

1. To adopt the text of a VLKSM Central Committee appeal to the USSR Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee.

2. Komsomol committees will conduct the necessary political and organizational work for propagating youth and children's publications of the VLKSM.

3. The VLKSM Central Committee will allocate funds for advertising the central newspapers and magazines of the Komsomol.

4. Komsomol organizations-founders of periodicals will, together with editorial collectives, undertake the necessary steps aimed at bringing the principles and forms of political, economic, and legal mutual relations into compliance with the USSR Law "On the Press and Other Mass Media."

5. USSR people's deputies from the VLKSM will seek the establishment of preferential tax rates for publishing houses producing literature for young people and children during the consideration of the draft USSR Law "On General Foundations of State Youth Policy" in its second reading at the next session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

P.S. We know that this issue of the newspaper will end up in the hands of the delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress. What is your opinion, and what are your actions, delegates of the party forum?

First Independent Commercial Station Established

PM3107102090 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Jul 90 p 5

[Report by Elisabeth Lumby: "The Soviet Union's Red Baron Takes to the Air"]

[Text] With the KGB, the Red Army, and civil aviation as its nearest neighbors in the FM band, the Soviet Union's first independent commercial radio station, "Radio ROKS," will begin broadcasting by 15 October at the latest, but perhaps as early as September, with Tuborg, Carlsberg, LEGO, Dandy, and Rahbek Fisk as the first interested Danish advertisers.

"The most difficult thing is actually finding premises in Moscow. We have had no success so far," said managing director Andrey Romanchenko, technical director Viktor Goreglyad, and sales director Yuriy Akinshin, who are currently in Copenhagen for talks with director Torben Dhalvad of TD-Consult, which will handle contacts between "Radio ROKS" and advertisers in West Europe and the United States.

"We will start with 10 hours of broadcasts a day, and after a year we will be broadcasting round the clock: news, weather reports, traffic information, competitions, and horoscopes in the mornings—but music first and foremost.

"It will mostly be music for young people of 25 and over, although some heavy metal will be broadcast for the teenagers, said the three Russian radio pioneers, whose station can be compared to "The Voice" [reference unknown] and whose "red baron" is 32-year-old Vladimir Sipachev, who has become a millionaire by Western standards by setting up a bank, for example.

Andrey Romanchenko and Yuriy Akinshin speak fluent Norwegian, for they and the majority of the "Radio ROKS" staff, which currently numbers 17, are former members of Radio Moscow's Norwegian section, which now has only two journalists and two secretaries left.

The knowledge of Norwegian is very useful, because the new radio station, which is a joint venture company, will broadcast from a studio with a staff of seven in Oslo via the EUTELSAT 1 satellite to Moscow, where there is a staff of ten, until a studio can be found in Moscow. Initially "Radio ROKS" will also be broadcast to Leningrad, Vilnius, Minsk, Kiev, and Brest—with 40 million potential listeners—and will eventually expand to cover the whole Soviet Union, with a target group of 100 million 25-to-55 year olds who are eager to buy.

"Our staff members have been headhunted. Now that Radio Moscow's Norwegian section has been vacuumed, we will start on the other foreign sections. They have the best journalists and the people who are most au fait with what is going on. We pay better wages, but people will have to work harder for them than in a state enterprise," Romanchenko, Akinshin, and Goreglyad said.

"Ten percent of broadcast time will be advertising, chiefly for international firms from West Europe, the United States, and Asia. There is no point in advertising when there is toilet paper at the local supermarket. It will sell anyway."

One minute of advertising time on "Radio ROKS" will cost around 10,000 kroner. By way of comparison, 30 seconds of advertising time on Denmark's TV 2 costs 80,000 kroner.

The idea for "Radio ROKS" was born as recently as March this year and it will go on the air only a couple of months after the adoption of the Soviet Union's first press law. Gorbachev would like to see a wealth of commercial radio stations started by grassroots movements, political parties, and so on.

And the three directors of "Radio ROKS" look forward to free competition—on the air waves too.

New Television Programs Described

LD2807091390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] A total of three new programs have appeared on Central Television lately. They are: "In the USSR Government," which it is scheduled to be broadcast every Friday after the "Vremya" program; "Who's Who?" which is a once-a-month live broadcast that will acquaint

us with the Politburo members, CPSU Central Committee secretaries, and the leaders of inner party tendencies and other parties, and will get answers to questions posed over the telephone during the program; and "Gallery," which presents political portraits of new parties and politicized movements in the Soviet Union and can be seen on Central Television First Program on Friday 3 August. We advise you not to miss these new programs from our Central Television colleagues.

Economic

Ryzhkov's Meeting With IMF Chief Noted

PM3107151990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report: "Meeting With IMF Leader"]

[Text] A meeting took place in the Kremlin 28 July between N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and M. Camdessus, IMF managing director, who is in the Soviet Union on a working visit as a guest of the Soviet Government.

Welcoming M. Camdessus, N.I. Ryzhkov stressed that the Soviet Union attaches great significance to the development of relations with international monetary and credit institutions, and particularly the IMF in whose creation the USSR played a direct part. The present visit by the IMF managing director lays a good foundation for improving contacts between the USSR and the fund.

The results of the conference of the seven leading Western countries in Houston were discussed from the viewpoint of the possibility of rendering assistance to the USSR in implementing the economic reform program. M. Camdessus shared some ideas on effective forms of collaboration between the Soviet Union and the IMF in the matter of studying the Soviet economy in order to prepare recommendations for providing effective support for the reforms that are being implemented.

At his interlocutor's request N.I. Ryzhkov familiarized him with the progress of the reform of the economic system, stressing that the transformations taking place within this framework are creating a realistic basis for deepening the Soviet Union's integration with the world economy.

In view of the fact that M. Camdessus' visit marks the first time in the IMF's history that its leader has visited the USSR, the guest spoke in detail about the activity of the organization he heads and the IMF's participation in the solution of pressing world economic problems.

During the meeting there was an examination of ways to build cooperation between the USSR and the IMF and use its managerial experience and expert appraisals to solve the problems of restructuring the Soviet economy structurally, optimizing investment programs, reforming the pricing system, and introducing ruble convertibility. A plan of practical work to develop cooperation between the USSR and the IMF was laid down.

S.A. Sitaryan, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and E.Ye. Obminskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, on the Soviet side; and senior IMF officials L. Whittam and T. Ter-Minasanian, from the IMF, participated in the conversation.

Shevardnadze Shows Interest in Joining IMF

PM3107112190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report: "Meetings with the IMF Leader"]

[Text] A meeting took place at the USSR Foreign Ministry 28 July between USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and IMF Managing Director M. Camdessus who is in the USSR on a working visit.

It was pointed out that, under conditions of the world economy's deepening interdependence and the development of integration trends, the IMF is playing an increasing role in coordinating the member countries' macroeconomic policies and in formulating concepts for overcoming underdevelopment and settling the foreign debt problem. The failure of a country such as the USSR to participate in the fund weakens the universal nature of this organization.

The minister declared that in the new kind of international relations that are taking shape conditions have grown ripe for beginning talks on the USSR's joining the IMF. Our country regards participation in this organization not as an end in itself but as a logical continuation of the policy of broad involvement in modern world economic ties.

M. Camdessus positively welcomed such an approach. In this connection the mutual interest in developing broad cooperation between the USSR and the IMF was emphasized.

Soviet Government Currency Resolution Examined

LD3107191390 Moscow TASS in English 1729 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Commentary by TASS World Service analyst Andrey Orlov: "The Soviet Government's Currency Resolution: Epitaph for Ruble?"]

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—Accomplished at last! Beginning on August 1, any Soviet citizen may stroll into any store trading for freely convertible currency on Soviet territory and purchase whatever meets his eye—from a limousine to a bra—paying in dollars, pounds, or yens depending on what he has in his purse. And no one will bore him with a piercing look, a frown, and the question where his or her dollars, pounds, or yens stem from.

This has become possible thanks to the Soviet Government's resolution "On Perfecting Retail Trade and Services for Foreign Currency on Soviet Territory" that will go into effect on Wednesday.

If explanation that followed are to be believed [as received], the decision was prompted, among other things, by the desire to bring closer the ruble's convertibility.

That seems to provide sufficient ground for optimism: If earlier the Soviet Union upheld very strict rules for foreign currency operations, the new resolution permits all Soviet citizens to earn hard currency, spend it on Soviet territory, and open hard currency accounts in Vneshekonombank [Bank for Foreign Economic Activity]—all this without declaring the source of his foreign currency income.

Still, I feel no joy both because the government's step was forced, and because in solving some problems it give rise to new ones.

Of course, it can be expected that the legalization of the population's savings in foreign cash (according the COMMERSANT newspaper they amount to two billion U.S. dollars), if spent in newly opening Beryozka shops, trading for foreign currency, or deposited in bank accounts, will help patch up the country's well-worn foreign currency budget.

Respect is also due for the Council of Ministers' courage in recognizing the mistake it made in closing the Beryozka shops in the first place and thus incurring the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars.

Finally, one may agree with the statement that the Soviet market will become much more attractive for foreign capital, above all producers of cigarettes, alcoholic drinks, and consumer goods.

But how can one overlook unpleasant implications, the chief one among which is that the incapacity of the Soviet national currency unit—the ruble—has now been admitted at an official level.

Many financiers and bankers are already warning that the emergence in the Soviet Union of two parallel money markets—the dollar market and the ruble market—can lead in some regions of the country (taking into account the actual economic situation) to a fast replacement of the latter by the former.

The current total shortage of goods and services on the country's domestic market, which creates the producer's absolute domination over the consumer—something completely strange for a Westerner—if combined with the legalization of the dollar can soon result in a situation where Soviet citizens will be asked to pay in hard currency not only for a packet of Marlboro cigarettes but for his airline ticket, a reservation in the restaurant, and for mending his television set.

It is hard to disagree with a scathing remark in a Soviet newspaper which said that the new resolution marks a step to the convertibility not of the ruble but of the dollar.

There is nothing new under the moon, as the saying goes. The wheel we have now invented has recently been tested by our Comecon partners which embarked onto the path of economic experimentation before we did.

A few trial-and-error years led them to a conclusion that while the parallel currency circulation has something to say for it, it fails both to bring nearer the convertibility of a national currency and the end of a black currency market. As a result, East Europeans have rejected the parallel circulation of foreign currency in favor of full-scale convertibility, even if they had to resort to the shock therapy which we have rejected.

One would like to hope that this experience will be taken into account when further steps are taken to perfect Soviet currency legislation.

Transcaucasus Rail Problems Lead to Huge Losses

LD3107200690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1700 GMT on 31 July broadcasts within its "Vremya" program a 2.5-minute recorded video interview with V.S. Zakharenko, deputy chief of administration in the Ministry of Railways, by correspondent Kozhukhova. The venue is not indicated.

Zakharenko says that the problems in the Transcaucasus railroads are causing huge losses. There are two trains running on 31 July which were sent through the Azerbaijani railway. Traffic is paralyzed from Tbilisi to Veseloye, and from Tbilisi to Massis. Armenia is completely cut off from one side.

On 31 July, 166 cargo trains were without engines; this amounts to 18,000 rail cars. Some 32,500 people have been laid off. Application has been made to the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply to sell off the goods sitting in the freight trains on the north Caucasus and Azerbaijani railroads.

Food Processing, Storage Deal Made With Italy

PM0108083990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Report by N. Chernyshova from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] It is no secret that international economic and scientific cooperation with Western states helps us to improve our lives, our housing, and our food.

[Chernyshova] Even today people still live under the illusion that if there are goods to be sold you can sell them off your lap. Today's goods can't just be sold off your lap. There are more than a million different types. What you can do is ruin them. [video shows rotting food

being dumped] It is legal—think about that word—legal for 25 percent of produce to go to waste. And this means that once every five years all our agriculture is working to no avail. Produce needs a roof over its head. [video shows framework of building] And foodstuffs need proper storage immediately after production. Putting the food in cold storage means sharply reducing losses. [video shows Fata promotional material] And this, in turn, is equivalent to growing new produce. The need to feed the people as quickly as possible made the Kemerovo Oblast leadership appeal to the Italian Fata firm which specializes in developing all the equipment needed in food storage and processing. A primary role in the adoption of this decision was played by the talks between the government and the miners' strike committees. [video shows M.I. Naydov, chairman of Kemerovo Oblast Soviet Executive Committee]

[Naydov] The development of the workers' movement in the Kuzbass was a major incentive and even a stimulus to make us solve these problems, to make us take responsibility for our own concerns. By 1992 food consumption in the Kuzbass should be at the level of biological norms—that's the task we're setting.

[Chernyshova] The plan is scheduled to last 10 years. The sides' commitments have been defined. What surprised me most was that the Italian plan contains an analysis of the agricultural situation in the Kuzbass and gives the optimum recommendations as to what should be grown and in what way. [video shows G. di Rosa, president of Fata]

[Di Rosa, translation read by Chernyshova] In our industry great importance is attached to being able to provide comprehensive processing. Only by so doing can quality be achieved.

[Chernushova] Can your machines be fooled?

[Di Rosa] That's a good question! But we are now producing types of equipment which are virtually foolproof. If they encounter low-quality produce, the machines stop working.

[Chernushova] [video shows rusting equipment] Unfortunately, we have had bitter experience of equipment bought for hard currency not working because of poor-quality raw materials. Milk may be diluted or tomatoes may be squashed.

[Naydov] We've already thought this over, and we're moving in that direction. We will be reequipping the food processing industry on a new basis: ownership. And I think that the training of people, who'll be studying both in Italy and here with us, should create an entirely new climate. Otherwise we won't produce any results. And even such advanced technology won't save us.

Yakovlev Receives Soros Fund President

LD3107192390 Moscow TASS in English 1822 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—Member of the Soviet Presidential Council Aleksandr Yakovlev today received President of the Soros Fund George Soros.

They discussed restructuring in the Soviet Union and possibilities to develop international cooperation in various spheres of economy.

Agricultural

Ryzhkov Interviewed on Grain Procurement

LD3107204290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Interview with Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, by correspondent S. Medvedev in Kazakhstan on 31 July; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Medvedev] Nikolay Ivanovich, today you had the opportunity, both in Saratov Oblast and here in Kazakhstan, to see and perhaps to check how the resolutions adopted by the Council of Ministers on the eve of the harvest—both this one and the previous one—are working. So what is your assessment from your first impressions?

[Ryzhkov] Of course it is difficult in one day to make any sort of assessment that would be truly objective, but my first impressions are very good. In Saratov Oblast, of course, a very good harvest is ripening. I think that the rate at which they are working on the harvest is very good. There are questions, but to some extent there is cause for satisfaction in the fact that the acuteness of what questions there were at the beginning of the harvest, when we started the harvest, have been ironed out to some extent because the main questions appear to be solved; questions of fuel, for example, are not so serious.

[Medvedev] Are they not being raised today?

[Ryzhkov] They are not being raised either in Saratov Oblast or in the Urals Oblast of Kazakhstan, although there are questions of spare parts, questions of batteries, and a number of such problems which of course worry and alarm people. Measures must be taken here. However, the harvest here is very good, and what I like and what provides a certain amount of satisfaction is the fact that people really are pleased by this harvest. We all are pleased. We had been expecting this harvest and today it has come.

[Medvedev] Today you said you would be pleased not to pay foreign currency for grain you are buying from abroad, but unfortunately this is not the case. Incidentally many farms this year also, in an unprecedently

high-yielding year, are providing grain to the state reluctantly, even for foreign currency. What is the reason in your view?

[Ryzhkov] Well, I think that sales will start. The first thing is that people are worried to get grain for themselves to settle accounts with the people, where it is acceptable to settle accounts with grain. The next thing is to get a seed stock, and then they will start selling to the state.

The conclusion I reached from the meetings today is that the farm managers are very good at counting money. Incidentally, I am pleased that there is not simply the struggle for the plan, as we were always used to; it was always the plan and nothing but the plan, going for quantity, and so forth. Today people think; they say we need to keep so much grain on the farm and to provide so much to the population, and so much we will sell. Today the sales are in progress, so I think that the resolutions adopted by the government on the eve of this harvest...back in winter we made the decision that procurement prices should be raised, and I think we acted correctly although some people criticized us, saying: Why did they do this? They have isolated them from other price factors—but I think we were right to raise the procurement prices for grain, and we feel that it is starting to have its effect today.

Grain Harvest Situation Analyzed

904B0271A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 28 Jul 90 p 1

[Article by L. Vashchukov, head of the USSR State Committee for Statistics's administration for statistics on the agro-industrial complex: "Commentary of the USSR State Committee for Statistics—Strict Account of the Harvest"]

[Text] The editorial board has received the latest report from the USSR State Committee for Statistics on the course of the harvest. The editor asked L. Vashchukov, head of the USSR State Committee for Statistics' administration for statistics on the agro-industrial complex, to comment on this report. Here is what he said:

The harvest is underway in 13 Union republics. The pace is a little slower than last year. By 23 July 19.7 million hectares of the grain on the country's kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms]—19 percent of the sown area—was mowed, and 17.0 million hectares—86 percent of the mowed grain—was threshed. By this time in 1989, 28.7 and 24.5 million hectares were harvested respectively.

Farms were completing or approaching completion of the harvest in Stavropol and Krasnodar Krays; North Ossetian and Chechen-Ingush ASSRs [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics]; and Crimean, Odessa, Kherson, Zaporozhye, Nikolayev, Dzhambul, and Chimkent Oblasts where 85-100 percent of the grain crops have been collected. Judging by the yields, an unprecedented harvest has been grown that could exceed the 1978 record when 237 million tons of grain (in initially credited weight) were harvested. But the situation must be examined in real terms. There are many negative phenomena which keep us from repeating the aforementioned result.

In the first place, the country is continually reducing the area sown with grain crops. Today it totals 111 million hectares on all categories of farms. This is over 17 million hectares less than there were in 1978 and 1.9 million hectares less than there were last year. In addition, on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes there are great amounts of land designated in the spring for grain which is either not harvested or is harvested for fodder. Last year this amounted to 3.7 million hectares. And how much will it be this year? Not less than 4 million hectares, it is believed. It is also worth keeping in mind that in a number of regions (as opposed to 1978) unfavorable weather conditions arose (Altay, southern Siberia, some of the northern oblasts of Kazakhstan, and a few other places) which will lead in the future, of course, to a decrease in the yield.

We must also recognize that this year many kolkhozes and sovkhozes are less well prepared for the harvest. The farms have a huge stock of combines for harvesting grain available to them. However, by the beginning of the harvest, 107,000 of the 700,000 available combines were not ready for work. Almost 30,000 harvesters needed repair. Of course a shortage of spare parts may be considered the main reason for this situation, but poor organization has also played a negative role in the affair. In the Russian Federation alone, even without the oblasts of the Non-Chernozem Zone, about 52,000 combines (17 percent of the stock) and 21 percent of the harvesters were not ready at the beginning of the harvest. In Estonia, one-fourth of the combines were not ready; and in Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Armenia the number was 15 percent.

But the biggest scourge is the loss of grain. Many of our combines, especially the "Niva" and the "Kolos," have turned out to be unable to harvest high-yield grains. In addition, their productivity is low. There is a lack of motor vehicles and machine operators, and there is little transport for delivering grain to the elevators. In some regions the capability for receiving, processing, and storing grain is weak which also leads to losses. Unfortunately even the farms themselves turned out to be unprepared for a large harvest. The storage capacity does not exist and there is a shortage of dryers. By 1 July, for instance, of 203,000 grain cleaning machines, more than 30,000 were still in disrepair. Much grain has accumulated on the threshing floor awaiting processing and delivery to elevators and to kolkhoz and sovkhoz storehouses.

Scientific

Current 'Mir' Flight Proceeding Normally

LD0108080890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 1 Aug 90

[Text] The latest expedition to the Mir space orbital station is to be launched today. Its current crew—Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin—have carried out practically all studies and experiments planned by scientific program. Now Gennadiy Manakov and Gennadiy Strekalov, who are to arrive at the Mir station in the Soyuz TM-10 transport craft, will take over. Within the framework of the program of environmental studies, cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin will take the latest series of photographs of specific areas of the southern part of Siberia.

According to the program of space materials study, the work on the Kristallizator technology unit continues. An experiment is to take place on the study of the load of characteristics of the complex orbital system consisting of five space units. The flight of the Mir complex proceeds according to the scheduled program, the flight control center reported. The state of health and well-being of Solovyev and Balandin is good.

Yeast-Based Hepatitis-B Vaccine at Testing Stage

PM0108090990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Report by A. Fedorovich from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Genetic engineering is a scientific field that is developing quite rapidly in many countries of the world. Soviet scientists have also made interesting developments.

[Fedorovich] [video report comes from the M.M. Shemyakin Bio-organic Chemistry Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences] This vessel contains the concentrate of a new preparation on which Soviet scientists are pinning considerable hopes. It is a genetically engineered vaccine. At present there are only a few thousand doses of it against the hepatitis B virus. A great deal is already known about this virus, but no one has yet succeeded in conquering the disease. The vaccine serum is now ready on an experimental basis. What next? That is the question for you, Igor Viktorovich.

[I.V. Krasilnikov, director of BIOVTI subsidiary] Next, we will have to prove it by means of various tests that the WHO has developed specially for genetically engineered preparations. Then we will have to carry out checks on a limited number of volunteers; only then can the vaccine be used by clinics and within our country's health service.

[Fedorovich] [video shows laboratory] Original technology which researchers from a number of the country's scientific centers have developed has enabled the vaccine to be produced. At first there were few people who believed that bakery yeast, well-known to every housewife, would be useful for these purposes. However, the inoffensive substance made up of microscopic microorganisms proved simply fantastic. Scientists succeeded in removing a fragment of the B virus' DNA—the gene responsible for surface antigen synthesis. It was then incorporated into a yeast microorganism strain which also produced the desired protein. One of the requisite proteins was then purified and was of crucial importance in the manufacture of the new vaccine. A biotechnological vaccine has many pluses, but two main ones. First, complete safety: It contains absolutely pure proteins. And second, today's sophisticated technology makes it possible to design a vaccine with any structure. We note that hepatitis virus statistics are extremely unfortunate. Some 300 million people worldwide suffer from chronic forms of or covert, latent hepatitis B.

Military

Progress of Soviet Troop Withdrawal Reviewed

LD3107104690 Moscow TASS in English 1037 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—Units of Soviet troops are being withdrawn from East European countries and from Mongolia to the Soviet territory according to schedule, said Colonel-General Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. Today he gave an interview to TASS in connection with the conclusion of a stage in the Soviet troop withdrawal.

General Omelichev said that over 52,000 (or 65 per cent of the servicemen who are to be recalled to the USSR), over 900 tanks (some 58 per cent), some 900 cannons (about 63 per cent) and 100 planes (some 72 per cent) will have been withdrawn by August 1, 1990.

Omelichev noted that the staff of the army corps, an armoured division and a motorised rifle division with logistical support, an anti-aircraft rocket brigade, an anti-aircraft rocket regiment, two rocket brigades, two air regiments, and several battalions were pulled out of Czechoslovakia.

The general said that two rocket brigades, one anti-aircraft rocket brigade, an anti-aircraft rocket regiment, four battalions, and three air regiments had been withdrawn from Hungary. The withdrawal of an armoured division is being concluded. In addition, some 3,000 servicemen were withdrawn from the Western Group of Soviet Forces in the German Democratic Republic and the Northern Group of Forces (Poland).

The second stage of Soviet troop withdrawal from Mongolia has been proceeding successfully since May 14, Omelichev said. He said that more than 27,000 servicemen (or 85 per cent of servicemen to be withdrawn),

514 tanks (100 per cent), 400 cannons (100 per cent) and 138 planes (100 per cent) will have been withdrawn by August 1.

The general said that the Soviet Union will undoubtedly meet the agreed-upon schedule.

Impact of Secession on Baltic Fleet Assessed

PM3107104490 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 26 Jul 90 p 3

["Focus" article by APN military commentator Commodore Valeriy Myasnikov: "Soviet Baltic Fleet Could Survive Lithuanian Independence"]

[Text] Lithuanian secession from the Soviet Union and, in the longer term, similar developments in the other two Baltic republics comprise a reality that is impossible to ignore. Events in Lithuania have shown that the acquisition of full state independence will be extremely painful both for the republics themselves and for the USSR. But the process cannot be separated from a solution to the military questions, and the most important issue here has to do with the Baltic Fleet which, it is said, could be isolated at its main base of Baltiysk from the rest of the Soviet Union.

Baltiysk is in the Kaliningrad area which only borders on Lithuania and Poland. Supplies of electricity, raw materials, and finished products come via Lithuania. Some 12 million tonnes of freight are transported every year on the railroads alone, and some of this is destined for the main forces of the Baltic Fleet.

If we were to assume that all the ships in the ports of the Baltic republics were to be relocated at Baltiysk, supplies to the Kaliningrad area would also have to increase.

The main problem is energy supplies. The Kaliningrad area can only provide 20 percent of the electricity that it consumes from its own resources while the rest comes from or through Lithuania. One of the region's most important oil refineries is located in the Lithuanian town of Mazeikiai.

So will the ships be able to leave Baltiysk at all if Lithuania does not allow supplies to the Kaliningrad area? And how will the Baltic Fleet's antiaircraft defenses and the Soviet Union's northwestern border in general be affected if the Baltic republics demand that the Soviet military bases on their territory be removed?

Let us imagine that extremists come to power in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, that they ban all Soviet military bases and seal off all channels for the supply of military products to the Kaliningrad area. Even in this worst possible scenario, the Baltic Fleet could manage to provision itself under its own steam with transports from Leningrad using the Fleet's own transport ships, support ships, and even landing craft which are already to some extent used for this purpose. The tanker fleet could handle fuel supplies, and while the fleet builds its own power stations on the coast it could make the transition to autonomous electricity supply from the ships' own units and from special ships whose task it would be to charge submarine batteries.

It would be more difficult to make antiaircraft defenses effective again. Radar stations, missile units, and airfields would have to be moved to the Leningrad area and Belorussia; this would make it more difficult to detect and knock out targets in the air in time. It would also require an increase of 300-350 km in the operational range of combat aircraft. This decline in effectiveness would have to be balanced by giving the Baltic Fleet modern ships with radar surveillance and the destruction of airborne targets as their main task.

But this was the worst possible hypothesis scenario. It is more probable that Lithuania's and the other two Baltic republics' relations with the Soviet Union will be laid down in agreements—an assumption that is strengthened by Lithuania's positive reaction to Russia's proposal of a mutual treaty. In such a case developments would take another course.

On the basis of treaty arrangements, the Soviet Army would be able to use oil pipelines, railroads, and roads in the Baltic region and also lease the land around the military bases. Certain units—tank and artillery units and others—would have to leave the Baltic region, but sections of the antiaircraft defense forces and the Baltic Fleet's bases would be able to remain in their old locations. This would probably be both economically and militarily advantageous to the three republics.

When the Lithuanian parliament announced its declaration of independence, people in Vilnius were expecting swift economic, financial, and military aid from the West, chiefly the Nordic countries. But this proved to be excessively optimistic. At the same time, every country has to be able to guarantee its own security, and that is why the Baltic republics must rely in the situation that has arisen on military support from the Soviet Union. In a possible future agreement, the Soviet antiaircraft defense units and the naval bases could undertake to defend Baltic territory.

Also, Soviet military aid is needed if the new states are to be able to build up their own armies—something that is already going on in Lithuania. For the time being they are relying on the experience and knowledge of people who have served in the Soviet Army and of reservists from the same Army. Lithuanians are being encouraged to refuse to serve in the Soviet Army and to make their way to the republic's cadet schools instead. But this is a drop in the ocean compared with the military support that Lithuania could receive through an agreement with the Soviet Union, and people in Vilnius realize this very well.

That is why, for the time being at least, there is no reason to claim that the Baltic Fleet would be isolated in its main base and that the Soviet antiaircraft defense system would collapse when the Baltic republics leave the Soviet Union. Some military experts in the West also take this

view. This is true of FOA's [Swedish Armed Forces Research Institute] Bjorn Eklind, for example, who takes the view that independent Baltic republics must take account of the Soviet Union's vital interests when establishing their security policies.

At the present time the Soviet Union is taking no action whatsoever to strengthen its Baltic Fleet. On the contrary, it is continuing to cut down the numbers of missile-carrying Golf-class submarines. Four have already been scrapped and the last two will be scrapped before the end of the year. Their missiles and nuclear warheads will be destroyed.

Yazov Congratulates Personnel in Navy Day Order

PM3107162390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jul 90 First Edition p 1

[USSR Defense Ministry Order of the Day No. 295]

[Text] USSR Minister of Defense Order of the Day No. 295, 29 July 1990, Moscow.

Comrade sailors, soldiers, petty officers, and sergeants!

Comrade warrant officers and ensigns!

Comrade officers, admirals, and generals!

Comrade shipbuilders, ship repair workers, and defense industry workers!

Comrade veterans of the Navy!

Our country and its Armed Forces are today celebrating USSR Navy Day.

The Worker and Peasant Red Navy, together with the Red Army and created during the years of revolution and civil war, protected the young Soviet Republic heroically and selflessly. The sailors covered themselves with everlasting glory during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

In the postwar years, through the efforts of the Soviet people the Navy was transformed into an ocean-going navy equipped with modern surface ships, submarines, and naval aircraft. It is honorably fulfilling the urgent task of protecting our motherland's sea frontiers.

Today's festival is being observed at a significant time. The 28th CPSU Congress has concluded its work. Radical sociopolitical and economic transformations are taking place in the country and a profound military reform is being carried out in accordance with the principle of reasonable sufficiency. The resolution of defense tasks in the present conditions is aimed at preventing war and ensuring the inviolability of the USSR's state borders and our state sovereignty.

The Navy personnel, together with servicemen from other branches of USSR Armed Forces, are concentrating their efforts on the activization of restructuring processes, raising the standard of naval training and the combat readiness of units and ships, strengthening military discipline, and establishing a healthy moral atmosphere in collectives.

I greet you and congratulate you on the festival—USSR Navy Day! I wish the Navy personnel success in combat and political training.

I wish the shipbuilding and defense industry workers great labor successes in the work of further strengthening the country's defense capability.

I wish the Navy veterans good health and success in educating the rising generation and preparing it to fulfill an honorable obligation—service in the USSR Armed Forces.

To mark USSR Navy Day I ORDER:

That a festive firework display be held today, 29 July 1990, at 2200 hours local time, in the hero-city of Moscow, the capital of our motherland; in the capitals of the Union republics; in the hero-cities of Leningrad, Volgograd, Odessa, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, Kerch, Tula, Smolensk, Murmansk; in the hero-fortress of Brest; and in the fleets and flotillas.

Long live our great motherland—the USSR!

Long live the USSR Armed Forces and their valiant Navy!

[Signed] Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, USSR defense minister.

Navy Day Celebrated at Fleets' Home Ports

PM0108085590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Reports by L. Savitskiy from Vladivostok, V. Anuchin from Severomorsk, V. Plotnikov from Sevastopol, and S. Chekalin from Kaliningrad; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Vladivostok—Neptune's emergence from the depths of the ocean acted as a signal for the festivities to begin. [video shows warship] The crews of ships of various classes successfully demonstrated their heightened military skill, as people said here. [video shows another ship firing missiles] Military seamen as well as their training and coordination must be given credit. A torpedo attack and assault landing looked particularly effective.

Severomorsk—The bronze seaman rising up over the Kola Gulf is a symbol of the Northern Fleet's capital, Severomorsk. It is a tribute to those people who at harsh times defended Soviet polar regions. Some 85 of Severomorsk's seamen are Heroes of the Soviet Union. Today Severomorsk's road is handsome. The dressed ships are motionless on parade, their flags fluttering in the cold wind. [video shows ship's parade undergoing inspection] The Northern Fleet is young; it is scarcely more than 55 years old. There are many glorious pages in its short

history. But there are also the bitter pages relating to the loss in peacetime of the Komsomolets nuclear-powered submarine. Today seamen have gone to sea and thrown wreathes on the bleak waters.

Sevastopol—[video shows various ships] To distinguish the current holiday from past years, the men of the Black Sea not only demonstrated the potential of the terrible weapons and the fine precision of their actions, but they also confirmed the course of detente. It is well known that the Black Sea Fleet has made a great contribution to confidence-building among different countries' military seamen. Recently for instance, Sevastopol received a detachment of French warships, and Americans were also here the day before. In turn our seamen have also paid friendly visits to foreign ports. The residents of the hero-city were accompanied by numerous guests at the festivities, including children from the Chernobyl zone on vacation in the pioneer camps here.

Kaliningrad—[video shows lighthouse] The fleet commander, USSR People's Deputy Admiral Ivanov, reviewed the ceremonial parade of warships from the Twice Order of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet at the country's westernmost naval port of Baltiysk. Thousands of Kaliningrad's inhabitants came along for the colorful water sports festival which, as usual, was opened by Neptune, lord of the seas. They applauded the crew of the escort missile ship Bditelnyy which has just returned from many months' cruising, and the fleet's best crew from the warship Neukrotimyy, along with the renowned and fast Donetskiy Shakhter and the nuclear-powered submarine Ulyanovskiy Komsomolets. The first STRAZH BALTIKI day was held within the framework of the festivities. There were speeches, ensembles, singing and dancing by men of the Twice Order of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet; exhibitions of arms and military hardware; and now, as you are watching this program, festive fireworks have been launched skyward from the Baltic.

Baltic Republics

Baltic Council Decisions, Documents Reported

PM3107081590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 2

[IZVESTIYA correspondent Irina Litvinova report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Documents Signed"]

[Text] Riga—The Latvian Supreme Soviet Press Center is circulating three documents. Two of them—"Statements by the Council of Baltic States"—have been signed by the chairmen of the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian Supreme Soviets. The four top men's signatures are affixed to the "Report of the Meeting Between the Chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the Latvian Republic, the Lithuanian Republic, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], and the Estonian Republic."

One of the statements by the Council of Baltic States points out that "USSR central organs are taking various steps with a view to impeding the establishment of state independence for the Lithuanian republic, the Latvian republic, and the Estonian republic and destabilizing the situation in the Baltic region." The document says that the setting up on the orders of the USSR Council of Ministers of the "Integral" Association comprising enterprises and organizations under Union jurisdiction constituted one such step.

Another statement by the Council of Baltic States points out that the "three Baltic countries' plenipotentiary representatives took no part in elaborating the Union treaty and henceforth do not think it possible to take part in this process." The statement indicates that it is most advisable to hold talks with the USSR on the "three plus one" principle or, simultaneously, with close coordination. The talks should result in "agreements of a political nature, on the basis of which agreements on relations and cooperation in individual areas of activity and interest." The three Baltic states have said that they have no territorial, property, or other claims on one another. In their statement they asked each of the USSR's 12 republics individually to say if they have any territorial, property, or other demands to make on the Latvian republic, the Lithuanian republic, or the Estonian republic.

The report on the meeting between the chairmen of the Latvian, Lithuanian, RSFSR, and Estonian Supreme Soviets signed by A. Gorbunovs, V. Landsbergis, B. Yeltsin, and A. Ruutel says that the meeting's participants decided to immediately begin preparing bilateral state treaties between the Russian Federation and the Latvian republic, the Lithuanian republic, and the Estonian republic respectively. The intention is to sign political and legal agreements on economic, scientific and technical, trade, social, interethnic, cultural, and other relations, and also on questions of citizenship. It indicates that the sides will not put forward any preliminary conditions.

Reportage on RSFSR, Latvian Talks in Moscow

Talks Begin

LD3107191190 Moscow TASS in English 1834 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Lev Aksenov]

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—Delegations of Latvia and the Russian Federation today began official consultations on possible content of an agreement between the republics. The sides agreed they should sign a political declaration and a more specific agreement on economic, cultural and parliamentary cooperation and relations in other spheres.

"I am satisfied with the meeting, as we have reached understanding on many issues. When a partner had a different opinion, it was perceived with understanding, which shows the community of our attitude to the main problems," Latvian parliament's Vice President Andres Krastins, heading the Latvian delegation, told TASS.

First Vice Premier of the Russian parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov positively assessed the meeting. "I believe the agreement will be prepared for signing without delay. Certainly, economic agreements should be discussed more thoroughly. We should specify how we are planning to supplement each other," he said.

Khasbulatov denounced attempts to "oppose the talks to the negotiation process between the Baltic republics and the Soviet Union." "I believe the talks complement each other and strengthen friendly relations between different parts of the Soviet Union on a new basis. Latvian partners share the opinion," he said.

The decision to prepare agreements between the three Baltic republics and the Russian Federation immediately was adopted at the Baltic Council's meeting in the Latvian resort of Jurmala on July 27. The meeting was also attended by President of the Russian parliament Boris Yeltsin, who is currently on a vacation near Riga.

Latvian Chief on Progress

LD3107220890 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] The discussion and definition of the mutual cooperation treaty between Latvia and Russia continued today in Moscow. We requested Andrejs Krastins, head of the Latvian delegation and deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, to comment in a telephone conversation on the course of the treaty. Imants Austrins is talking to him:

[Began recording] [Austrins] The treaty has been further defined over two days now. Are there any proposals that are unacceptable to the opposite side of those the Latvian delegation offered?

[Krastins] Well, practically there are no fully unacceptable propositions. In the first part of the treaty, that is, in

the political section, all the propositions are acceptable to the Russian Federation. Only, well, a little discussion takes place on the formulation of one or another proposition, or on a stronger emphasis of some proposition, but there are no contradictions of principle.

[Austrins] Are various political forces participating on the Russian side?

[Krastins] Well, as much as can be judged from the delegation of our Russian Federation partners, from their utterances and reaction, it is of a democratic tendency, which is also represented by Boris Yeltsin and by his deputy. At least in their utterances we cannot perceive anything of the kind that would contradict what had also been announced and acknowledged by Yeltsin and others, whom we know as democratically disposed persons in the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet.

I think that tomorrow we could reach an agreement fundamentally on the main points and propositions, and even on their formulations. In the next stage of the talks, which could take place in Riga, we could work out the final version of this treaty's political section.

[Austrins] Is the course and the atmosphere of the talks also influenced by the successful conclusion of the visit by Ivars Godmanis and Janis Jurkans to the United States?

[Krastins] Well, it is possible that this is so, although the partners in the talks have not formulated it in such a way. But during the talks, you see, this visit was mentioned, and also !vars Godmanis had been here in Moscow before this visit and had been talking with both Russian and USSR high-ranking officials. These factors were mentioned.

[Austrins] Can it be felt in the positions that are expounded by the representatives of the Russian delegation that some of them are in contradiction with the formulation that is being laid down by the Soviet Government?

[Krastins] Yes, frequently it has to be said explicitly, because on many positions, regarding both the political and the economic spheres, the representatives of the Russian Federation express—well, one could say—an opposite stance and also (?adopt further) the stance of the USSR Government.

[Austrins] Thank you for the interview. Obviously it will also be of interest to our radio listeners to learn about tomorrow's events. So then, we will try to contact you by telephone tomorrow.

[Krastins] Yes, please do. Tomorrow evening we will be at your disposal. [end recording]

Gorbunovs Statement on CINA 'Transgression'

LD0108121190

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1030 GMT on 1 August carries a report by correspondent Anta Busa during an adjournment of the Latvian Supreme Council session in Riga. She reads a statement by Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia:

"On 1 August 1990 a statement by the Council of the Baltic States is published in the CINA newspaper, under which the signatures of the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia, Anatolijs Gorbunovs; the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis; the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, Boris Yeltsin; and the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia, Arnold Ruutel, are to be read.

"The chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, has not signed the joint document of the three Baltic states.

"Boris Yeltsin's signature has appeared because of a fault by the workers of the CINA newspaper editorial office. It is to be regarded as a coarse transgression against the journalists' ethics. The responsibility for the political consequences of this disinformation must be fully assumed by the editor and publisher of the newspaper.

"The statement has been signed by the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia, Anatolijs Gorbunovs."

Latvian-USSR Talks on Seaport's Restoration

LD3107164390 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1500 GMT 25 Jul 90

[Text] Preliminary talks have been held in Liepaja on restoration of the commercial seaport there. Taking part in them were Janis Janovskis, the Latvian minister of communications; Eduard Semenkov, deputy commander in chief of the Soviet Navy; and the leadership of the town soviet of people's deputies. The military department agrees to give back only two berths comprising one-tenth of the former working zone of the port.

Talks will be continued between the Latvian government and the USSR Government.

Lithuanians Refusing Military Service 'Kidnapped'

LD0108123990

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0900 GMT on 1 August carries a report by an unidentified correspondent on this morning's session of the Lithuanian Supreme Council Presidium. Deputy A. Sakalas, chairman of the Mandate Commission at the Supreme Council, tells the correspondent that "servicemen dressed in civilian clothing have kidnapped our

young men who refuse to serve in the Soviet Armed Forces." He says this information was presented to the Presidium, and in its turn the Presidium entrusted the procurator general of the republic to deal with the matter. The procurator general said criminal proceedings would be instituted against the kidnappers. Sakalas also mentions the other issues discussed by the Presidium: working space for parliamentary commissions, an application by two Polish individuals to change their nationality in their personal passports, and the parliamentary library.

Landsbergis on Negotiating Partners, Union Treaties

LD3107195990 Moscow TASS in English 1936 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazys Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius July 31 TASS—Lithuania has now two negotiation partners—the USSR and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis said in his radio address to the population.

Landsbergis made it clear that he regarded the Russian Federation as a more reliable partner than the Soviet Union.

According to the head of the Lithuanian parliament, commissions of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and groups of experts entrusted with preparations for negotiations would continue work.

Within a month or two, they are expected to finalise a political treaty between Lithuania and Russia, which will stress that the two republics recognise each other as separate states and their interrelations shall be equal and well-meaning.

"We have no intention to sign any Union treaties. We want to have a free and independent life", Landsbergis said, referring to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Last Day of Lithuanian Soviet Session Viewed

Ends Amid 'Tension'

LD3107185490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] The last day's work of the first session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet today proceeded in a state of tension. Discussion of the matter of providing the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the republic with wider powers in the period between sessions provoked the greatest emotion.

In all during the period of its work the republican Supreme Soviet has adopted hndreds of laws and other acts. Yet the legislative activity of the parliament is inconsistent. Its striving to limit democracy is increasingly felt. Such a view is confirmed and made public today by the appeal to the inhabitants of Lithuania written by 20 authoritative representatives of the creative and scientific intelligentsia and deputies of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.

It is planned to convene the second session of the Supreme Soviet of the republic in September.

Problems Evident

LD3107213190 Moscow TASS in English 2115 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazys Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius July 31 TASS—Work on the last day of the first session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet was conducted in a nervous and tense atmosphere.

Emotional outbursts were provoked by debates about the proposal to grant the Presidium of the republican Supreme Soviet extensive powers for the duration of the recession.

Some deputies viewed these powers as attributes of the presidential rule. Others suggested that the session should continue its work and deputies waive their vacations in order to avoid making this decision.

The tensions ran so high that the parliament had to halt debates for some time.

The session began its work on March 10. On March 11, it promulgated the declaration of independence, calling for the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state. A few months later, it had to proclaim a moratorium on this act.

On the whole, during its first session, the republican Supreme Soviet adopted hundreds of laws and other regulatory enactments.

However, the parliament's legislative activity lacked consistency. Lately, its desire to restrict democracy and undermine the work of the republican Council of Ministers has become manifest. This is the opinion voiced by broad public circles and confirmed by the appeal to the population of Lithuania, which was signed by 20 recognised leaders of artistic and scientific intelligentsia and deputies of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. The appeal was published here today.

Confrontation between the parliament and the government is becoming unmistakably evident in the republic. The leaders of the parliament are reluctant to rebuff increasingly frequent attacks on Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene and the government as a whole for their alleged concessions to Moscow.

The closing days of the session's work were largely devoted to the discussion of economic affairs. The Lithuanian parliament adopted the laws on the joint-stock society, on the enterprise's register, on the budget structure and some others.

It decided to adjourn until the next session the consideration of the bills on the transfer of trade union property to the state and on individual taxation, which evoked acute public reaction.

The second session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet is due to convene in September.

31 Jul Lithuanian Supreme Council Session Carried

LD3107151490

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1200 GMT on 31 July continues its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

At 1200 GMT, it is decided to discontinue the debate on the draft law on state enterprise for the time being and to start discussion on other issues.

Deputy Rudys reports on the draft law on taxation of juridical bodies.

At 1230 GMT, questions are put to Deputy Rudys on the draft law.

At 1242 GMT, debates take place on the draft law on taxation of juridical bodies.

At 1255 GMT, debates continue on the draft law on taxation of juridical bodies.

At 1307 GMT, voting takes place on individual articles of the draft law.

At 1330 GMT, an interval is declared until 1400 GMT.

At 1400 GMT, the relay resumes. Deputy Sakalas states on behalf of the mandate and ethics commission that some deputies made unconstructive remarks at the Supreme Council. He appeals to them to behave correctly and more friendly toward each other.

At 1406 GMT, Deputy Patackas criticizes Deputy Ramonas for his unfriendly remarks addressed to Chairman Landsbergis and for his refusal to attend a meeting of the mandate and ethics commission.

At 1408 GMT, there are only 88 deputies in the hall; voting is impossible as there is no quorum.

At 1410 GMT, there are 94 deputies in the hall, voting may continue.

At 1415 GMT, voting begins individual articles in the draft law on taxation of juridical bodies continues until 1500 GMT.

Lithuanian Deputies' Perks, Cutbacks Contrasted

PM0108100590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 8

[INTERFAX report: "Deputies' Privileges"]

[Text] A correspondent of the independent INTERFAX agency reports that the Lithuanian press is expressing concern in connection with the growth of expenditure for the maintenance of the organs of power, which has increased by 21 million rubles (R) in comparison with last year.

The youth newspaper LIETUVOS RYTAS (DAWN OF LITHUANIA) reports that, apart from raising deputies' salaries, it is planned to purchase expensive cars and build depots and garages. At the same time the newspaper points out that funding for social and cultural measures in the republic has been cut by R51 million, and expenditure for education and health care by R38 million and R12 million respectively.

RSFSR's Khasbulatov on Talks With Lithuania

LD2807072690 Moscow TASS in English 0710 GMT 28 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Lev Akseonov]

[Text] Moscow July 28 TASS—Ruslan Khasbulatov, first deputy head of the Russian parliament, described as "successful" the official consultative meeting between the delegations of the Russian Federation and Lithuania held here recently.

"The talk focused on a wide range of issues, primarily on cooperation in the economy, as well as in politics and culture," Khasbulatov told TASS.

He noted that the Russian Federation conducted similar talks with all Union republics.

"It is now difficult to say what forms agreements with Lithuania will take. But it can be said already now that compatibility with partners is observed," Khasbulatov said.

"In our view, the circumstance that Lithuanian comrades are interested in conducting talks with Russia should be regarded as a positive factor. As a result, our Union may be provided a fresh impetus on other foundations, which are more friendly and are devoid of pressure from above.

"Such talks are all the more important to us since our fellow citizens live in Lithuania. Who should show concern about their future? If we refuse to conduct talks, what will we achieve? This is an absurd stance.

"We have an opportunity to get agreement, on an equitable basis, on the destiny of our fellow citizens and reduce tension emerging in relations between various national communities as a result of the lack of some understanding on the part of the central authorities.

"During our contacts, we hope we will succeed in complementing the talks, which are being conducted by the central government. Talks between Russia and Lithuania should be viewed in the general context of actions aimed at upholding, defending common interests

rather than against the interests of some national groups or the Union's general political interests," Khasbulatov said.

Antisecessionist Localities Plan To Join Talks

LD2807144690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Representatives of the towns and rayons that have expressed disagreement with the republic seceding from the USSR are to take part in the forthcoming negotiations between Lithuania and the USSR. Such a proposal is contained in an appeal to USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev which has been adopted at the session of the Citizens' Committee of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, which has taken place. The participants in the session discussed the question of the political situation in the republic on the eve of the negotiations.

New Lithuanian '11 March' Party Formed

90UN2389A Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian 18 Jun-23 Jun 90 p 1

[Report on interview with V. Cepaitis by LETUVOS RITAS correspondent A. Svirbutavichyute; place and date not given: "The 11 March Party Is Formed"]

[Text] There is a new reflection in the changeable political mirror of Lithuania: An initiating group for the 11 March party has been created, and the party has declared its ideas in an appeal to the citizens of Lithuania. The appeal says: "11 March—these are not empty words, but a threshold beyond which is a new era. The 11 March party is the name of an assembly of people who intend by their deeds and resolution to strengthen and consolidate our independence." Virgiliyus Cepaitis, one of the initiators of the party, answers questions from LETUVOS RITAS correspondent Aldona Svirbutavichyute.

[Svirbutavichyute] When and how did the idea of forming the party occur?

[Cepaitis] A portion of "Sajudis" should develop into a party—this idea appeared at the end of last summer when we began to realize that "Sajudis" had the opportunity to win in the elections to the Supreme Council. We decided then that organized forces were needed to help implement changes in Lithuania. "Sajudis" itself, from which we have come and in which we participate, is not suitable for the usual daily work. For the most part it was a movement of mass meetings, demonstrations, and mass actions. We feared that if the idea of a party were put forward too soon, it might harm "Sajudis" itself. I myself was and remain opposed to turning all of "Sajudis" into a party and making its structure tighter. At a congress of "Sajudis" both concepts which favored tighter structures—I will call them the Kaunas and Radzhivilas concepts—suffered defeat. It seems to me that "Sajudis" is very necessary just as it is and that only a certain portion of it should be prepared for organized work. There was a constant struggle in "Sajudis" between the desire to introduce membership and the desire to leave it as it is. I am against a strict membership. However the time has now come when Lithuania needs a more organized force.

[Svirbutavichyute] Will it be a political party?

[Cepaitis] Yes. It is a political party. At first there was a proposal that it be called the Party of Independence. But it seems to me that the 11 March Party is a broader name inasmuch as after the full restoration of independence it will not lose its sense.

[Svirbutavichyute] The day 11 March strikes a most responsive chord for everyone. Do you not fear that it will grow in number to become a superparty?

[Cepaitis] I do not believe it could become too large, but our idea should evoke the widest response in society.

[Svirbutavichyute] Who belongs to the initiating group?

[Cepaitis] The initiating group was created in two stages. Someone approached me during the "Sajudis" congress and said he was joining a party. It is part of the old Seim and part of the new and many people from the provinces. The second group is the 11 people who signed our appeal. In addition to Kazimieras Motieka and me there are six other people.

Lithuanian Statistical Body on Immigration

LD3107090690 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] There have been reports in the Soviet and foreign press that Russians are emigrating to Lithuania. The Polish newspaper RZECZPOSPOLITA points out that the emigration is taking place for various reasons: Some people do this so that their children can live in a civilized part of Europe, in a better ecological environment. Others see Lithuania as a place for a leap to West Europe. Is this really so?

A representative of the Lithuanian Statistical Department has neither confirmed nor denied this. Yes and no, she said, stressing that in the first half of this year, for the first time since 1958, we had a negative balance of residents' emigration. In the first half of this year nearly 3,000 more people left Lithuania than arrived. This year, nearly 2,500 Russians, 1,500 Lithuanians, and over 400 Belorussians came to Lithuania. People are leaving mostly for the Russian Federation, Belorussia, and Ukraine.

Mazeikiai Oil Refinery Facing 'Problems'

LD3107115690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Excerpts] Today's problems at the Mazeikiai oil refinery. Our correspondent Audrone Zubaviciute conversed with the refinery's director, Vainoras:

[Begin Vainoras recording] The enterprise is at present working at full capacity. [passage omitted] However, we are facing a very serious problem, and I do not see how it can be solved. This concerns products which are not removed from the enterprise. For instance, yesterday we had in our reservoirs 30,000 tonnes of gasoline, about 20,000 tonnes of diesel fuel, and over 70,000 tonnes of fuel oil. The state of affairs as regards fuel oil is especially bad. It is not being transported from the enterprise, and we will be forced to stop production. This has been continuing for almost a year. Our efforts in Riga, Vilnius, and Siauliai have not yielded any results. The problem is very serious, and it should be solved not by local means, but by the new Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of Power, the Council of Ministers. They should seriously consider this problem. [passage omitted] The railways transport the quantity of products which suffices for Lithuania, but products are not being transported to Latvia, Estonia, Kaliningrad, and other oblasts. [passage omitted]

'Abrupt Fall' in Sajudis Popularity Viewed

90UN2471A Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian 9-14 Jul 90 p 1,2

[Article by A. Yuozaytis: "Are We Saying Goodbye to 'Sajudis'?"]

[Text] **The results of a public opinion poll have shown that the Lithuanian Communist Party is more popular today than "Sajudis." The author talks about this unexpected change in people's mood.**

An abrupt fall in the popularity of "Sajudis" is too serious a phenomenon to pass over in silence. Something significant has happened, something which it is difficult and perhaps even somewhat frightening for us to talk about. Something unbelievable has happened: An outdated political organization, or more accurately its remnants—the Lithuanian Communist Party—has taken the lead from "Sajudis" for the first time in two years. Who could have predicted it? "Sajudis" is unbeatable, the very incarnation of renewal, life, and hope. And now that hope has beat a retreat. The Lithuanian Communist Party has beaten "Sajudis" not only as an organization. It beat the very spirit of "Sajudis." It would not have done this had not "Sajudis" figures paved the way for their own defeat.

Over recent years we have watched a duel not so much between two organizations as between two performances, two ways of life. Moreover, we have seen a struggle between the past and the future around and within ourselves. We have felt hope and hopelessness simultaneously. It seemed that the future was triumphing over the past.

And now daylight has arrived, and we see that the past has returned. Why?

People turn from everything that is false. This is an eternal, unavoidable law. They even turn to the past so long as it is more reliable for their family and for life. This law must not be forgotten.

In all times and everywhere, especially under democracy, people suspect that anyone who seeks power does so from egotistical motives. This is the reason all kinds of institutions for the control and limitation of power are introduced. They are necessary.

What do we see today? In the first place the Supreme Soviet still has not approved a procedure for recalling deputies—an elementary condition of democracy. In the second place, at each step it affirms that it stands higher than the Council of Ministers and should control the latter. This position has nothing in common with civilized procedures. Nor does it have anything in common with what the officials of "Sajudis" were saying not so very long ago.

Yes, it is worth acknowledging that the creeping shadows of disappointment have been disturbing my peace for a long time now, although I kept on hoping that everything would come out all right in the end... It did not come out all right.

Why has all this happened?

Because the 50-year slavery continues to live on in our souls, and these souls, especially the souls of the political figures, have done everything to restore, albeit in another form, those same sins and that same passion for power. Many people have stepped into the limelight for the sake of power, and it is as though they are tainted by love for that which is most costly. Yes, at first there was a word, there was a shy ray of hope, but soon everything changed. I saw much, and I saw how the fight for independence turned into a fight for power. And I saw something even worse: Everyone stubbornly wished not to notice that change.

And everything that has happened and is happening today is only a consequence and not a cause. We have not matured enough for causes, because we have not created an independent, dignified life which could give us the fruits of good. We continue to create what a half-century of slavery has programmed us to create.

As a result today, as previously, we approach power with the hope and belief that it will change a person. Yes, it changes the person—he becomes worse.

As a result today, as previously, we are not prepared to separate the Supreme Soviet from the administration. We have betrayed ourselves, and we have become worse than our predecessors. They, in any case, did not declare the need for this separation and thus there was nothing for them to betray.

As a result today, as previously, we persecute our brothers—those who think differently and who, perhaps, are more cautious but who have also done much for independence. We insult them to the depths of their souls and call them "traitors" or push them off the side by

force. We betray "Sajudis," which was unbeatable while it encompassed the whole nation.

And today, as always, we begin to divide ourselves into those who are more or less "distinguished," and we artificially begin to encourage a cult of suffering, real and imaginary, to the detriment of truth. In this fashion we doom ourselves to bitter reproach in the eyes of our children.

The pain that will sooner or later befall many people will not be exhausted by these or perhaps other words. "Sajudis" has retreated. Everyone who has not closed his eyes to the truth sees this. It is for this reason that we must draw our conclusions today, because universal evil restricts our souls today.

I believe that one of the main conclusions is as follows: "Sajudis" has done what it set out to do. It cleansed and revived the souls of many people and created all the preconditions to make real people of those who wanted to become real people. Perhaps for this reason it is not yielding to attempts to turn it into a toy for political manipulations. It is retreating because it sees that parties are necessary and that there is no place for it among them. It will remain one of the brightest moments in our history, a window through which falls the light of life and not politics.

A second conclusion is that it is too political. Now that former representatives of "Sajudis" have come to leadership at both the Soviet and the Council of Ministers, the remaining people (and they are the structure of "Sajudis") clearly do not understand which of them to support more. Separation of these two organs of power is necessary for a civilized Lithuania. The differences between them are already more than apparent today. As a result one is not surprised by the superfluity of the Seimas Council's statement on the occasion of the moratorium: It went unnoticed because it was unilateral. And only just recently if any statement came from that corner it united Lithuania.

And one more main conclusion: Things have grown too comfortable and not at all dangerous in "Sajudis." Perhaps it is only as dangerous as is living in Lithuania, loving it, and working for it. It is probably for this reason that so few work in the "second" "Sajudis."

The extremely strange "revenge" of the popularity of the Lithuanian Communist Party testifies to the confusion of our people. If they are clinging to the past, that means we have reached an impasse. We should turn it into a crossroads. And no labels will save us here: The more you attack, the less you win. Perhaps we have had enough.

It would be ideal if gradually but fairly quickly neither the Lithuanian Communist Party nor "Sajudis" were to remain in the arena of public life as political organizations. Let both of them remain what they were, and instead of them let there be newly created political parties which will free the political thinking of people and not begin to claim that they will bring happiness only by way of seizing power. Normal forces of life should enter the arena where reason and wisdom meet, and not the symbols of a slavish past and a troubled renewal. We need this today in order to dispel mysticism and speculation.

Lithuania is changing, and only people of ill will would want to stop this process. Let us trust in its free and wise future, in the name of which we once created "Sajudis."

Leaders of Estonian Parties Propose Coalition

90UN2466B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 10 Jul 90 p 3

[Declaration of the joint meeting of the leaderships of the Estonian Democratic Labor Party, the Estonian Social Democratic Independence Party, the Russian Social Democratic Party of Estonia, and the Association of the Estonian Socialist Party Abroad]

[Text] Based on recognition of the fact

—that with the changeover of the Estonian society to principles of self-regulation and free entrepreneurship, more and more significance is being attached to the need, along with individual freedom, to protect our socialist principles from attacks by both extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing forces,

—that several parties with similar platforms have found their place at the left of center of the Estonian political scale, which makes it difficult to form a membership and base of support for each of them and also creates artificial obstacles to interethnic communication,

—that the stage-by-stage nature and a certain indistinctness of the path as well as Estonian independence require that active politicians and social figures unite on the basis of clear party platforms,

the leaderships of the Estonian Democratic Labor Party [EDPT], the Estonian Social Democratic Independence Party [ESDPN], the Russian Social Democratic Party of Estonia [RSDPE], and the Association of the Estonian Socialist Party Abroad [EOESP] have resolved to suggest to their members that they unite into one party and conduct a combined congress of the parties on 8 September 1990 in Tallinn in order to accomplish this.

[Signed] V. Saatpalu, chairman of the EDPT
M. Lauristin, chairman of the ESDPN
Yu. Yurovskiy, chairman of the RSDPE
Y. Mikhkelson, chairman of the EOESP.

Estonia's Sillari Assesses CPSU Congress

90UN2466A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 18 Jul 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Enn-Arno Sillari, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia Central Committee, by

Nelli Kuznetsova; place and date not given: "My Interests Are the Party's Interests"]

[Text] [Kuznetsova] Enn Augustovich, this is the first time you are giving the newspaper an interview in your new capacity—as a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo... How do you feel now? How do you evaluate the congress, its significance, and its results?

[Sillari] I shall begin with the congress... Since the composition of the Politburo and my participation in its work as the first secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia Central Committee are directly related to the changes the congress will make in our life, to its results...

Of course, it is still difficult to assess the significance of the congress and its consequences. But it is quite clear that everything that could have been done in this stage—I repeat, in this stage—for the renewal and democratization of the party has been done. That is, we did the maximum amount possible if one takes into account today's realities, the composition of the congress, and its direction...

[Kuznetsova] The mass media and foreign specialists and journalists regard the congress as a victory for Gorbachev...

[Sillari] Of course, the very fact that he was elected general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee inspires hope. On this plane also the reconstruction of the Politburo which was accomplished by Gorbachev was also one of the most important victories at the congress. Foreign specialists regard the new "image" of the Politburo—I have in mind, of course, not its personality but the **principle** of its formation—as a **symbol** of something like a new political structure of a federative Union which Gorbachev is introducing while striving to retain the unity of the state. This is what is important... It is from this standpoint that one must consider the new approach to the Politburo elections.

[Kuznetsova] As we know, at the congress itself there was a desperate struggle around this principle of federalism in the party. It is thought that this will destroy the party...

[Sillari] A couple of days go I heard an interview with Yu. Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom [City Party Committee]. He, incidentally, was one of the most noticeable people at the congress. He emphasized that he is convinced that the principle of federalism will not weaken but strengthen the party... And he is not the only one who thinks that. We were convinced of this at the congress...

[Kuznetsova] And how do you regard your membership in the Politburo? What does this mean for you and for the Communist Party of Estonia?

[Sillari] We have gained access to the highest level of political leadership of the country. Imagine the composition of the Politburo. It includes the president of the USSR, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, his deputy, and also all the first secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union republics, many of whom are also president of their own republic (Kazakhstan, for example) or chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium (Georgia). We can now resolve at the level of the Politburo issues pertaining to Unionwide problems, including party problems, and at the same time have close ties at the level of the republics. That is, the ties are both vertical and horizontal... That is the first thing.

Second. The composition of the Politburo itself now presupposes the development of large political solutions in keeping with the principle of consensus, taking into account the interests of many parties, various republics, and the party as a whole. This makes this possible. The president and the country's high leadership have direct and reliable information from the local areas, from the Communist Parties, and from the republics.

We ourselves now—I would like to note this once again—have the opportunity to participate in the development of party policy. And this is important...

[Kuznetsova] The situation in the Communist Party of Estonia, as we know, is quite difficult. It has not been easy in the delegation either. The entire congress felt that, beginning on the first day when the composition of the Presidium was considered and up until the last day when the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was formed...

[Sillari] Yes. Various viewpoints were represented in the delegation. And I, incidentally, suggested in my speech that congress delegates pay attention to this viewpoint. One must say that the delegates representing this viewpoint spoke very actively both from the podium and from the microphones, and distributed their documents. So people in the hall were well aware of their position, of their viewpoint. M.S. Gorbachev had to notice this too. And, of course, he has spoken many times about this issue. At the CPSU Central Committee plenum when the candidacies for Politburo were being discussed a secret vote was prepared, and he emphasized that the election of Sillari to the Politburo would make it possible to improve the situation within the party in Estonia. And I thank him for this support. Not because I was counting on any posts, of course. It will be difficult in the Politburo. In general all the problems and all the difficulties lie ahead of us. But I understand that this is important for the Communist Party of Estonia and that this is necessary for the cause, for the present and the future.

[Kuznetsova] Working with the delegates elected at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Estonia these days are V. Malkovskiy, Yu. Tolmachev, and N. Zakharov. They have worked actively and intelligently, understanding the situation and evaluating it correctly... And, of course, all of our work will be arranged in such a way so as to take into account their interests and the interests of the communists standing behind them. And I think this will make it possible for communists who

have not yet taken a stand and defined themselves politically to support the policy we shall pursue. I think this will correspond to the interests and hopes of the majority of communists who hold progressive positions regardless of their nationality.

[Sillari] This is even more important since the Communist Party of Estonia is the only force in the republic today which unites people of various nationalities. And in the future I think we will be able to work more successfully in this area. Speaking at the congress, I said that there cannot be a party with only one nationality; it will be doomed to failure, to destruction; it will contradict the very essence of communist ideology. I am convinced that this is so.

There arises a question to which many people are not indifferent: Whose interests, opinions, and positions will I reflect in the Politburo when participating in its work? I wish to say at the outset that it will not be just my opinion and my view of the problems. The policy will be developed by the Communist Party, its Central Committee, and its bureau which, as I have already said, should and will include communists of various nationalities.

[Kuznetsova] And what can we tell our readers about the contribution of the Estonian delegation to the work of the congress and the development of its most important documents?

[Sillari] You were at the congress yourself and you saw that our delegation, the part of it that was elected by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Estonia, seemed very outspoken at the congress...

[Kuznetsova] Yes, I heard many responses which amounted to saying that the Estonian delegation was working efficiently and concretely...

[Sillari] We worked more in the commissions, considering that this is where one can do the most good. You saw for yourself that it was difficult to make any decision in a hall filled with 5,000 people. And in principle such audiences are not capable of self-organization. Emotions frequently prevail here. Somebody's loud, emotional speech is heard and the hall is infected by it. And a person can vote and then change his mind two or three hours later. This happened repeatedly during the course of the congress. In general in politics emotions are a poor adviser; they generate, encourage, and stir up unpredictability.

So we worked in the commissions. And this is the way the most important documents were generated. I must say that these documents reflect in practice all the main aspects of our platform with which we went to the congress.

In my opinion, this is a very important document—a declaration of interethnic relations. It is very modern in tone and I think that it, this document, is oriented toward the future. It reflects points that are important to us pertaining to the judgment of the Stalin regime, the establishment of the Union of sovereign states as a community of nations, and so forth.

It is interesting how it originated... I shall disclose, as it were, a somewhat behind-the-scenes aspect of the congress... First there was the apparatus variant that was submitted to the commission. Then an alternative variant occurred, literally during the night of one of the "night" parties. This was a dramatic moment. One of the workers of the CPSU Central Committee told me that if this variant had been adopted, God forbid, he could not have worked on that basis; it would have been impossible to work with the Communist Parties. Then a new variant appeared; we called it the Palma-Allika variant, and one must say that it was almost fully integrated into the first document. It was on the basis of these two variants that the document adopted by the congress originated.

In general I think that our delegation contributed many of its ideas to the congress documents. But they too, these documents, enrich us, give us the opportunity to work creatively, and introduce certain new aspects into our policy. Today it seems that one cannot say that we stand behind any particular rigid platform that is distinctive to us. Now, we are proceeding in the channel of general processes. And the congress has shown this.

Of course, there are individual aspects linked to the specific features of the republic. I have in mind our concrete problems arising from local conditions and the effects of various political forces. But we cannot even insist that all of these aspects be included in the overall context of the party; otherwise this would again be a unitary policy that would be equally mandatory for all, without taking internal differences into account. After all the party is developing a common direction, a common policy.

In terms of the radical issues discussed at the congress, the Estonian delegation turned out to be the closest to the delegation of the Moscow city party organization and the delegations of Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Moldavia. And M.S. Gorbachev understood us. That is, there was more agreement in all views here than there was with certain other delegates. And this is important. For politics, as we know, is the art of finding allies.

We were convinced—and this is the main thing—that the Communist Party of Estonia was proceeding in the right direction.

[Kuznetsova] Which aspects seemed the most dramatic to you during the course of the congress?

[Sillari] The reports from members of the Politburo... The atmosphere of aggressiveness and hostility that appeared at that moment. Otto Latsis said that it was not the loftiest dramatic feeling that appeared in the hall at this point. And I agree with that. One is also stunned by

the fact that the most intelligent, clear-thinking people who are devoted to Gorbachev and his allies are leaving party leadership.

A very critical situation arose at the congress during the discussion of Paragraph 22 of the new CPSU Regulations.

The Regulations Commission on which I worked began a discussion of the provisions of the regulations, essentially as early as May. And if we compare where we began and where we ultimately ended up, one could say that this is an immense distance. Initially the draft was in the spirit of the old regulations. But then it changed a great deal. And all the commission members supported the new document, which corresponds more to the spirit of the times. Mikhail Sergeyevich, incidentally, expressed this idea: We had the old regulations and the processes still took place. And if we introduce a rigid framework again will this help things? Then let the old one remain... Still, it will not work in real life.

We had very heated discussions in the commission. And when we got to Paragraph 22 it was adopted unanimously. We members of the commission all came to understand a great deal and evaluated things in a new way during this time. We came to understand the situation in the republics. It was not by accident that one of the members of the commission, who spoke later, during the discussion in the hall, said: "We have moved along the razor's edge. We have tried to retain the unity of the CPSU and maximum independence of the Communist Parties of the Union republics, as well as the possibility of operating on the basis of their own specific features and their own objectives, having their own programs and regulations."

[Kuznetsova] But then Lembit Annus made an amendment...

[Sillari] It is not a matter of Annus... It is simply that this viewpoint exists. Going back again—to pro forma but compulsory unity or, rather, to uniformity which binds everyone by their hands and feet... And under the conditions of a multiparty system they will simply perish... One after another the delegations declared that if the amendment were adopted they would have to leave the congress... Gorbachev explained to the delegates six times what the threat was. And again and again he emphasized that the Union republics need strong, effective communist parties. Many simply did not understand while others, possibly, were pursuing their own goals here. But life forces us to understand...

[Kuznetsova] But the delegation did not leave...

[Sillari] No. Our delegates decided they would fight to the end... They decided they could not give up their positions to opponents of Gorbachev... This was indeed a dramatic moment. There could have been a split... But Gorbachev fought...

And, of course, the situation in the Politburo... This formula for its composition was found essentially at the beginning of the congress. And I have already said why. This principle for forming the Politburo was supported by Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Moldavia... They saw this as a possibility to stay on top of the processes and be able to anticipate and warn people... It is known that certain members of the Estonian delegation were against it again... But they found no support. By a secret vote the Central Committee plenum affirmed the correctness of this approach and the need for it. And Gorbachev said once again: I do not want to oversimplify the situation, but I think the right choice has been made.

And, recalling this difficult situation, I wish to mention V. Malkovskiy and our comrades from the northeast again. In general they did a great deal of work at the congress. It would have been difficult for us if the members of the coalition Central Committee had not acted in concert. Of course, there were varying viewpoints among us. In the evenings when we gathered to sum up the results of the day disputes frequently broke out. But the next day these had already been resolved. Because we discussed everything openly, without being cunning or beating around the bush. And if objections arise we try and will continue to try to find ways of coming together and developing common approaches. And, in my opinion, this is happening. And this is the opinion of the entire delegation elected at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Estonia.

The congress has ended. But the work of the delegates does not end. Before us we have meetings, speeches, and open discussion, if necessary.

I wish to emphasize that we are open to all; we are not concealing our objectives, our intentions, or our policy. Because this is the only way we can count on support.

RSFSR

Tatar State Sovereignty Drafts Published

LD3107124890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1130 GMT 31 Jul 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Drafts of a declaration on state sovereignty have been published in Tatariya. It is interesting to note that in one of the drafts the Tatar Autonomous Republic is transformed into a Union republic. The question of proclaiming sovereignty has been included on the agenda of the work of the Tatar parliament.

Shostakovskiy Fired From Moscow Party School

Situation Discussed

90UN2465A Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 Jul 90 p 2

[Unattributed collection of materials on the firing of V.N. Shostakovskiy from his post as rector of the

Moscow Higher Party School: "To Be Released From His Post..."; published under the rubric: "The Law Is Obligatory for All"]

[Text] The press center of the journalism department of the Moscow Higher Party School reports that Professor V.N. Shostakovskiy, rector of the Moscow Higher Party School, fired from his position in the bureau of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom [City Party Committee], has protested that decision by addressing the People's Court of Moscow's Frunzenskiy Rayon on 19 July.

[Signed] V. Shinkarenko, head of the journalism department of the Moscow Higher Party School and doctor of historical sciences.

From an Interview with Professor V. Shostakovskiy

[Question] Vyacheslav Nikolayevich, the press has reported your withdrawal from the CPSU. They say that on that basis a decision has been made to fire you from your post as rector of the Moscow Party School. What can you say about this?

[Shostakovskiy] Yes, that was a very strange statement in the press. It was supposedly made according to materials from a press conference that we conducted. But at the conference we read out a statement which was signed by a group of people and which I tried to make public at the congress. And the paradox is that in this statement we called upon people not to abandon the party, not to withdraw, not to close the door, but to divide themselves. We declared the need to divide the CPSU and our intention to form a new parliamentary party from that part of the party which supports the ideas of the Democratic Platform. So there was no withdrawal, and we are against our comrades' handing in their party cards chaotically and without organization. I did receive a document about my discharge from my work. It was a decision of the bureau of the party gorkom of 13 July, that is to say that it was adopted the day after my speech at the congress and while the congress was still in session. The decision was adopted in private, without consulting the school's labor collective and in my absence, and it was sent to us by special delivery. Long live democracy!

Decree of the Bureau of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom of 13 July 1990: On Comrade V.N. Shostakovskiy

At the 28th CPSU Congress, V.N. Shostakovskiy made a statement in the name of a number of communists concerning a split in the CPSU and their intention to form their own democratic parliamentary party. This political step cannot be seen as anything other than voluntary withdrawal from the CPSU.

In connection with this the Moscow CPSU Gorkom Bureau decrees:

To release Comrade V.N. Shostakovskiy from the post of rector of the Moscow Higher Party School as not conforming to the post he occupies.

[Signed] Yu. Prokofyev, secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom.

From a Letter from V. Shostakovskiy to the Moscow CPSU Gorkom

In connection with the Moscow CPSU Gorkom decree of 13 July 1990, I declare the following.

I consider this decision to be illegal for a number of reasons. The post of rector of the Moscow Higher Party School is under the jurisdiction of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, and I was appointed to that post by a decision of the secretariat. I do not understand upon what basis the Moscow CPSU Gorkom Bureau has acted. If the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat has adopted an corresponding decision, I would like to receive it....

I categorically reject the formula firing me from the post of rector "as not conforming to the post" I occupy. I was presented the post of rector for a period of five years on the basis of a 1987 study of the opinions of teachers, associates, and students by secret vote at a meeting of the academic council. I did not pass any other test for "conforming to the post" of rector or teacher of an educational institution. Is it possible that the Moscow Gorkom Bureau also conducted such a test secretly, the way they adopted (by a vote) the aforementioned decree? Does it have the authority? In any case I request that I be presented the materials from this test.

From a Declaration Sent to Comrade Yu.A. Prokofyev, Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and First Secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom

A group of teachers and scientific associates of the Moscow Higher Party School, with the participation of a number of the members of the rectorate, the academic council, the party committee, the party bureau, and leaders of the departments and subunits, has acquainted itself with the Moscow CPSU Gorkom Bureau decree of 13 July "On Comrade V.N. Shostakovskiy." We consider it in essence illegal and state our resolute disagreement with the act of firing V.N. Shostakovskiy from his position as rector of the Moscow Higher Party School.

Being familiar with Comrade Shostakovskiy and his practical, political, and moral qualities, we consider the formulation in the decree firing him, that he does not conform to the post he occupies, to be illegal. A concept for transforming the school into a party and state institute of a new type has been prepared and is being implemented at the initiative and under the leadership of V.N. Shostakovskiy. It is supported by the labor collective and has been received positively by a council of rectors of higher party schools and a scientific society.

We demand that the action of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom Bureau decree that the firing of Comrade V.N. Shostakovskiy from the post of rector of the Moscow Higher Party School be halted until the issue is examined

at the primary party organization and at an academic council of the Moscow Higher Party School.

[Signed] Associates of the Moscow Higher Party School; 30 signatures in all.

From the Statement of Citizen Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Shostakovskiy to the People's Court of Frunze Rayon, Moscow

The Moscow CPSU Gorkom Bureau has fired me "for not conforming to the post" I occupy.

I consider this formulation ungrounded and illegal for a number of reasons.

I propose that the political organs and its bureau are not competent or authorized to deliver a verdict about the conformity or lack of conformity of a rector of an educational institution to the post he occupies, regardless of the departmental subordination of the VUZ [higher educational institution]. Throughout the world this is the prerogative of a board of people able to evaluate professionally whether or not a person can fulfill a certain number of functions. In this instance it is the academic council of the school.

One also notices the circumstance that, as it follows from the preamble of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom Bureau decree, I am being released from my work because of political motives. It is clear that the formula for firing me should correspond to the essence of the issue as well.

I request that the court review my statement concerning the legality of the formulation firing me from the post of rector of the Moscow Higher Party School and defend my professional honor and personal dignity.

From the editor. As we publish these materials received by us, we consider it necessary to make a short explanation. At issue is a member of a trade union who has been fired from his work. We are not inclined to discuss here the political motives of this decision. But whatever they may be, any organs—including party organs—are obliged to act in conformity with existing norms of labor legislation. And in this instance these norms have been ignored.

Prokofyev Addresses Firing

90UN2465B Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by Yu. Prokofyev: "'To Be Released From His Post...'"; published under the rubric: "Answer to TRUD"]

[Text] **Documentary material about the circumstances of the firing of V.N. Shostakovskiy, rector of the Moscow Higher Party School, about deviations from the law applied in this case, and about the fact that the formulation of the firing offends the professional honor of the scholar was published in yesterday's issue of the paper under the same headline as today's article.**

Yesterday the editor received a response signed by Yu.A. Prokofyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom [City Party Committee], which we publish in its entirety.

Respected editor!

I believe that I do not have the right to ignore TRUD's 24 July article under the headline "To Be Released From His Post..." which concerned the firing of Professor V.N. Shostakovskiy, rector of the Moscow Higher Party School. I wish to clarify the position of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom Bureau in this respect. By comparing the points of view, the reader of the newspaper will be able to draw conclusions about and make evaluations of the actions of V.N. Shostakovskiy himself and of the gorkom bureau even if they are not, as they say, in our favor. It is important for both sides taking part in this case to be heard.

First I would like to say that the knowledge, experience, and theoretical thought of Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Shostakovskiy were always valued in the Moscow city party organization. And that is not a hypocritical statement. This is the very reason why he was made the leader of a party educational institution and is a member of the gorkom. He really has done much to develop the party school and to increase the level of scientific work in this educational institution. Our attitude toward him as a scholar has not changed. But this is not the issue. Ultimately, if ideological differences arise, they may not and cannot be resolved by administrative means. You will agree that administrative resolution was possible only so long as the creative potential of the rector of the party higher educational institution was directed toward fundamental renewal of the party, its perestroyka, and radical democratization.

Now V.N. Shostakovskiy and a number of those who think like him have declared, from the tribune of the 28th congress as well as in other places, a split in the CPSU and their intention to create a new democratic parliamentary party. We do not question their right to do that. We have taken the road of developing democracy and political pluralism in society. If they want a new party, let them leave and form a new party.

But instead, V.N. Shostakovskiy did not declare his own withdrawal from the CPSU as a formal act, and he still has the party card of a communist in his pocket. A new tactic for the fight against the Communist Party (for you cannot call it anything else!) has arisen—its disintegration from inside. Can anyone dispute it? The followers of Shostakovskiy themselves do not hide their goals: Recently at a meeting at the University of Vladivostok, for instance, V. Lysenko, a "Democratic Platform" activist, declared that "Democratic Platform" is not trying to create an anti-communist party, but that it should not be a communist party either. Is this not a sufficiently unambiguous declaration of their repudiation of communist ideals? And is it not political cynicism

to declare this, while simultaneously declaring that they will not withdraw from the Communist Party?

We cannot reconcile ourselves with such a line of conduct. It is not a question of ideological tolerance for various points of view, but of the political fate of the party. This is a fundamental question.

V.N. Shostakovskiy, as much as he is respected as a scholar, quit being a communist in essence and by his convictions, and he does not hide it. And it was for this reason that he stopped conforming to the demands of the post of rector of the Moscow Higher Party School.

V.N. Shostakovskiy's abilities as a scholar and an organizer could be of much benefit to the beginning democratization of inter-party life. But I believe that he made his choice consciously and fully independently.

It is possible to contest the formulations of the document adopted by the gorkom bureau in court, to which the former rector of the Moscow Higher Party School has now turned, and if necessary they will be brought into correspondence with the law which, indisputably, applies to all. But the essence of what has happened will remain unchanged.

Journal Details RSFSR Proposal for Union Treaty

90UN2488A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 30, 28 Jul 90-3 Aug 90 p 4

[Conclusion of article by RSFSR Supreme Soviet First Deputy Chairman R. Khasbulatov begun in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 28: "What Will the Union Treaty Be?"]

[Text] We are completing the publication of an article by R. Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet.

The Version of a New Union Treaty Proposed by the RSFSR

In May and June the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies set forth the main provisions for the legal status of Russia which are important in principle. This is, first, the complete (without exception) sovereignty of the RSFSR on its territory which calls for the primacy of the law of the republic over the law of the USSR; second, a guaranteed declaration of the rights of citizens in keeping with the commonly accepted norms of international law (without any exception); third, a ban on interference by political parties and other public organizations in the operation of soviet, economic, administrative, judicial, law-enforcement, and other organizations (their depolitization and deideologization); fourth, a ban on the combination of the posts of the heads of the organs of state power and government with those of party functionaries.

The delineation of the functions of the RSFSR and the center carried out by the congress is particularly significant in the aspect in question. The RSFSR delegates to the center the functions of ensuring defense (while controlling the operations of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex on the territory of the RSFSR), state security (with corresponding control on the territory of the USSR), the energy economy, maritime and air transportation, and the sphere of international relations (in part). That is to say, at issue are the powers which the Union organs of power and government should exercise with a view to ensuring the guaranteed integrity of the USSR.

The RSFSR intends to perform on its own all other functions, including all internal activities, such as economic, social, and cultural policy, finance and credit operations, and foreign economic operations. With a view to the practical implementation of these decisions, the RSFSR government was instructed to embark on negotiations with the USSR Government, as well as to embark on negotiations with all Union republics and other states on an equal- rights, treaty basis with a view to signing treaties on economic, social, interethnic, cultural, and other issues.

At the same time, the Constitutional Commission formed by the congress was instructed to work out the drafts of a new constitution and a new Union treaty.

How to Relieve the Tension Between the RSFSR and Autonomous Entities

The task of harmonizing relations with autonomous entities is particularly urgent for the RSFSR. It may be accomplished in the course of discussing the future federation treaty. Without repeating what has already been said, it is necessary to note the following circumstances which are capable of playing an important role in accomplishing the task of relieving the tension between the center and the autonomous entities in the long run.

First. A date should be set very soon for consultations between the RSFSR and the autonomous entities on the issue of determining the political status of the autonomous entities.

Second. The legal recognition of autonomous oblasts and okrugs, along with autonomous republics, as the subjects of both the RSFSR and the USSR endowed with full rights could become one of the goals of such talks, all the more so because the autonomous republics have been recognized as the subjects of the USSR in a law passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Third. The multiplicity of state structures—Union republics, autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs—should be eliminated. The clear-cut and profound notion "republic," which is a millennium old, should be accepted as the foundation instead of this.

Fourth. The issue of the restoration of the "national hearths" of the peoples who have lost it as a result of

Stalinist repressions and the arbitrary redrawing of the ethnic map of the natural settlement of people should be considered.

It is necessary to replace the formula "a powerful center—powerful republics" with the more flexible, realistic, and dialectical formula "powerful Union states—an effective center." Our experience, as well as that of the world, has shown that "the powerful center" accomplishes little if it fails to ensure the efficiency of all elements of the overall federal system. As our domestic history once again testifies, "the powerful center" may sometimes hamper the creative process of the entire system by endowing it with neo-totalitarian traits. Meanwhile, the task is to liberate ourselves from these traits, thus creating a firm foundation for drawing closer to the modern civilization of the world.

RSFSR Deputy Chairman Khasbulatov Interviewed

90UN2492A Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 July 90 p 2

[Interview with Ruslan Khasbulatov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, by N. Dorofeyev; place and date not given: "...'I Believe in the Rebirth of Russia!'"]

[Text] [Dorofeyev] First of all, Ruslan Imranovich, I would like to know what kind of legacy you have inherited.

[Khasbulatov] In Russia the situation has become very difficult. It has turned out to be the most ravaged of all the republics. We have nonequivalent commodity exchange and ecological disasters in all the main industrial regions, polluted rivers and air, and mostly impoverished and unfortunate people. And at the same time we have a direct and somehow maniacal desire by the Union government, come what may, to effect economic transformations at the expense of the population. And this when our people here are literally living in poverty. The conversion program also fails to offer anything to the republic's national economy and there has been no serious cutback in the military-industrial complex. Foreign economic aid remains unmonitored and subject to certain subjective wishes. And most of these problems, and other problems, have arisen not because of perestroyka but through the incompetent management by administrators and their reluctance to create a normal economy.

This is all giving rise to serious resentments among the people. This was confirmed by the recent miners' strike, for they are not striking for an easy life. The USSR Government adopted the well-known resolution No. 608 and has failed to do almost everything that it promised.

[Dorofeyev] Having proclaimed the "500 Days" program, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet itself selected the time frame and set a rigid framework for its own existence. The countdown of the days has started. Has it succeeded in doing anything yet?

[Khasbulatov] If you are talking about the work of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, then it has been devoted almost entirely to implementing the declaration on sovereignty issued by the congress. In developing it we have passed about 20 legislative enactments, including the resolution on the banking system and controlling the foreign economic sphere, and the law on property on RSFSR territory. We started with this because we have seen how the central government has started to engage in active attempts to distribute Russian property into some kinds of mythical joint-stock companies and concerns (that is, former ministries). As a result, what is starting to appear is not state ownership or public ownership but some kind of incomprehensible ownership. There is, of course, a certain cunning in this. For five years the center has done nothing and now suddenly it is in a great hurry, precisely when Russia has started to implement a quite purposeful radical economic reform. With the law on property we have established a clear boundary, a limit to what is permissible in terms of interference in our Russian affairs.

The next thing, also very important, is to review, during the first reading of the law on fundamental principles, how foreign economic activity takes place on the territory of the RSFSR and to adopt a resolution for immediate action in this matter. Henceforth the entire sphere of foreign economic activity will be transferred to the control of the Russian government and its Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, and the Foreign Trade Bank [Vneshnetorgovoy bank] that we are now setting up, and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations that has already been created.

We have announced a more favorable and easier regime for the activity of foreign entrepreneurs and have given the local authorities opportunities themselves to register enterprises belonging to foreign citizens.

At the same time the RSFSR Supreme Soviet has also adopted another resolution on the creation of special economic zones on republic territory. Up to now we have adopted proposals regarding Leningrad; Vyborg and the adjacent area; and the Maritime Kray including Nakhodka, Sakhalin, and Chita Oblast. The government has been assigned the task of studying requests from other regions. We seriously intend to create these kinds of inclusions in our economic system. I am sure that they will help in including the republic's national economy in the system of the world market. The historical experience of other states shows that free economic zones constitute a very convenient channel for penetration into the world market.

[Dorofeyev] How are relations now taking shape between the republic and the center? Is there not some feeling of opposition to B.N. Yeltsin's "team's" initiatives?

[Khasbulatov] I see no clearly expressed encroachment on our actions, with perhaps the exception of one, in my view, tactless move. We adopted a resolution of the

RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the transformation of the republic branch of the State Bank [Gosbank] into the republic State Bank of Russia. And now V. Gerashchenko, the chairman of the board of Gosbank, is sending to all his subordinate branches a telegram in which he states that by issuing its own resolution the republic Supreme Soviet has violated some provision of the USSR Council of Ministers. You see, the Gosbank board chairman believes that it is possible to in fact repeal the Supreme Soviet law....

Unfortunately, it is necessary to act firmly in such cases. But we are obliged to make it understood that a decision of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet can be rescinded only by the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies or the Supreme Soviet itself. No one else. No one should have illusions about this.

[Dorofeyev] Does this not mean a course toward confrontation?

[Khasbulatov] Both the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the republic government are counting on cooperation with the center. It is necessary because we do not have the right to engage in games about who is "pulling" whom. We have but one problem, namely a people who have been fleeced, who incidentally do not intend to tolerate their impoverished position any longer. We have not been given very long to find a way out of this economic impasse—500 days. I am marking them off on my own calendar. The central government is another matter. It has been philosophizing now for five years and it assumes that it has another 15 in reserve. It has used up its credit of trust.

But the Russian people have trusted us and have elected precisely this parliament. The Supreme Soviet and its leadership and the government have been elected in a most democratic way. And they are right to shape their actions in accordance with the old, albeit admittedly and obviously nondemocratic, Constitution. Meanwhile, we have not adopted a single standard that is not in accord with it, for it states in the Constitution that the republics are sovereign states that joined the Union voluntarily and their right of secession is proclaimed. We are not talking in any way about secession, but if the republic is sovereign then surely we have the right to exercise our sovereignty on our territory?

[Dorofeyev] How is it proposed to do this in practice?

[Khasbulatov] Very simply. We limit the influence on Russia from the central departments in economic, political, information, and cultural terms. We have even created our own ministry that we will call the Ministry of Information.

We must overcome the information blockade and we must have our own newspaper. We have been counting on some good gesture of understanding that SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, for example, might give us especially since two of its three founders were the republic Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers. But for some reason the Russian Communist Party Congress is affirming its right to be the creator of a newspaper while at the same time the Russian Communist Party has not been among the sponsors of a newspaper.

But it is not merely a question of the newspaper. We are having difficulty in equipping the offices of the deputies for we have a parliament that is in permanent session. However, there are few offices. The building in which we are located was not built for this kind of activity. But the deputies should be working seriously. Everything has to be found—equipment, money, premises. We have eliminated ministries, but we do not know when they will vacate the buildings. At the same time we have created a Supreme Economic Council but have nowhere to house it!

One thing alone does please us: Very interesting people are constantly coming to us, ready to cooperate, and they are putting forward interesting ideas and asking for help. Alas, I am still being forced to tell them that all I can give them is their freedom.

[Dorofeyev] But perhaps you will then turn to the central government....

[Khasbulatov] To beg? We have no mandate for that. Our congress assigned us the task of seizing power and acting in accordance with the mandate.

[Dorofeyev] And how are relations taking shape with the all-Union ministries which have grown accustomed to behaving as though Russia were their own ancestral land?

[Khasbulatov] We are now trying to understand the range of their powers. Within the republic structure it has been decided to abandon the sector ministries, and in their place ministries dealing with industry and the economy have emerged. They must make a careful study of the work of all enterprises operating until recently within the framework of the all-Union ministries, and of course cut short completely any possible control on their part. The organizational and financial links of the enterprises will be returned to the RSFSR and the semifeudal dependence of Russian industry on the central departments will be removed.

[Dorofeyev] Ultimately they will become totally unnecessary, will they not?

[Khasbulatov] Undoubtedly! It is not known why they have in general continued to exist until now. The all-Union ministries long since lost their potential and capacity for creative activity. And if they are operating it is only by way of inertia, and then only to feed the highly placed officialdom. The center should retain only those functions that are agreed with the Union republics. The existing center cannot now be the cessionary of the future. This is what we think, and as far as I know it is what the leaders of the other republics also think.

[Dorofeyev] And are the leaders at center of the same opinion?

[Khasbulatov] To judge from their statements and proposed plans, they prefer something different.

[Dorofeyev] A final question, Ruslan Imranovich. What is your prediction for the coming months: What can Russia expect?

[Khasbulatov] It is difficult for me to judge that today. The economy of a country as enormous as Russia must for a certain period develop under the force of inertia. If a long-term recession is traced, then this trend will not be removed in an hour regardless of what we do now. We must live through a certain time during which the effects will continue while they are not amenable to influence. For two or three months life will be complicated. And during those months it is difficult to expect any real reprieve from this effect. It is another matter that today we have created the very serious psychological climate needed for future transformations. To judge from the feedback from voters, they do not just simply recognize us as the authorities, but also trust us.

There is no need to observe the rates in the economy that we had set; what is needed is a correct shaping of the relationship between the different forms of ownership and the creation of a mass of small enterprises, and the formation of an economy operating on a competitive basis. We must make a serious economic analysis for every region of the repblic and determine the legacy that we have inherited; which enterprises should be urgently developed with the help of, let us assume, foreign capital; and which should be transferred to joint-stock companies or cooperatives, individuals, and farmers. In my opinion it would be of interest to build a dozen car assembly plants and numerous small enterprises to produce video equipment and electronics. And they should be built quickly, within a year. And a large number of factories producing ready-to-wear clothing and apparel and to process agricultural produce should also be brought into operation. Not the giants but small plants, many of them—hundreds.

In short, there is an enormous field for activity here. So let us untie the hands of entrepreneurial people and you will see how quickly the economy, culture, and morality of Russia will be revived. I believe this deeply....

[Dorofeyev] I would like to share your conviction....

RSFSR Congress To Discuss Land Ownership

LD3107192590 Moscow TASS in English 1837 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Aleksey Lvov]

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—An Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation will meet in Moscow at the end of October to consider the revival of the Russian countryside and the development of the republic's agro-indstrial sector, Boris Isayev, deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, told a briefing here today.

"The most urgent and paramount task now is to solve the food problem," Isayev said. In this connection he pointed out the need to elaborate new approaches to the problems of the countryside, which means primarily to solve the land issue.

The government of Russia will tell the people's deputies of the republic its concept of the revival of the countryside and the development of the agro-industrial sector.

A number of bills will be submitted to the congress for consideration, Isayev said. The major [as received] of them will be bills on land reform and on individual-operated farms. These documents envisage new property relations.

The previously usual term "land use" will be replaced by "ownership of land". The draft new land code of the Russian Federation, which will also be considered by the congress, determines rights to own land for life, to inherit, purchase and sell it.

All forms of ownership in the agrarian sphere will be recognised as equal, the briefing was told. An equal right to set up a farm is guaranteed for all citizens, and assistance to their activities shall be ensured. Such measures, law-makers believe, will make it possible to move from the multi-mode character of the economy to fuller utilisation of land resources.

The drafting of bills, judging by everything, is proceeding not without difficulty. Journalists were told about a negative reaction from conservative-minded leaders of collective and state farms to a number of provisions of the documents that are being prepared. "But we are confident that common sense will prevail," Isayev said.

A whole package of decisions covering both production, social and cultural aspects of life in the countryside is being worked out during preparation for the congress.

Russian People's Deputies To Meet in October

LD3107172390 Moscow TASS in English 1630 GMT 31 Jul 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Lev Aksenov]

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—An Extraordinary Congress of Russia's People's Deputies will convene in Moscow in late October this year, Russian Vice President Boris Isayev told Soviet and foreign journalists at a briefing here today.

Russia's supreme legislature will consider matters relating to the revival of the Russian countryside and the development of the republic's agro-industrial complex.

Democratic Platform Leaders Campaign in Far East

PM3107142990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jul 90 p 1

[Yu. Sorokin and A. Yermakov report under the "To the Issue!" rubric: "The 'Democratic Platform' on Wheels"]

[Text] As we have already reported, "Democratic Platform" leaders and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies headed by Vladimir Lysenko, went on a visit to the largest cities in the Far East and Siberia.

Yesterday, the group arrived in Kemerovo, leaving behind Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, Blagoveshchensk, Krasnoyarsk, and Novokuznetsk. For the first time since the intraparty discussions in the 1920's the leaders of the minority, who did not win at the congress, tried to win after the congress by appealing directly to communists and non-party members, and openly campaigning for their own political program. Incidentally, all organizational questions connected with the visit (and there are many of these on such a long itinerary), are resolved in the localities by deputies from local soviets and "Democratic Platform" supporters. Workers from the party apparatus do not participate in this as a rule, which is understandable in itself: At the 28th CPSU Congress, "Democratic Platform" leaders announced their organized withdrawal from the CPSU and the creation of a new parliamentary party.

One of the aims of the visit is to clarify the reasons for this decision. According to Lysenko, the party, which will be created on the basis of the "Democratic Platform," must not be anticommunist: "The people are tired of 'isms.' There is no need to create anything 'anti.' What is created on hatred is short-lived and doomed. We need a civilized, multiparty parliamentary system, and the shortest, most effective, and most natural way of reaching it is by dividing the CPSU itself, in which according to political scientists' assessments, up to a dozen various ideological trends now coexist."

It is proposed that the constituent congress of the new party—the "Democratic Platform"—be held in Moscow in October of this year. Regional conferences of the supporters of the Democratic Platform should be held before this, and as the visit shows, there are many of them. In Khabarovsk, after Vladimir Lysenko and RSFSR Peoples Deputy V. Belov addressed the Great Hall in the Political Enlightenment Center, around 200 people put in applications to join the "Democratic Platform." In Kemerovo, 16 people announced that they were leaving the CPSU and going over to the side of the "Democratic Platform," including Nikolay Yashin, first secretary of the Lenin Communist Youth League Gorkom [City Party Committee]. The primary party organizations of the KOMSOMOLETS KUZBASSA and NASHA GAZETA, the most popular miners' newspaper in the Kuzbass today, left the party. And these are just some examples in a movement that will possibly become a mass movement.

The remaining stops for the "Democratic Platform" are Novosibirsk, Omsk, and Sverdlovsk.

Sakhalian Leader Discusses Radical Reform Plan

AU3107142090 Vienna PROFIL in German 30 Jul 90 pp 40-41

[Interview with Valentin Fyodorov, "head of government of the Island of Sakhalin," by Michael Siegert in Moscow; date not given: "Sakhalin, the Little Dragon"]

[Text] Valentin Fyodorov, born 50 years ago in the Siberian city of Yakutsk has resolutely advocated a market economy reform for the USSR. His model is the West German postwar reconstruction, whose history he was able to study for six years as a grant recipient in the FRG. In a PROFIL interview two years ago he advocated "total freedom for the entire economy." As long as he was a professor and prorector at the Plekhanov School of Economics in Moscow, Fyodorov was regarded as an outsider. Since he was appointed head of government of the Island of Sakhalin (between Siberia and Japan) in April, his views have made him a significant factor in the great match of the reformers.

[Siegert] Professor Fyodorov, two years ago you told us that you would like to lease all of Siberia and carry out a radical market economy experiment there. Now you have been able to lease a part of Siberia, so to speak, the Island of Sakhalin. Is this big enough for you?

[Fyodorov] I would like to lease not just Siberia but the entire country! Yet, since I am a modest man I content myself with Sakhalin. The USSR will be next in a few years, after we have been successful with Sakhalin. And we will be successful! For three months now I have been chairman of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Sakhalin, that is to say "governor" of the island. One could also say I am the premier of that area. Sakhalin has a population of 730,000 and its size is 92,000 square kilometers.

[Siegert] So it is ten percent bigger than Austria but has only one-tenth of its population.

[Fyodorov] We are about twice as big as Taiwan and a bit smaller than South Korea. We want to turn Sakhalin into the fifth "small dragon" of Asia. This small dragon was born in April, and in a few years it will grow up.

[Siegert] Do you want to set up a purely market economy system?

[Fyodorov] We are no extremists. I do not want to completely destroy the old system at once. Over a period of two years I will foster small and medium-sized enterprises, exclusively private ones. This is our only remedy. We need three "f's": new forms, firms, and farms. We will also make new products. We are creating cooperatives, joint stock companies, and private agricultural enterprises. As soon as we feel strong enough we will destroy the old system. Our experiment is directed against the year 1917.

[Siegert] Can you not eliminate the heritage of Lenin and Stalin at once?

[Fyodorov] No, we cannot. The kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] are like a drafty old house, which nevertheless continues to provide shelter against the rain and snow. If we eliminate the sovkhozes today then we will not have any food tomorrow. We will only strangle them a bit: We take away some land from them, but we will also take land from the Army, fallow soil, and hand it over to private farmers. They are the true heroes of the USSR, not those who bear the order "Hero of Socialist Labor."

[Siegert] When will you privatize the state sector?

[Fyodorov] As soon as it is possible to buy enough meat and potatoes from the private sector we are able to abolish the state estates. The same holds true for state enterprises in industry. There is a large wasteland. On our island we have coal, natural gas, crude oil, fish, and furs, yet Moscow confiscates everything and we must beg to get something back. Now we will reverse this situation: We issue concessions to Soviet firms that register with us. We grant Liberian flags, so to speak.

[Siegert] How does this system of concessions work? For example if you want to fish in the Baltic Sea we are your harbor. We levy taxes but do not interfere in anything else. Or there may be cooperatives from all over the country that come here and offer to construct roads, brickyards, and cement plants for us. This has been working for two months. Even foreigners have come. [1]

[Siegert] What is Moscow's reaction to your privatization plans?

[Fyodorov] Our system is not good for boxing. It is brutal. This was felt by the GDR in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979. The last ones who experienced it were the Lithuanians. We must play wisely with our system. If we privatize everything at once Moscow will strike back. Unfortunately we are very vulnerable because we get most things supplied from Moscow. Now we have said that 25 percent of our fish remains in Sakhalin.

[Siegert] What does the fishery ministry think about this?

[Fyodorov] They are of course outraged. Yet 25 percent is a well-balanced amount. Had I said 40 percent then measures would have been taken against us. They can manage if we keep one-fourth for ourselves.

[Siegert] You no longer want to be a mere supplier of raw material?

[Fyodorov] We want to further develop all economic branches to the stage of processing. As a first step we managed to produce soap. This is the biggest success of Soviet power in more than 70 years! In the past it was shipped from Moscow to us over a distance of more than 7,000 km. Now we make our own curd soap. I have asked the directors: Do you not want to become millionaires? Well, go and make toilet soap! The second biggest success of Soviet power is cheese. In New Zealand we bought a modern plant, and now we are producing our own cheese.

[Siegert] Mr. Fyodorov, how did you make the move from theory to practice?

[Fyodorov] I have again and again proposed these reforms but never thought that I would implement them myself. The islanders read my articles and interviews and invited me to run as a candidate in the spring of 1989. This is how I was elected to the USSR People's Congress on Sakhalin. Last fall there were elections to the regional Soviet and I was appointed head of government. In April of this year I came here with my colleague Viktor Sirenko, who was also a lecturer of economics at the Plekhanov College in Moscow. We are a team. Yet there are some intelligent people in Sakhalin as well. I believe in the people's interest in the economy, in the natural instinct of those engaged in the economy. I appeal to the people: "Get rich!"

[Siegert] This is the old slogan of the French bourgeois King Louis Philippe from the middle of the 19th century: "Enrichissez-vous!"

[Fyodorov] Yes, it was quoted by Nikolay Bucharin at the time of the new economic policy in the twenties. And I repeat it here: Get rich! Through your own work—not by stealing state property. The people like getting rich. We have already noticed this through the example of our modest soap production.

[Siegert] You will need banks, a stock exchange, a tax system.

[Fyodorov] We will create new financial institutions. I have invented something else, a kind of Marshall Plan for Sakhalin. It is based on donations that range from 10 rubles given by the old babushkas to 100,000 rubles donated by enterprises. We use this money to grant loans. In addition we want Western aid.

[Siegert] How do you get this aid?

[Fyodorov] In September I will visit the United States and in November the FRG. There I will point to the Marshall Plan. Why should the Americans not provide assistance to Sakhalin? Why should the West Europeans not pass on the Marshall Plan money that continues to be in the ERP funds? I will ask the Americans whether the Harry Truman government was more clever than that of George Bush. At the Houston summit...

[Siegert] ...the West said that it does not want to throw its good money down the drain, which is what happened with the one billion German marks in Hungary in the last year of Kadar. Afterwards nobody knew where the money had gone. It simply disappeared.

[Fyodorov] In its own interest the West should grant the USSR loans. True, the system is decayed and devours

everything, even its own resources. If the West grants loans these will of course disappear somewhere for ever. Yet this would be good for the West because then the USSR's debt situation would be disastrous, such as Poland's. Once our debts reach $100 billion we are lost and no longer have a perspective of our own for our development.

[Siegert] So you are looking at credits not as a financial investment but as a political one—the profit would be the fall of the system?

[Fyodorov] Yes, that is correct. The West has the unique chance to enter the economy of the USSR, but the Western leaders are acting like small-town shopkeepers, they buy the Jews from us or negotiate insignificant concessions for the Lithuanians. They lack any vision.

[Siegert] What is your vision for Russia?

[Fyodorov] I want to show that we are as capable in the sphere of economy as in literature, music, and science. Just think of Dostoyevski, Tolstoy, Tchaikovsky...

[Siegert] ...the mathematician Kolmogorov, or Leontyef, who won the Nobel prize for economy and who is from the Soviet Union as well.

[Fyodorov] This shows that we are as good as the rest of the world, if we are allowed to develop in freedom. This is my dream. If we are successful...

[Siegert] ...you will also be awarded a Nobel prize.

[Fyodorov] This might well be, but is of secondary significance. Then I will return to Moscow with my aides and we will tell people there: Do things this or that way—or resign!

[Siegert] Mikhail Gorbachev has promised perestroyka, but so far it has not yielded any economic results or even negative ones.

[Fyodorov] I support Gorbachev, but I see his mistakes, his announcements which are not always followed by deeds. However, he has earned historic merit: He gave democracy to the Soviet Union. It was Gorbachev who initiated this development, not the party. In doing this, he showed courage. Kissinger once stated rightly that a politician does not need wisdom but courage.

[Siegert] Is the 28th CPSU Congress a step forward or a foul compromise—as so many CPSU congresses in the past?

[Fyodorov] I was a delegate there and view it as a step forward. However, life has already made two steps forward. So the party is lagging one step behind. I see a lot of hesitation and theoretical dogmatism. For this reason, I will organize a separate platform, a "market platform," within the CPSU. There are not only negative aspects to the party. It represents an enormous human potential. However, if it does not follow me, I will leave the party.

[Siegert] In the Soviet Union, the term market is linked with unemployment and rising prices.

[Fyodorov] A total of 99 percent of the people in our country do not understand what market really means. For them market is capitalism.

[Siegert] Which is still an obscene word in your country.

[Fyodorov] For this reason, we must inform people. There is more socialism in Austria than here. I simply rely on the experiences made during the reconstruction of Germany, Austria, and Japan after the war. No socialist country has been successful so far, only countries that were based on a market economy. What we have in the Soviet Union is not socialism but an offense against socialism. Basically, I am in favor of socialism as a concept, which includes equal rights and happiness for all. We will arrive at this kind of socialism in 100, 200, or 300 years. You will have it before we will have it.

[Siegert] Mr. Fyodorov, how long will you need to complete your experiment?

[Fyodorov] Two or three years.

[Siegert] Gorbachev has repeatedly said that. Every time the two or three years are up, he asks for another two years.

[Fyodorov] The situation is still deteriorating. We must first reverse this tendency. I will need two years to do that.

[Siegert] What will happen if this does not work?

[Fyodorov] I will shoot myself or emigrate.

Footnote

1. In mid-July Fyodorov concluded an agreement with an American company that will drill for oil and natural gas in Sakhalin. The oil is to be exported to the West for foreign currency, while the natural gas will be used for heating purposes in Sakhalin and parts of Siberia.

Moscow Decision on Housing Questioned

904DO174B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA correspondents N. Batalova and M. Polyatykin: "At the Moscow City Soviet Session"]

[Text] In the last year and a half our public life has acquired a remarkable feature: Everybody knows now that we speak better and better, we write more and more freely, but we live worse and worse. And that is in spite of the fact that now, just as before, the most unrivaled decisions are being taken at all levels which then remain on paper.

Can the present Moscow City Soviet guarantee to its constituents that the fundamental decisions on property adopted several days ago will be carried out and will improve our life?

The Moscow City Soviet passed a decision on municipal property, for instance. From now on municipal property means all non-residential, separately standing buildings and non-residential premises in buildings belonging to the state residential fund within the city limits. The Moscow City Soviet canceled all previously issued authorization papers but no organization became "homeless"—the tenants may temporarily use the buildings and premises on the previous terms.

This decision was passed before the Law on Property in the USSR was put in force. The law treats property issues much more widely. That may be why some deputies still wonder about certain issues connected to the transfer of the premises to the city.

What about the buildings and structures that were erected by agencies? Can the Moscow City Soviet decision affect the pace of the construction of structures needed by the city? Finally, what will be the borders between the property of the city, its rayons, and self-administration committees? And who will be the owner of a store located, for instance, in a cooperative residential building?

In other words, there are quite a few points that are still vague. Evidently it was not just a phrase that the given document is a political action rather than practical guidance. In its present form it requires a thorough revision and a solid legal foundation.

The same can be said about handing over residential premises to private owners. The decisions of the previous ispolkom [executive committee] allowed apartments to be sold to private owners. In contrast, the present session considered it reasonable to hand the apartments over to their current tenants free of charge.

Such a measure is sure to find enthusiastic supporters among Muscovites. Can it, however, affect the time limits set for resolving the living space crisis in the city? As Deputy Filippov mentioned in his speech, at present about 60 percent of the apartments in Moscow are assigned to people after they have been vacated. What will happen to those who are waiting for them?

And another question: How will they protect the rights of people who still live in the communal apartments in Moscow? What will the rent be and who will provide maintenance for the premises privately owned by the people?

All these questions should be answered by the permanent commissions and by the Moscow City Soviet Ispolkom which have been requested to draft the corresponding regulations and standards. And then practice and not theory will prove whether the Muscovites are going to lose or gain from the Moscow City Soviet decisions—on condition that they are realized before the term of office of the present Moscow City Soviet expires.

Yesterday the session dealt with the "other" part of the agenda and after that they discussed the candidates for the positions of deputy chairmen named by the Moscow City Soviet Chairman G. Popov. By secret vote N. Gonchar was elected deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet.

Moscow Soviet Views Non-Residential Premises

904D0174A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 13 Jul 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "The Houses Have an Owner"]

[Text] **The decision on non-residential premises in the city of Moscow is among the most important decisions adopted at the first session of the Moscow City Soviet.**

Non-residential premises as well as land within the city limits make up one of the most important items of city revenue. These premises are not being used effectively at present and as a result many buildings deteriorate or crumble; that is especially true in the center of Moscow. The Moscow City Soviet has not remained indifferent to the situation.

In accordance with the USSR laws "On Property in the USSR" and "On General Principles of Local Self-Government and Local Administration in the USSR," the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies has declared all non-residential, separate standing buildings and structures **municipal property** starting July 1. They include houses that are under construction or reconstruction as well as non-residential premises housed in buildings belonging to the state residential fund.

All the previously issued authorization papers for these premises have been voided as of 30 June. Those who have contracts or leases for them at present may use the given premises **temporarily** on previous terms.

The permanent Moscow City Soviet deputies' commission for economic policies and enterprise has been requested to draft, together with other permanent commissions, a Moscow City Soviet presidium decision by 1 October. The decision should set the limits for the property of the Moscow Soviet, local soviets, and the Zelenograd City Soviet (again with respect to non-residential premises).

The Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies asked the procuracy of the city to verify whether non-residential buildings and premises are owned or used legally.

Plant Will Double Kemerovo Housing Potential

PM3107110990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Report by N. Chirkov, V. Voronov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] The housing problem is acute. Housing is not being built as quickly as we would like or in the quantities we would want. One of the reasons for this is the lack of construction materials—good bricks. However, recently, in cooperation with Western firms—Italian and Spanish, particularly—it seems that things are getting moving. The first batches of output have been produced by the largest ceramic wall materials plant in the Kuzbass. It will make it possible to double brick production in Kemerovo at a stroke.

[Reporter] After the plant reaches its planned capacity Kemerovo's construction workers will receive 75 million bricks a year. Translated into square meters this equals more than 200,000—almost as much housing as is being built in Kemerovo at present. [video shows interior of brick plant] The brick production technology is Italian. All the equipment is manufactured under license from the "Unimorando" firm. Despite the vast dimensions of the shops hardly any people are in evidence. The entire process—from the mixing of the clay, through the molding, to the firing of the bricks—is automated and computerized. Brick-packaging lines will soon be commissioned here, and this will virtually eliminate any losses during shipment. This new standard of production—still strange to our Soviet brick plants—has required more highly qualified specialists: tool setters, machine operators, and programmers. [passage omitted]

New Publishing House Publishes Yeltsin Book

LD0108141190 Moscow World Service in English 1000 GMT 1 Aug 90

[Text] A new independent Soviet publishing house has issued its first book—"Confession on a Set Theme" by Boris Yeltsin [published in the West as "Against the Grain"]. The book was presented at the writers' club in Jurmala on the Baltic Sea in the presence of the author.

The president of the new publishing company, (Aleksandra Rekenchuk), said the choice of the first publication was intentional. Our wish to bring down the state monopoly on publishing is encouraged by the policy of the Russian president aimed at developing free speech and free enterprise, he said.

Next the publishers plan to launch a series of books by winners of the Nobel Prize in literature.

Industrial Development of Yamal Questioned

LD0108104690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 1 Aug 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Summary] A special expert commission of the state commission on nature again refused to confirm plans for the industrial development of Yamal peninsula a few days ago. Correspondent A. Shvetsov interviewed V.P. Tsarev [not further identified] who says Yamal has uniquely complex conditions and untried technology must not be used there. But, suitable technology does not exist at present. It has an unstable natural system and even slight encroachments could lead to unforeseeable consequences. A large amount of scientific research needs to be done before Yamal is industrialized. Shvetsov says that in spite of this, geologists, builders, and gas workers have been working in Yamal for several years with little thought for ecology. With large financial backing from their departments they have been drilling and they are building a railway from Labytnangi northwards. Members of the public, deputies, journalists, and nature protection bodies are working to protect the environment and the interests of the aboriginal people. Some of the work has been halted, and quite large sums sent to compensate for the damage that has been done. Transport workers are building housing and social facilities in several aboriginal villages.

Bryansk Water Supply Polluted With Phenol

PM2707142190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 25 Jul 90

[Report by A. Guglya from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] In the spring we reported an accident at an industrial enterprise in Ufa. At the time, phenol—a highly potent toxin—was discovered in the city's drinking water. The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] government took urgent steps to eliminate the consequences of the accident.

It never rains but it pours. On 21 July at approximately 1800 hours an accident happened at the Ivot Glassworks in Bryansk Oblast.

[Correspondent] Two engineers driving shunting locomotives while under the influence of alcohol overturned and damaged tank cars containing phenol and formaldehyde. All this happened in pouring rain, as a result of which more than 20 tonnes of noxious substances threatened to seep into the Desna River together with the runoff. [video shows damaged tank cars, stream of white liquid] Water from the Desna is used to supply Bryansk's population of almost 500,000.

An emergency commission adopted urgent measures to localize the consequences of the accident. The inhabitants of the oblast center are at the moment being supplied with water from reserve artesian wells only.

The contaminated upper layer of soil at the scene of the accident is being temporarily deposited in a special pit on the works territory. [video shows bulldozers]

[A.A. Yudin, director of the Ivot Glassworks] It remains to be agreed now where this soil should be buried, and I hope that within the next day or two all the work in connection with the accident which occurred at our works will be completed.

[Correspondent] At 0000 hours on 24 July the permissible limits of phenol and formaldehyde concentrations in drinking water were exceeded by 1.8 and 3.0 times,

respectively. The hygiene service is constantly monitoring the water, and prosecutor's office organs are conducting an investigation.

Western Republics

Reportage on Ukrainian Party Congress Speeches

Ivashko Speaks

90UN2371A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 26 Jun 90 pp 2, 3

[Report on speech by V.A. Ivashko at 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress]

[Text] Comrade communists! This is how I would like to begin. Our congress is being held in a specific political situation and wholly reflects all the processes that are occurring both in the party and in society. It is characterized by a diversity of thought, mood, and view. Of course, some things we can agree with, others we cannot. And this is perhaps characteristic of the atmosphere in which we live.

I would like to make a few observations.

First, concerning the report. Of course, we knew what we were doing, knew that the approach on which the report had been built would not be accepted by everyone. The report was built on the basis of the fact that it is necessary to realistically and truthfully reflect the political situation in the party and in society and formulate the common principles and directions of the renewal of the party and its policy. We believe that it is the political approach and determination of the policy line that should be the basic function of a renewed party. It is impossible to take on everything, as we have done for many years.

Everyone should do his own work: the Supreme Soviet, its work, the Council of Ministers, its work.... Our business, however, is the formulation of policy. No one has any need for a party lacking a strong policy in all spheres of the life of society.

We have proceeded from a self-critical account in the report of what was and what is. Each of us must understand that things today are entirely different from what they were four years ago, when the 27th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress was held. Big changes have occurred in this time. I have been reproached with having boasted of the big replacement of first secretaries. I boasted of nothing, nor is there anything to boast about. It is our turbulent life itself that is making such changes. Just look at the composition of the Politburo even: the first secretary is the second in four years, the second secretary is the third, the ideology secretary is the third also, and so forth. And it was the times themselves that demanded the solution of these questions. We believed that self-criticism in the report should not become self-flagellation. See how much of all kinds of dirt has already been heaped on us by our political opponents, who are taking advantage of everything for this, our history included. So, are we ourselves going to add to this? Where is the party which voluntarily debases itself? Of course we must acknowledge our mistakes. And we are doing and will continue to do so.

So, I repeat, during preparation of the report we tried to stick to the political approach. Of course, it is not ideal, and we made mistakes in some things. And I personally apologize to our veterans. We have been correctly criticized here for the fact that the report said nothing about their problems. But the report should, after all, be studied in a complex with three reports drawn up by the party Central Committee. These are the draft resolution of our congress, the program principles of the party's activity, and the Ukrainian Communist Party Rules. It is they that determine our entire future policy.

Now about myself, inasmuch as I have been subjected to criticism here, and there have been demands that I render account also. I have, as you know, been first secretary for nine months—not enough time for a person to be born even. But I am prepared to render account for this period, to render account for each day. My comrades and I have things of which to render account to the Ukrainian people.

Much has been said here about food. I will tell you that at this time we are as yet living, as before, in a unitary state. The changes which have occurred have not been great as yet. Up to 1990 the plans for supplies of meat to Union stocks had increased for decades here. And it was only this year that I and Comrades Masol Grintsov and Kolomiyets achieved, despite everything, a delivery reduction of 130,000 tons. It is being said that this is not being perceived, it is true. No, it is not. And this is because in the five months of this year procurements of meat declined 52,000 tons compared with last year. But, after all, if it is not produced, there will be no more on the table, however much deliveries are reduced. There has been talk here about supplies in Khmelnitskiy Oblast. Khmelnitskiy Oblast has this year purchased 22,000 tons less meat. And Ternopol, say, 13,000 tons less.

Further, I would like to say that together with Comrades Masol, Shcherbak, and Gurenko I made every effort to ensure the adoption of a Union program for elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. This provided the republic for two years six months with 5 billion rubles [R] from the Union budget. And the main thing now is assimilating them. Many other such examples could be cited also. There have mistakes also, of course.

V.A. Ivashko then answered congress delegates' questions. A number of questions, he said, concern my election as chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. Specifically, people inquire as to why I made a statement concerning the impossibility of the combination of the offices of Supreme Soviet chairman and first secretary of the

Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee only after I had been elected. But how else? Some deputies had approached me and said plainly: Declare this prior to the voting, and there will be no questions about the election. But I could not do this. And after I had been elected, I declared that I would put this question to the congress. So take this into consideration.

There are the following questions also: What, then, following your example, should people now be renouncing the office of first secretary also? We need to see not ourselves but the party and Soviet power. A new political system is being created, and if people have elected us to the soviets, it is there that our main business lies. We should pursue the party line in the legislative and executive authorities. But the party committee, of course, is always headed by a communist. Of course, it is necessary in each instance to proceed from actual circumstances. The rayon or oblast is one thing, the republic, quite another. Tell me, could I, say, at work at the session for six months, head the work on the party's renewal?

The next question. Why does CPSU Central Committee Politburo member Ryzhkov deliver to the USSR Supreme Soviet a report on the rapid transition to a controlled market economy, while CPSU Central Committee Politburo member Ivashko calls on the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet to be in no hurry with the reform? Had Politburo member Ryzhkov first coordinated what he wished to say with Politburo member Ivashko, this would not have happened. This question was not examined at a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. I learned of this formulation of the issue from the newspapers practically. And you yourselves saw how there was immediately speculative buying in the republic, as in the country also. And this is understandable. Nothing was prepared. People, however, can see that there is no market and no reform, but price rises are promised.

It was for this reason that I resolved to make a statement at the session on this matter. And the Supreme Soviet supported me.

At the same time I wish to emphasize that I am by no means opposed to controlled market relations. But this needs to be approached with a prepared financial system, the corresponding organization of production, and so forth.

It is asked: What, in your view, is the mechanism of the party committees' influence on the economy under the conditions of a multiparty system, market relations, financial autonomy, and self-financing? How should an enterprise director react to demands of the party committee? There can be no demands. Taking the socioeconomic policy of the Ukrainian Communist Party as the basis, the party organization and party committee should find the most efficient possibilities of their enterprise's development. The director—a party or nonparty man—will then himself do all that is necessary.

There are many questions as to why I have not named the actual culprits of this shortcoming or other in the work of the last Central Committee. I have not done so deliberately. After all, there is nothing easier (and we have done this for decades, incidentally) than, concluding a particular section of the report, to say: These shortcomings could have been avoided had such-and-such a secretary worked to greater purpose. But what is the point of this? Were we now to accuse one another of all sins, instead of pulling the plow together everywhere—in the primary, rayon, and oblast party organizations and in the Central Committee—no good would come of it.

The next inquiry: Please tell us, only candidly, your personal opinion as to whether Comrades Masol and Grintsov are capable of working in the new way and fruitfully. I will say absolutely candidly that, granted all his deficiencies, of which I am more aware, perhaps, than he himself, Comrade Masol is the person who currently is having to think about the entire economy of the republic, except, perhaps, for two sectors—coal and iron and steel—because they are not of republic but Union jurisdiction. And I would in this very difficult period propose that the chairman of the Council of Ministers be precisely Comrade Masol. In addition, good people, "you don't change horses mid-stream."

About Comrade Grintsov. I understand why this question is asked—his speech here was not a success. But I wish to say that he is a person who in terms of his practical experience, capacity for work, and vision of the situation merits his position as secretary of the Central Committee. There is the following question: How, in your view, will the principle of democratic centralism, which has up to this point worked for the usurpation of power by the party apparatus, work without changes for democratization? The principle of democratic centralism has not worked, it is the principle of bureaucratic centralism which has operated up to this point. We must now transfer the maximum in the way of rights to the primary and rayon organizations in order to really ensure the power of the party masses. This principle will then acquire the content with which Lenin invested it. However, it should be borne in mind that there can be no party without discipline.

The question: Could you not express your personal attitude toward such a question as a change in the party's name? But why change it, what is the point? We have nothing to fear, nothing to be ashamed of. I have already said in the report that in 1938, of the 102 members of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee, there remained just two. And of the Auditing Commission, none—all had been executed. Eight out of every 10 members of the Ukrainian Communist Party fell at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

We should not succumb to the trivial ideas which are being tossed us. After all, it is obvious that the party was the first casualty of totalitarian Stalinism, which was brazenly called socialism.

People ask: The newspaper—is it an organ of the party committee or the party organization? Comrades, we are continually being dragged into contrived debate. Only we are not getting down to work. I believe that the main thing is to ensure that the party newspaper and the party committee closely pool their efforts. The party committee participates in the work of the newspaper, the newspaper participates in the formulation of the policy line.

There are questions about my position concerning the possibility of a restructuring of the CPSU into a union of republic communist parties. The idea of the party's federalization does not, generally, appeal to me. This could weaken our party's forces. But the republic's state sovereignty envisages also changes in the status and a considerable broadening of the independence of the Ukrainian Communist Party. In addition, we need to take account of realities also. For instance, we have never as yet had a separate, if only organizationally, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party. But however circumstances take shape, I believe that our party should be an ideological and organizational alliance of communists of the whole country.

An alliance of free sovereign states—does this not mean the liquidation of the USSR as a single state? We cannot allow this, for this would be a tragic mistake. That we currently have a unitary state is another matter. And it is a question of a return to the Leninist concept of our union, which requires general consent.

The following inquiry: "We propose that for the purpose of the increased efficiency of the work connected with elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station, the Central Committee Politburo and republic Supreme Soviet establish a special state prize."

Such a prize could be established, of course. The main thing is that there be such research efforts.

People ask how we view the inactivity of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences in questions of the development of nuclear power engineering in the Ukraine.

We should not be speaking of the Academy of Sciences in this way. Our scientists were the first to raise their voice against the ill- conceived policy of the concentration of nuclear electric power stations in the Ukraine. And this is the truth. As also is the fact that they were among the first to participate in the work on eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station.

How many workers and kolkhoz [collective farm] members are there in the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, it is asked. Twenty-six workers and 25 kolkhoz members, including 24 kolkhoz chairman. Whoever was elected.

How many persons were accepted in the period under review as members of the CPSU? Some 310,000.

What, in your opinion, is the alignment of forces in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and what are the communists' possibilities in it?

It has to be said that the party members in the Supreme Soviet vary, as they do currently in the party itself. I have recently been criticized for having paid "tribute" to the wrong people. I would ask you to understand life's realities, which have to be taken into account. And if the communist deputies support me, we will be able to pursue a policy in the interests of the Ukrainian people.

Here is an inquiry with an implication which I have to read. "As chairman of the Supreme Soviet, please answer. Can a party, following the enactment of the corresponding law, be registered if it does not have its own program and has not defined its place in the Ukraine?

"Do you believe that a sovereign state should have a sovereign communist party? All the newly formed parties have fundamental documents and are ready for this.

"I would request that you read the question in full. Delegate Gavrilyuk from Lvov Oblast."

You know my position on these matters, it was set forth in the report also. We are for an independent Ukrainian Communist Party which is a part of the CPSU and is guided by common ideological and organizational principles.

"You have said nothing about the formation of the republic Peasant Union. Your attitude toward it?"

Positive, let people unite, many hands make light work, as they say. And we will help.

There is a very long letter about the principles of the formation of the Central Committee. I would like in this connection to emphasize the following points of principle. First, people who have the brains to perform their assigned work should be elected to the Central Committee. Second, it is necessary to ensure in the Central Committee due representation of the workers and peasants. And it is not a question of some percentage or other here. The Central Committee is setting no quotas now. Decide everything yourselves locally.

Now about a question concerning the Communist Party of the western Ukraine. People are requesting a decision on the question of its complete rehabilitation. Truly, in the period of the cult of personality the Communist Party of the western Ukraine shared the tragic fate of the Communist Party of Poland. It was branded a "party of provocateurs" and was unjustifiably dissolved, and its members were subjected to punitive measures. Were the Communist Party of Poland and the Communist Party of the western Ukraine fully rehabilitated in 1956 by a joint statement of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committees of the Italian, French, and Bulgarian Communist Parties, the Communist Party of Finland, and the Polish United Workers Party? If there

is something further that the Ukrainian Communist Party should do, we should do it.

Which secretaries and Central Committee department heads have in 1989-1990 visited a rural raykom [rayon party committee] and an oblast, it is asked? In just five months of the present year the first secretary of the Central Committee has visited four rural raykoms, the second secretary, six, Grintsov, several rayons of six oblasts, and Yelchenko, 13, and Kravchuk, eight rural raykoms. In less than 18 months Central Committee secretaries have visited all oblasts of the republic. Nine Central Committee department heads have in this period spent 659 days on business assignments.

How much, it is asked, is our congress costing? According to preliminary estimates, expenditure on the preparation and organization of the congress will amount to approximately R600,000.

The following question. A party leader recently gave an interview to foreign correspondents. How much was he paid for this interview, and to what end will the currency be used? I do not know whether he received any fee or not. I personally have in the past seven or eight months given an innumerable multitude of such interviews—to both Americans and Canadians. But have not been given a single dollar or cent or kopek even.

What amount of money does the Ukrainian Communist Party transfer to the CPSU Central Committee? This depends on our budget outlays and revenue. Some R48 million were transferred to the CPSU Central Committee in 1988, in 1989, R51 million.

How many raykoms are on a subsidy? I cannot give a precise answer to this question for the following reason. We know that the Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporozhye, Crimea, Lugansk, Lvov, Odessa and Kharkov Oblast and Kiev City and Oblast party organizations make a profit. All the others are subsidized.

What is the party budget expenditure on running the Central Committee? As you know, the congress has formed a commission to inspect the Central Committee's financial affairs. It will report its results to the delegates. I can say now, however, that last year this expenditure constituted R5.75 million, half of which went on wages.

Much is being said in the central press about an increase in prices, for newspapers and journals included? I can say nothing definite at this time. But there are evidently grounds for this After all, it is perfectly probable that there will be an increase in the cost of paper and postal and telegraph services.

There are many complaints about the fact that our scholars, staff of the Ukrainian Communist Party Institute of Party History included, have failed to provide theoretical substantiation for the restructuring processes. Only 48 scholars work at this institute. And they have been working chiefly on archive material and on translations of the works of V.I. Lenin, Marx, and Engels. I said in the report that we intend to create a social problems or political problems institute on the basis of it. This is very much needed today. Generally, however, it is not so much their fault but misfortune that they for decades "serviced" party decisions. But now everything needs to be done the other way about. In order that political decisions be based on science.

In conclusion, V. Ivashko said: "We are living at a time when the situation is changing very rapidly. So let us learn to analyze the political process in depth and formulate the appropriate tactics and strategy. Let us strengthen our unity and go forward."

Gurenko Speaks

90UN2356C Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 24 Jun 90 p 1

[Concluding address at the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, given by S.I. Gurenko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee]

[Text] Dear comrade deputies!

I believe it is necessary to sum up certain results of the first phase of work of our congress.

We probably have grounds on which to state that we have dealt with the basic tasks of the congress. First of all, we must emphasize that the congress has witnessed the deep alarm of communists at the state of affairs in the party and in society, their acknowledgment of responsibility for surmounting the crisis situation, and the sharp need for urgent practical actions.

The work of the congress itself reflected the processes of renewal which are gaining strength in the party. It was conducted in an unfettered atmosphere of democratism. All delegates had the full opportunity to freely express their views and positions. During the course of discussing the political report of the Central Committee alone, 301 delegates spoke at plenary and sectional sessions. This is incomparably more than at any previous congress. Most of the speeches were constructive in nature and there was an active search for the most effective means of resolving burning issues.

Yet another distinguishing feature of our congress was the critical approach to evaluating the activity of the party's leading organs and the republic party organization.

Formation of the new Central Committee membership was also marked by a high degree of exactingness and new approaches.

The congress rejected the traditional "ex officio" principle. A course was maintained toward expanding the representation of workers and peasants in the central party organs. Maximum consideration was given to all proposals from the localities.

At the same time, it is clear from several of the addresses that some party members continue to live according to the old concepts and think in terms of yesterday. Proceeding from this we see in particular attempts to blame everything on the "top leadership," with practically a complete absence of self-criticism. We are faced with organizing the work of the newly elected Central Committee taking these realities into account.

What do we take with us as we leave the congress? What are the main results of this first phase?

A whole series of documents were adopted at the congress which determine the main directions the Ukrainian Communist Party will take in its work. I think we have determined the policy line with which we will move to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Our congress has spoken unanimously in favor of a renewed party, supported by a broad social base. Delegates were unanimous in the belief that the party, in strengthening its ties with all categories of workers, must have a far greater knowledge of the interests of the working class and peasantry first and foremost, must be more resolute in fighting for these interests, and must ensure their broad representation in elective organs.

The congress states its support of the party as a political organization, capable of functioning successfully in a multiparty environment while fulfilling a consolidating role in the achievement of national accord and social progress. We are in favor of a party that will wage a struggle for ruling credentials in elections to the soviets, will operate using political methods, will promote its policy through communists in soviet and state organs, and will combine parliamentary activity with work performed directly in the labor collectives, in residential localities, and in mass democratic organizations.

Congress delegates supported the concept of broadening the independence of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Under conditions of state sovereignty for the republic, it must take upon itself full responsibility for the development and implementation of policy in all spheres of activity in our republic.

The congress believes that all these tasks, and others as well, will be accomplished by the party only if it preserves its ideological and organizational unity. Without precluding the possibility of the existence of diverse points of view, various platforms, and the development of constructive compromise in tactical questions, we resolutely speak out against attempts to create factions or split the party from within.

The political line of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee advocating confirmation of true state sovereignty for the republic within the USSR found support at the congress, as did the policy line advocating acceleration of the processes of perestroyka in all spheres of social life, the penetration of democratization, affirmation of the ethnic originality of the Ukrainian people, and the development of national culture.

The pressing, painful problems of socioeconomic policy were a subject of especially sharp discussion. The congress stated its unequivocal support of the adoption of urgent measures for overcoming the crisis situation in the economy. We, members of the newly elected Central Committee, will pursue this line of the congress from literally the first day forward. We must clearly recognize that sociopolitical stability—and the prestige of our entire party—depend on the state of affairs in this sphere to a great, if not decisive, degree. To put this in specific terms, we are referring to:

—accelerating perestroyka in the republic economy, turning it toward human needs; in particular, saturating the consumer market with goods;

—increasing housing construction volume, introducing fundamentally new approaches to solving the housing problem, and improving people's cultural and everyday living conditions, the provision of all types of services;

—effecting a rebirth of the village and peasantry of the Soviet Ukraine, priority development of agriculture and the entire agro-industrial complex, and resolving the food problem on this basis;

—affirming the economic sovereignty of the Ukraine, renewing its mutual relations with the USSR and the Union republics based on mutually beneficial, agreed-upon principles.

Attention directed toward the problems of transition to a regulated market has become especially keen. Our position here is as follows: This matter should be begun not with increased prices, but with the formation of organizational-production and financial premises, and the creation of a reliable mechanism for providing workers with social protection.

Thinking about the future of our party and society, we must always remember that it is in the hands of the young generation. This requires us to develop a realistic and sound youth policy precisely oriented on their interests, needs, and requirements, on the particular features of various categories of youth.

Dear comrades! Our congress is an important phase in the process of reforming the party. Certainly it did not—it could not—answer all the questions actuality has put before us. The search for these answers must continue in the localities themselves, in the party organizations. We must approach the second phase not only with the conclusions of the 28th CPSU Congress but, most importantly, with our own practical experience, with the generalized opinion of broad masses of communists and nonparty members.

The significance of our congress will be evaluated not only by the resolutions and decisions it has adopted, but also by the mood it imparts to the party organizations and labor collectives. And most important, of course, are

the practical steps toward realization of all that has been planned. It is on this we must concentrate all our efforts.

In conclusion, comrades, in the name of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, I would like to sincerely thank all those who participated in the preparation for our congress and its work, all those who placed great confidence in us. Allow me to wish all of you success in your efforts in this critical period for our party.

Gurenko's Speech Reviewed

90UN2371B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 26 Jun 90 p 3

[Report on speech by S.I. Gurenko to Ukrainian Communist Party Congress published under the rubric "Programs of the Candidates for the Position of First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party"]

[Text] Dear comrades! So much has already been said in this hall in recent days in the speeches of the delegates and in the closing remarks of Comrade First Secretary Ivashko with which I agree 100 percent, as they say, that this makes my position considerably more difficult; for this reason I offer for your judgment the following. I shall say a few words about myself and will cite literally in thesis form the issues which, in my view, are particularly important today. If there are questions, I will answer them.

I am 54 years old, was born in a teachers' family, and have lived in the Donbass for more than 40 years. I graduated from the Kiev Polytechnical Institute and began work in 1958 at the Leninskiy Komsomol Ukrainy Mechanical Engineering Plant. With a short break, I worked there until 1976. I started out as a production engineer in the tool shop and ended up as director of the plant. It was there that I was admitted to the CPSU and it was there that I defended my dissertation for my candidate of economic sciences degree.

From 1976 through 1980 I was involved in party work as secretary of the Donetsk Oblast Party Committee and dealt with economic affairs. As of 1980 I worked in Kiev, spending seven years in the Council of Ministers as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. In 1987 I returned to party work and have subsequently reported to you. I would like to say that I took part in the work on overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl accident in 1986 and even now maintain ties with the people of Chernobyl. I was elected from there as peoples' deputy of the Ukrainian SSR, and USSR people's deputy, from Zaporozhye Oblast. I have government awards, two grown-up children, and three grandsons.

My position as regards the party is illustrated in full in the Program Principles of the Activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party for our congress and in the documents which you have heard today. In my view, the main political result of the period we are reporting on today is the fact that under difficult conditions the Ukrainian Communist Party has nonetheless maintained its positions as a consolidating social force. In order to strengthen them and accomplish the tasks we have set ourselves we need today, it seems to me, to take the following practical steps.

First and foremost, the Ukrainian Communist Party should have a realistic and attractive practical action program. I support the proposals that have been made here concerning the formulation in the time between the two congress periods of specific proposals for a program of the Ukrainian Communist Party pertaining to a way out of the crisis situation. But I would like to caution that this should not be that same document which we have become accustomed to seeing in previous five-year plans—it should be a political, specific document comprehensible to everyone.

To what am I opposed? I am opposed to continuation today of the practice foisted on us by a group of theorists and politicians, who, in my view, have very unfoundedly arrogated to themselves the right to proclaim social development prescriptions. They have brought us from the times of voluntarist stagnation the word "acceleration" which has today come to mean practically running in place.

New plans, new postulates, new programs are being proclaimed currently, quite frequently without any thought being given to the consequences of these programs and, what is most important, how this will be reflected in people's lives. Nor, I am sure, should some plan, however attractive, be unduly imposed on society. Experiments on the people are impermissible today. I believe that the pace of perestroyka needs to be made commensurate with the degree of society's readiness to accept it, and that preparation of the social environment and most importantly people for acceptance of the program goals of any political party is essential. This is one of our main tasks. And I say clearly, what is more, I do not abjure the ideal inscribed on our banners and am opposed to any renaming of the Communist Party, and I support communism which I understand not as a simplistic postulate of the state of society but as the embodiment of people's aspiration to social justice. And proceeding from this, I understand what the social base of the Communist Party is—it is a party of working people, workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia—and that of course this ideal attracts no smart operators of the shadow economy and our latter-day investors and I believe that it is not on these that we should be counting.

Vladimir Antonovich expressed the positions in respect of the market; these are our common positions. I wish to say only that there is just a little that he did not say. We were the sponsors of an appeal to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo which we sent off having accordingly adopted the decision of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo back on 17 May 1990, immediately following Comrade N.I. Ryzhkov's television speech, and in which we set forth our position in a considered manner and expressed a categorical

protest against such an impetuous approach to the transition to market relations and the interference in most important spheres of people's lives.

There have been rebukes today that the position of the Central Committee and the Politburo in respect of the soviets has not been defined. What can be said in this connection? In my view, the communists who have been elected to the soviets have a special responsibility. They are obliged in the representative organs of state power to actively champion our position and scrupulously defend the interests of the working people.

It has to be seen also that today certain soviets are becoming organs of struggle against the CPSU. This is a fact, comrades. We must give our attention to the communists who have failed to maintain their positions, if only minor, in the soviets and help them and, what is most important, help our party organizations of all regions restore their influence in the organs of people's power.

I do not share the opinions of certain representatives—I stress, certain representatives—of the Democratic Platform who believe that parliamentary activity should be the principal sphere of our party's activity, but am convinced that an extension of this sphere and its improvement, and the elaboration of methods of the party's practical activity under the conditions of the current opposition, is today a very important part of our strategy and tactics and that we should pay heed to it.

I believe that we need to have done with talking about the democratization of intraparty life. Having returned from the first stage of our congress, we need to engage in practical action pertaining to this restructuring, and I believe that this item of the agenda, which we have allotted the second stage of the congress, should be prepared with the assistance of the congress delegates. It is already clear who has shown an interest in this matter and who has done good groundwork. We need to form working commissions from their ranks and on this basis present proposals concerning the status of the primary party organization. And one further point in conclusion.

Comrades have asked me about my attitude toward the countryside. I will say that I am a delegate from Zaporozhye Oblast and was elected USSR people's deputy there. There are four rural rayons in the district. My position, and it has already been practically embodied to some extent, is to do everything to bring back to the countryside primarily the construction workers, the forces which will help the countryside create a real infrastructure. It is a question of both credit and building materials. The main thing today is providing water, providing gas, providing roads, and affording the comrade peasants an opportunity to build—at any price, even at the expense of the city. Otherwise we will not solve these questions.

I support the proposal concerning the five percent which the iron and steel industry workers could transfer now. I believe that we could prepare our proposals for the government which, I am sure, will be headed by a communist. This government should defend this program of ours.

I support a youth policy. I believe that Comrade Matviyenko criticized me fairly although he jumped the gun a little, but this is typical of youth as they say. He forgot in the heat of his argument about our discussion in the Komsomol [Communist Youth League] Central Committee on the eve of the congress—incidentally, with Comrade Kravchuk, my esteemed opponent today—about our plans, about the participation of Comrade Kravchuk and other secretaries in the Komsomol congress, and about our resolution which we prepared with the active participation of Komsomol members. Let us now struggle for a real youth policy.

I would like to end here for there's no saying everything, nor, most likely, should everything be said. It would be better for me to answer your questions.

Answering the delegates' questions, Comrade S.I. Gurenko set forth his views on certain theoretical and practical problems of the party's activity. Specifically, he said that he would not insist on the adoption of the Ukrainian Communist Party Rules if the 28th CPSU Congress culminated in the consolidation of the party and a renunciation of federalism.

In his opinion, the apparatus of the party committees requires further improvement. Specifically, it was a question of it being necessary to give thought to the unification of city and rayon party committees of the same name, and to determine where a city party committee and where a rayon party committee should remain. But, Comrade S.I. Gurenko emphasized, this cannot automatically duplicate the structure of the soviet authorities.

The speaker supported the proposal concerning the need for regular accounts from members of the Politburo and secretaries and heads of departments of the Central Committee in the primary party organizations. It is necessary only to determine the procedure and periodicity of these accounts.

At the same time, however, it was emphasized that it is very important to bring closer together the viewpoints on ideological and organizational matters of the party officials of different components of our party to revive the atmosphere of party comradeship. The immediate goal, S.I. Gurenko emphasized, is to establish truly professional relations between the Central Committee and the oblast, city, and rayon committees.

In connection with the Democratic Platform, the candidate for the position of first secretary of the Central Committee said that he had met with comrades who had signed the "Joint Democratic Platform in the Ukrainian Communist Party" here at the congress, and did not see out-and-out splitters among them. I am convinced that the Central Committee which will be elected will organize with them work on the discussion of positions.

Ukrainian, as the official language, is an important indication of state sovereignty. Knowledge of the language is enriching, and the speaker called for the study of Ukrainian in order to master the official language of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, as also the language of interethnic communication—Russian.

S.I. Gurenko described in detail his understanding of the problems of the countryside and the specifics of the transition of the economy of the Ukraine, where coal and iron and steel industry and heavy machine-building are developed, to market relations and economic independence.

Ukrainian Politburo, Secretariat Named

90UN2356A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 24 Jun 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] The plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee elected by the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress was convened.

The plenum elected the Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee as follows: S.I. Gurenko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee (elected by the congress); I.G. Grintsov, secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee; B.V. Gromov, commander of troops of the Red Banner Kiev Military District; V.A. Ivashko, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet; P.M. Kozachenko, foreman of the comprehensive brigade of the Kiev scientific-production association "Bolshevik"; L.M. Kravchuk, second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee; P.Ye. Kuknerik, shaft tunneler in the mineshaft administration imeni N.P. Barakov of the Krasnodon production association for Coal Extraction; V.P. Kukhar, director of the Bio-Organic Chemistry Institute of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences and vice president of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences; V.A. Masol, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers; V.Ye. Ostrozhinskiy, secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee; A.P. Savchenko, secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee; N.P. Sobchuk, chairman of the "Forty Years of October" kolkhoz [collective farm], Vasilkovskiy Rayon, Kiev Oblast.

The Secretariat of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee was established as follows: S.I. Gurenko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee; L.M. Kravchuk, second secretary; secretaries—I.G. Grintsov, V.Ye. Ostrozhinskiy, and A.P. Savchenko.

Ukrainian Decision on Military Service Noted

PM3107183190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Sergey Tsikora report: "Parliament in Resolute Mood"]

[Text] Kiev—The Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet has declared that it is impermissible to use Ukrainian citizens performing compulsory military service or serving in the republic's law enforcement organs in regions where there is a deterioration in interethnic relations.

This is said in a declaration adopted by the republic's parliament. It notes that the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is receiving numerous appeals from citizens expressing concern for the life and health of their relations who are taking a direct part in protecting public order and localizing interethnic conflicts outside the Ukraine.

Declaring that it is impermissible to use for this purpose citizens of the Ukrainian SSR "performing compulsory military service or serving in the republic's law enforcement organs," the Ukraine's parliamentarians "called on the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR president to make efforts to resolve interethnic and other conflicts by political methods."

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet also issued an appeal to the supreme organs of state power of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kirghizia, and Uzbekistan "to ensure law and order on their territory via their own forces."

In order to implement the provisions contained in the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet's declaration, the republic's parliament adopted a special resolution instructing the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers to implement a number of urgent measures. The main ones are: returning staffers of the republic's law enforcement organs from "trouble spots" to their permanent places of service in the Ukraine within a month, resolving within two months the question "of transferring to Ukrainian territory Ukrainian SSR citizens performing compulsory military service in regions where interethnic conflicts are taking place," and, as "from fall 1990, drafting people for compulsory military service, as a rule, into troop units stationed on Ukrainian territory."

To judge by deputies' remarks, it will not be easy to implement these documents. They do not even rule out the possibility of a constitutional crisis if the Union authorities refuse to recognize the republic parliament's resolution. But, even though they were aware of these consequences, 339 parliamentarians voted for the document's provision and only seven against. It looks as though our generals will have to give some thought to elaborating and organizing subunits of a new type against the eventuality of interethnic conflicts—rapid response internal troops formed from volunteers on a professional basis and financed by contributions from all republics.

Ukrainian Communist Party Resolution on Miners

90UN2356D Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 24 Jun 90 p 1

[Resolution of the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress: "On Evaluating the Decisions of the First USSR Miners' Congress"]

[Text] The 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress expresses deep alarm in connection with the growth of negative trends in the political, economic, and social spheres, and it believes that this has been caused to a great degree by the ill-considered, inconsistent actions of the government of the republic and the country.

In the coal regions of the republic, the main reason for the forced political statements of miners is failure to fulfill Resolution No. 608 of the USSR Council of Ministers, dated 3 August 1989, and the agreement reached with the government during the course of the strike last year. The activity of commissions monitoring fulfillment of the resolution and agreed-to measures has been ineffective. Resolution of a whole number of vitally important issues dealing with sector development is dragged out in the Union organs themselves, and the path proposed for shifting to a market economy is fraught with losses—even of positions previously gained. The republic government has in fact withdrawn from accomplishing planned measures.

Today it is clear that much of what was promised turns out to be unrealistic. But the government lacks the courage to honestly admit this. As a result, we see the lack of confidence shown it by the First Miners' Congress, which convened in June of this year in Donetsk.

We believe the CPSU Central Committee and Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee have exhibited political short-sightedness in not being concerned and not intervening in this matter.

The congress shares the anxiety of miners as they have expressed it in their Appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Workers of the Country, and demands energetic action from the communist members of Union and republic governments in implementing Resolution No. 608 and taking additional measures for the socioeconomic revitalization of the coal industry and its regions, as well as other sectors of the economy.

The miners know very well that there are quite a number of critical problems in other branches as well, requiring radical, emergency measures.

The new composition of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee must make a principled evaluation of the activity of communist members of the government involved in fulfilling terms of the agreement reached with the miners.

Ukrainian delegates of the 28th CPSU Congress must be directed to propose that this body similarly instruct the new composition of the CPSU Central Committee.

At the same time, the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress supports the position of delegate-miners who have come out at the Miners' Congress in opposition to the activity of certain forces which have attempted to use the forum of the miners' congress to further their narrow political interests, with the aim of splitting the workers' movement and pitting the CPSU against the working class.

Delegates of the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress resolutely repudiate attempts to discredit the party, and believe that only in our unity and solidarity is the pledge of swiftest surmounting of all difficulties to be found. We call upon the communist-miners to fight for democracy and unite the efforts of labor collectives in accomplishing the urgent tasks of perestroyka.

Approach to Mining Contracts Questioned

PM0108105790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent S. Tsikora under the rubric "On Topics of the Day": "Will the Minister Reach Agreement With the Miners?"]

[Text] Kiev—The Ukraine's Declaration of Sovereignty, adopted by the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet a few days ago, has enabled miners to return beneath the republic's wing. This essentially new situation has given them an additional opportunity to resolve their problems. Naturally, this opportunity has not been missed, and a meeting took place in Kiev on the appointed day between representatives of the strike committees and a group of Ukrainian people's deputies from the Donbass on the one hand and V. Masol, head of the republic's government, and his deputy V. Fokin, leader of the Ukrainian SSR State Committee for the Economy, on the other.

What should be singled out in that meeting? With the Ukraine's adoption of the sovereignty declaration the coal-mining Donbass, which the Union ministry had looked on as a failing stokehold in recent years and so treated as a "village withhout a future," has become both necessary and promising for the republic. Such a striking change in assessments has come about in connection with the reorientation of the further development of Ukrainian power generation from nuclear to thermal power. The introduction of a moratorium on the construction of new nuclear electric power stations in the republic will require a 30-percent increase in fuel extraction for local thermal electric power stations alone by the year 2005. Such demand cannot be met without retooling the sector and introducing an improved management structure.

At his meeting with the miners the Ukrainian head of government reported that the USSR Council of Ministers recently adopted a new resolution approving the comprehensive program drawn up by the Ukrainian Council of Ministers for the socioeconomic development of Ukrainian SSR mining cities and settlements during

1991-1995. An additional 4.1 billion rubles [R] is being allocated for these purposes. It will be spent on constructing apartment blocks. Currency has even been found for this. For example, R623 million in freely convertible currency is being allocated from centralized sources to acquire medical equipment, medical supplies, and equipment for a diagnostic center at Lugansk and for three plants to burn solid domestic waste and to acquire various manufacturing lines and machines.

This is a gratifying attitude to the miners. The chief thing is that the new document should not meet with the fate of the notorious Resolution 608, in which much was promised but far from everything was realized. Here I would like to talk about two proposals which brought about a very lively exchange of opinions between the government and the miners.

The first of them is to form a state committee for the coal industry in the republic. It will not order enterprises about but will be expected to give them maximum help in asserting their economic independence and resolving labor collectives' social problems. The committee's head—and special emphasis was placed on this at the meeting—will have to take miners' proposals into account in the structure of the new organization.

The fate of the second proposal has not yet been fully determined. Its essence is the formulation of a question: Is it time to proceed to the conclusion of direct contracts between miners and the government? Why, pray tell me, is it possible to criticize the Council of Ministers for the slow pace of work on some project in the Donbass and keep quiet about the miners who underfulfilled the plan in July by several million tonnes of coal?

It is not just an ordinary obstacle that has stopped the conclusion of such a contract—the Ukrainian government's lack of its own pit props, which, naturally, could affect the fulfillment of pledges. There is another aspect too. If the government signs such an agreement with the miners, why should not chemical industry and railroad workers, farmers, and teachers demand the same thing tomorrow? In this way it is possible to take a good idea to absurd lengths and bury an excellent thought.

What is a practical way out today? It is seen as maintaining the idea of a contract, but applying it in a somewhat different form. For example, it is not the government that should go over to direct contracts, but ministries and state committees with their own enterprises.

CPSU Secretary Girenko Tours Oblasts

Visits Kherson Oblast

PM2707134690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Jul 90 Second Edition p 2

[UKRINFORM-TASS report under the general heading: "On the Path of Renewal"]

[Text] Kherson, 26 Jul—A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was in Kherson Oblast 24-26 July.

He met with the oblast center's party aktiv. There was a detailed discussion of the results of the 28th CPSU Congress and the significance of the Program Statement "Toward a Humane, Democratic Socialism" and the CPSU Statutes which it adopted. It was noted that the congress resolutely supported the course of purposeful continuation of perestroyka.

The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee toured the oblast.

Visits Crimea Oblast

PM3107153990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Jul 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Reporting Back to Voters"]

[Text] People's Deputy A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was in Crimea Oblast 26-27 July.

He visited Nizhnegorskiy and Krasnoperekopskiy Rayons, where he presented reports on his activity as a deputy to voters. A meeting with the Nizhnegorskiy Rayon party organization was held.

In his speeches A.N. Girenko talked about the work of the 28th CPSU Congress and the significance of its decisions for the life of the party and the democratic transformations in society. It was noted that the congress resolutely supported the course of continuing perestroyka. And that was its main result. Great attention was devoted to the most acute problems of the present stage of the transformational processes taking place in the country and to the situation in terms of settling interethnic conflicts.

There was also a vigorous and committed discussion of these questions when the CPSU Central Committee secretary met with Crimean Tatar representatives, when the implementation of the state program for the return of the Crimean Tatars to their homeland and organizational measures to implement it were discussed. A.N. Girenko also held consultations with visitors on personal questions.

Ukrainian Nationalists Disrupt Veterans' Rally

PM0108091990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 Aug 90 Second Edition p 2

[UKRINFORM-TASS report: "Against Common Sense"]

[Text] Ternopol, 31 Jul—"Let us reinforce the Ukraine's Declaration of Sovereignty with humane actions!" A rally organized by the Great Patriotic War, party, and labor veterans was to have taken place under this motto in Ternopol's Theater Square on Monday evening.

Shortly before the start of the planned measure, representatives of Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] arrived in the main square of the oblast center. From the numerous slogans and posters which they were carrying it was not hard to guess that this was a planned action and that its purpose was certainly not to consolidate public forces. This could be judged from the anticommunist inscriptions on the banners and sheets of paper alone.

The veterans' urgent request not to hinder the rally was drowned in whistling and malicious shouts. Not even an appeal from V. Negoda, chairman of the city soviet, made the uninvited guests listen to reason.

The Rukh members seized the microphone and held their own rally. Attempts by the other side—the veterans—to say anything were interrupted by frenzied shouts of "Janissaries!" and "Degenerates!" There were attacks on the leadership of the country and the republic and open threats.

Ukrainian Deputy Criticized for 'Barefaced Lie'

PM2707144790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jul 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Kovalyuk: "The Main Thing Is To Keep Crowing... Speech at a Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Session"]

[Excerpts] Many people have already gotten used to critical attacks on the Army. There is no denying that there are problems which need to be solved. But the speech by Ukrainian People's Deputy V. Kolints at a Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session about the terrible things happening in a military unit put me personally on my guard and perplexed me. [passage omitted]

In his opinion, the Soviet Army and its personnel are the "Moscow jailer," a "weapon in the struggle against their own people," and "the Army is incapable of fostering patriots; it can only make submissive slaves out of people." In order to back up these verbose arguments, the deputy read out a letter which he had allegedly received from a unit of the Carpathian Military District. The writer was not named, but the number of the unit was given. Here are some extracts from this "letter": "It's a mad-house here. There's nothing but drill.... The only salvation is to pop a pill or smoke a joint.... It's impossible to stand it. A guy from Zborovskiy Rayon (Ternopol Oblast—author's note) cut his own throat 14 June. They cut your face to show how long you've served. I've got two cuts already, I'll be getting 13...."

Next morning I visited the unit with other officers. The men there were also talking about V. Kolints' speech.

"The speech by the people's deputy was a barefaced lie from beginning to end," Lieutenant Colonel A. Mamichev stated indignantly. [passage omitted]

V. Kolints' speech has shocked public opinion not only in Ternopol Oblast. I later learned that the parents of Privates S. Petrishak, Yu. Gritskiv, S. Kuznetsov, and others had dropped everything to rush to the Lvov area. The fathers, mothers, sisters, and brothers, arriving at the regimental command post, immediately asked: Are our sons and brothers still alive?

Today, fortunately, feelings have died down somewhat. But parents are continuing to arrive at the signals troops' compound from all parts of the republic. People at the unit are trying to receive them with with due care, to house them, calm them down, and give them an opportunity to be with their sons for a little while to see how the men live, eat, and rest. The parents' hearts are nursed back to health and they return home with their fears calmed. [passage omitted]

Ukrainians Commemorate 'Bandera's Cutthroats'

PM2607105190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jul 90 First Edition p 3

[Dispatch by Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Nostalgia for 'Terrible Power'"]

[Text] Lvov, 21 Jul—A rally recently took place in Krakovets (Yavorovskiy Rayon), which was dedicated to the memory of Roman Shukhevich, former commander in chief of the Ukrainian Rebel Army and comrade in arms of S. Bandera.

Speakers at the rally said that the native of Krakovets was an "outstanding personality among the fighters for an 'independent' Ukraine." And General Yuriy Shukhevich's son even discoursed on the rebel army's contribution to the fight with the invaders. There was also talk of how the Ukrainian Rebel Army fought on two fronts—against both Hitlerism and Stalinism. However, nobody uttered a single word about the fact that the commander in chief of Bandera's cutthroats was a Hauptmann [captain] in Hitler's army and that the Ukrainian Rebel Army was supplied with weapons and ammunition by the Fascist Abwehrkommando 202. Neither did the speakers answer the question: What sort of "Stalinists" were schoolchildren and babies? How many of them were killed by the Fascist stooges. The same speaker from Rovno, M. Chalyuk, will surely know about the village of Borshchovka where fanatics doused 52 schoolchildren with kerosene and burned them alive. "Our power must be terrible," Bandera's followers used to say.

But nobody so much as breathed a word about this at the rally.

Bandera Ralliers Labeled 'Fascist Lackeys'

PM0108094790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jul 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy under "Direct Line" rubric: "Jokes With Us End Badly"]

[Text] Lvov—A rally has been held in Dragobych, Lvov Oblast, devoted to laying the foundation stone of a future monument to Stepan Bandera.

It is symbolic that the monument is to be erected on the site of a former monument to the "leader of all the peoples" [Stalin]. So, in the minds of some people one tyrant will be replaced by another. People in Lvov Oblast are nowadays harking back aloud to the "woodland tyranny" of Bandera and his allies. Former fascist lackeys are making their voice heard more and more loudly and persistently. The rally was addressed by Ya. Olkhovoy, for instance, who wore an SS uniform during the war. Now, posturing as a hero, he is branding those who are working in the Soviets, describing them as traitors and a "black force." He was echoed by M. Moroz, member of the Ukrainian People's Democratic Party. It was he who tried to infiltrate the Orthodox Church and establish the "new order" there. He puts it bluntly: "We are an organization which does not like jokes. Jokes with us are short and they end badly." So, Soviet power, take cover!

'Cultural' Event Takes on Nationalist Hue

PM0108093190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jul 90 Second Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent M. Odinets: "Culture and Enmity Are Incompatible"]

[Text] Chernigov, 30 Jul—In order to ensure their event's success, the organizers of the "Peal-90" ["Dzvin-90" in Ukrainian] cultural procession turned for support to cosmonaut-pilot and Twice Hero of the Soviet Union P. Popovich, in Moscow, who is chairman of the "Slavutich" Ukrainian cultural society. He responded to his fellow-countrymen's request and sent a petition to the Chernigov Oblispolkom [Oblast Soviet Executive Committee] asking for help in holding the procession which is aimed at "making known the history, culture, and in particular the folklore of various regions of the Ukraine."

On receiving the letter from Moscow the leaders of the Chernigov Oblispolkom endeavored to help the participants in the procession. What a surprise it was for the people of Chernigov, then, when they saw the participants in the procession marching through the city with anti-Soviet slogans. And afterward there was a rally. "A real anti-Soviet outrage," writes the newspaper DESNYANSKA PRAVDA, "where mud was flung at 'the Russian communist empire' and 'the 20-Century communist vandals and the oppressive Russians' from start to finish. The 'guests' from Lvov Oblast were particularly zealous. They sympathized with the 'slaves in the East' who had not yet attained democracy and called on them to 'get up off their knees, work for the unification of the western and eastern Ukraine in the struggle against Moscow, and seize their last, historic opportunity to withdraw from the USSR."

And similar outrages were committed by procession organizers in Kulikovskiy, Nezhinskiy, and Borzyanskiy Rayons under cover of the oblispolkom authorization. "In the guise of democracy, pluralism of opinions, and love for 'mother Ukraine,'" DESNYANSKA UKRAINA writes, "'Peal-90' is inciting people to enmity and violence. Do you really have to run down your motherland's history to show your love for it? No, that is not what our people need today. They need peace, consolidation, and honest labor. Unfortunately, the leaders of 'Peal-9O,' infected as they are with extremism and malice, have no wish to understand this."

Tatar Resettlement Commission Starts Work

PM2507134190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Stepan Troyan under the rubric "Direct Link": "Return to the Motherland"]

[Text] Simferopol—The state commission on problems of the Crimean Tatar people has begun its work in Simferopol. It is headed by V. Doguzhiyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The commission is examining practical measures connected with the return to the Crimean Oblast of the tens of thousands of people moved from their historical motherland in the mid-forties.

"The country's government recently adopted a resolution on priority measures to resolve questions connected with the Crimean Tatars' return to their native places," N. Bagrov, chairman of Crimean Oblast Soviet, told our correspondent. "But the local authorities have not been idle either. The oblast soviet executive committee has decided to settle approximately 8,500 families of returnees before the end of 1990, and in fact, as of 1 July, 1,000 families more than planned had received new residence permits."

Despite the complex economic situation in the country, the government is allocating almost 200 million rubles over the next 18 months to resolve the priority tasks of resettling the Crimean Tatars. In other words, 20 percent more capital investments than usual have to be assimilated in the oblast. Half of the considerable sum will be handed over to the settlers in the form of credits for house construction.

Trade Union Organ Denied Printing Facilities

PM3107090790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report: "Statement by Kuzbass Council of Workers Committees"]

[Text] At a news conference for representatives of the mass media held 17 July A. Melnikov, first secretary of Kemerovo CPSU Obkom [Oblast Committee], spoke about the organ of Kuzbass workers' independent organizations—NASHA GAZETA [OUR NEWSPAPER]:

"We will not print a newspaper with sharply critical materials denigrating the party." NASHA GAZETA is published at a printing house belonging to the obkom. There is no other print base for its production. The Kuzbass Council of Workers Committees, with which an INTERFAX correspondent made contact, issued a special statement. It views A. Melnikov's statement as an ultimatum under conditions of the already unstable sociopolitical situation in the Kuzbass. The council has appealed to labor collectives to defend NASHA GAZETA. It also urged all the country's democratic forces to express their attitude to this event and to help to create an independent printing base for the production of NASHA GAZETA.

Paper Criticized for Hinting Russia Hoards Gas

PM2507113790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Jul 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by TASS observer B. Grishchenko: "No Misunderstanding"]

[Text] Ukrainian machine operators, transport workers, and drivers of private cars who have been experiencing difficulties with fuel were given an exact address where they can get hold of scarce petroleum products without any trouble: "You can get as much gasoline as you like on Mikhail's farm (that is, in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]). KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA announced 20 July. This sensational discovery belongs to one of the newspaper's correspondents, the author of the review "Without a Chairman and Without Gasoline" which concerns the upcoming elections for chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. However, it would be too simple to attribute such a strange conclusion just to a journalist's "misunderstanding" in writing up his material.

Petroleum is politics. And if in the Ukraine there is a serious shortage of gasoline and in Russia they literally don't know what to do with it all, then of course we must look for intrigues at the center, for the notorious "hand of Moscow" at work. Since the author of the article has no precise figures at his disposal, he throws the following question at the reader in conclusion: ..."Is Moscow not thus demonstrating the value of Ukrainian independence?"

Despite the stylistic clumsiness, the question is an acute one and demands a precise answer. I asked V.N. Kostyunin, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, who is essentially the main coordinator of the distribution of fuel resources in the country, about this. Vladimir Nikolayevich reported that, during the first six months of this year, the oil industry workers undersupplied petroleum to the national economy by around 18 million tonnes, and almost 11 million tonnes of crude was not refined.

Maybe the Ukraine is somehow being given a particularly raw deal in this situation? No, the deputy chairman said. The republic was allocated 350,000 tonnes of gasoline and around one million tonnes of petroleum for the third quarter under the USSR Council of Ministers instructions dated 19 June of this year. And this was not done on paper only: The Ukrainian SSR received another thousand tonnes of gasoline above this limit.

It stands to reason that it is not pleasant to inform the reader about how difficult it is for the country to divide its scarce petroleum allowance. And you cannot fail to agree with the author of the review in the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA that "looking at serious questions in a good mood is beneficial to the health." But obviously we have to look more seriously at all our serious problems.

When we journalists report on the deficit of produce, goods, and power engineering vehicles, we frequently only discuss the principles of dividing up everything that society has at its disposal, forgetting that there is essentially nothing to divide. Output is being reduced, and performance and plan discipline have become totally lax. These are problems that deserve the most fundamental and tough journalistic analysis. And searches for one culprit for the irregularities in fuel smack of the 1930's style, whereby every significant economic failure was attributed to just another "enemy of the people."

Splashing petroleum into the fire of interethnic strife is of course effective—the flame of mutual hostility will shoot up even higher. Is that really what the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent wants?

Belorussian Sovereignty Declaration Reviewed

PM3107105790 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 31 Jul 90 p 3

[Undated report from Minsk by correspondent V. Legankov under the "News From the Republics" rubric: "Sovereignty Declaration"]

[Text] Just before "bringing down the curtain" on its first session the republic Supreme Soviet, following in the wake of Russia, the Ukraine, and other republics, adopted a "Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic" with a unanimity that is rare nowadays—229 votes for and not a single abstention or vote against.

The harmoniousness when it came to the vote had been preceded by three days of story and sometimes dramatic debates. They began with the very name of the republic, in which the words "Soviet socialist" were categorically rejected in the alternate draft presented by Deputy Z.S. Poznyak, leader of the Belorussian People's Front, and his sympathizers.

Defeated in its attempt to change the republic's name and the nature of its social structure, the opposition fought tooth and nail over every formulation used in the preamble and all 12 articles of the declaration. Moreover a number of its remarks and proposals were adopted in

the final version. With the consent of a majority of deputies the document proclaims the full sovereignty of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], the supremacy of republic legislation, and the republic's right to have its own armed forces and state and public security bodies. A demand to the USSR Government for unconditional and prompt compensation for the damage caused by the Chernobyl disaster and a number of other exceptionally important provisions were adopted. In particular, claims for a fair share of the all-Union foreign exchange and diamond funds and gold reserves were made. Admittedly the deputies failed to mention an appropriate share of the USSR's external and internal debts. Evidently they are not claiming any of that.

Despite the use of what were generally polite forms of parliamentary expression, which were only rarely interspersed with not excessively strong protests from malcontents, it was clear by the end of the second day of discussion that the situation was hotting up. On 27 July, before the final day, when the vast majority of the articles of the declaration had already been agreed and adopted, Belorussian People's Front pickets carrying their white, red, and white flags and banners saying things like "A New Union Treaty Means Death for Belorussia" appeared in Lenin Square opposite Government House, where the parliament was in session. The proposition that the Belorussian SSR proposes that elaboration of a new Union treaty be started without delay was indeed the first subject of that day's discussion at the session. Attempts to torpedo this proposition failed. It was adopted. And then it became clear that the political opposition to the bloc of communists and nonparty people did not agree with such compromise and would take some kind of ostentatious action. Belorussian People's Front leader Z. Poznyak stated that signing a new Union treaty would mean "putting your head in a noose" and demonstratively walked out of the hall, calling on his sympathizers to do the same. Around thirty or so deputies followed his example.

The objective was obviously clear: to frustrate a vote. But the number of deputies remaining still exceeded a quorum, and they adopted the final text of the sovereignty declaration without too much fuss.

When parliamentarians emerged into the street during a recess, a handful of people beneath the same white, red, and white flags in the square started to chant at them in unison: "Moscow lackeys." The militia did not intervene. As evening came several hundred people were still shouting beneath Belorussian People's Front banners. Not a lot when you consider that once they used to gather in thousands.

Belorussian Supreme Soviet Concludes Work

LD3107140590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] The first session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet ended today. Parliamentary debates on topical issues relating to the renewal of the republic's economic, social, and political life lasted 44 days. Summing up the work, Nikolay Ivanovich Dementey, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, said that the parliament of the republic has solved the main tasks that it was facing at the beginning of its work. Important decisions required by life itself were adopted. Among the undoubted merits of people's deputies work are the consideration and adoption of a declaration on, state sovereignty of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] by the Supreme Soviet and also a decision on measures to speed up the implementation of the state program on the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident aftereffects.

The formation of a new parliament is also a major result. The session confirmed the republic's supreme power formed on democratic principles, and formed the new republic's government that meets the requirements of the day.

In the course of metings the people's deputies paid a lot of attention to the problems of providing people with a proper standard of living, of a transfer to a market economy, and building a law-governed and democratic Belorussian republic.

The people's deputies have gone into recess. The session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet is planned for the last week in November.

Supreme Soviet Appoints Belorussian Officials

LD3107104390 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belorussian 21 Jul 90 p 2

[Summary] The Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] resolves to appoint:

Mikhail Ivanovich Demchuk as minister of national education of the Belorussian SSR;

Valeriy Guryevich Tikhinya as minister of justice of the Belorussian SSR;

Georgiy Andreyevich Markovskiy as minister of forestry industry of the Belorussian SSR;

Petr Kuzmich Kravchenko as minister of foreign affairs of the Belorussian SSR;

Vasiliy Stepanovich Kazakov as minister of health protection of the Belorussian SSR;

Nikolay Timofeyevich Gulev as minister of light industry of the Belorussian SSR;

Ivan Mikhaylovich Gritsyuk as minister of communications and information technology of the Belorussian SSR;

Nikolay Stefanovich Yakushev as minister of grain products of the Belorussian SSR;

Fedor Vladimirovich Mirochitskiy as minister of the Belorussian SSR [portfolio not given];

Aleksey Alekseyevich Shakhnovich as minister of water resources and land reclamation of the Belorussian SSR;

Tamara Fedorovna Krutovtseva as minister of social security of the Belorussian SSR;

Iosif Arkadyevich Antonovich as minister of installation and special construction work of the Belorussian SSR.

Belorussian Bureau Report to 20th Plenum

90UN2362B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 20 Jun 90 pp 2-3

[Report of Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau at the 20th Plenum of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee: "Firmly Defending the Socialist Choice!"]

[Text] Dear comrades!

Today we are today all asking ourselves: What will the 28th CPSU Congress mean in the lives of each of us? What decisions will it adopt? What will become of the party? In what direction will society develop?

These are not chance questions. In the course of the precongress debate the republic's communists have observed that in the past five years an appreciable step forward has been taken which has changed our society and our ideas about the world and ourselves. As a result of the party's decisive measures on the path of democratization we have become participants in and witnesses to profound transformations in the country's political system. Essentially new soviets have been formed, legislative and executive authority has been separated, and prerequisites for radical economic reform have emerged. The leadership of the party and the country has implemented effective measures in the international arena, which is affording an opportunity for the more successful solution of the most complex problems of the modern world.

However, something else is indisputable also. The political crisis in the country is intensifying. The polarization of social forces is increasing, discipline and law and order are deteriorating, and dangerous trends in the economy and social sphere are growing. Political instability is manifested in acute interethnic conflicts, separatist aspirations, and numerous strikes.

The social protection of people, and in certain regions, their personal safety, is in real danger. The situation is being made worse by the growing anxiety and psychological fatigue from the economic disarray. The depreciation of socialist values and Soviet laws continues.

Attacks on the party and psychological pressure on communists are intensifying, and officials of the party apparatus are being defamed indiscriminately. The Armed Forces are being discredited, and attempts are being made to depoliticize the law enforcement authorities. Values alien to us and the ideas of nationalism and separatism are being introduced persistently to the Soviet people's consciousness. The socialist development path is being declared a blind alley.

Difficulties also ensue from the fact that many people see as the main danger for the country only the conservatism of the party apparatus, not the united antisocialist, separatist, and nationalist forces, which are demoralizing society on the attractive pretext of democratization, glasnost, pluralism, and new political thinking.

In our view, those who captain the flagship and plot its course also bear a considerable share of the blame for the fact that "our ship is rudderless" and that "everyone is little by little getting sick." Expertise has been displayed more in acts of demolition than creation.

The situation which has taken shape in the country and the dramatic events in a number of its regions and in the East European countries are having a most direct impact on the moral and psychological atmosphere in the republic. It is clear to all of us that both within and outside the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] forces opposed to us are consolidating. Speculating on our difficulties, they are doing everything to prevent the party from singlemindedly engaging in creative work and are holding it as much as possible beneath the press of attacks. Their ultimate goal is to remove the communists from the political scene and change the state system.

Extremist groupings from the Belorussian People's Front and many of those who rank themselves as democrats and have adopted the position of a split in the Belorussian Communist Party have united on these grounds. "The worse, the better"—this is their slogan and action program. The tactics are simple—to call at mass meetings for consolidation, but in practice to spread dirt, upset the rhythm, pull back, and impede constructive action.

Nonetheless, granted all our shortcomings and difficulties, against the background of the other republics Belorussia is maintaining the dynamics of its socioeconomic development.

In four years of the five-year plan the gross social product increased 19.2 percent compared with a targeted 15.6 percent, and national income increased 16.4 percent. In terms of rate of growth of industrial production and consumer goods the republic's industry has exceeded the level planned for five years. The manufacture of nonfood commodities has increased by one-third here.

In the current five-year plan the proportion of products in the top-quality category has increased from 57.4 percent to 89.4 percent. Last year alone the proportion of the most important mechanical engineering products corresponding to world engineering standards increased almost 70 percent.

The average annual increase in the agricultural product was 1.8 times higher than in the 11th Five-Year Plan. Some 24 percent more meat and 16 percent more milk was produced annually.

In the past years of the five-year plan R1.6 billion more than planned were spent on the development of the social sphere. Average annual housing construction grew by a factor of 1.2, schools by 1.5, hospitals by 1.3, outpatient clinics by 1.7, clubs and cultural centers almost twofold, and highways by a factor of 2.7.

This is primarily to the credit of our exceptionally industrious, conscientious, and wisely patient and shrewd people.

The idea of the republic's transition to the principles of self-government and self-financing which we put forward at the 19th All-Union Party Conference was extensively supported among the working people.

Of course, the dynamics could have been even better had the sword of Damocles of Chernobyl not been hanging over us. The center actually left Belorussia and its people to face the Chernobyl disaster alone. Initially all this was expressed in the hushing up of the scale and nature of the accident, for the leadership of the republic and the oblasts and rayons included. Following repeated demands that the veil of secrecy be lifted, this was ultimately done.

However, there has yet to be a solution of the scientific and medical problem—there has been no answer to the question: How harmful have the consequences of the accident been for man's health? So one wonders: How could this have happened? We are building nuclear power stations and making active use of the energy of the atom in other spheres, and at the same time no one has been giving any thought to guarantees of the people's safety. Who is responsible for this? And also for the fact that there are no conventional radiation monitors, although we are into the fifth year since the day of the tragedy.

The conclusion is unequivocal: The Chernobyl tragedy was not a tragedy and pain for those whose fault it was that it occurred.

The communists' formulation at the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet session of the question of compensation by the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry to the republic for the damage caused is legitimate in this situation.

The problems of eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station will soon be extensively examined in the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet with the adoption of the corresponding decree.

But let us be self-critical. In all the shortcomings and troubles, Chernobyl included, it is not just the center which is to blame. We are making inadequate use of our economic and intellectual potential and have been unable to overcome the passiveness in the activity of a number of party committees and organizations and soviet and economic bodies.

The leadership of the republic can and should be criticized for the fact that it has not always displayed resolve in the face of the diktat of the center and has allowed its ill-conceived decisions through here also. I refer primarily to the campaigns against unearned income and drunkenness and alcoholism and deviations in the electivity of a number of categories of leaders and the organization of the cooperative movement.

And for this reason the rebukes and critical observations of the communists and working people which have been expressed in the discussion of the precongress documents are fair. It is important to use this collective wisdom, preserve all that is valuable in the proposals, and make it the basis of our political work.

Reality has confronted us with tough conditions of choice of means and paths out of the current situation. Our priority task is to create a mechanism, through the renewed soviets of people's deputies, which ensures that the people of Soviet Belorussia become the true master of all that they possess: the wealth of the land and its interior and economic, technical, and intellectual potential.

The path toward independence is for us difficult and thorny. We would be sinning against the truth if we painted everything in rosy tints. We have to rely mainly on our own resources. The unity of the whole people of Belorussia and the maximum input of each person are required.

The Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee will seek to ensure that not one serious step is taken in the republic without regard to people's opinion. Referendums and public opinion polls should be the main method of searching for ways to solve complex problems.

This is the main conclusion which ensues from an analysis of the social and political situation in the republic and the opinions and proposals of the communists and working people expressed at the time of discussion of the precongress documents and in the course of the elections of people's deputies. It will hence forward be determining for the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee.

I.

Comrades! The precongress debate has shown that the draft CPSU Platform and Rules require considerable additional work. There are a number of fundamental positions which, in our view, must necessarily be a part of their final versions. It is on these that I would consider it necessary to dwell.

Granted all the diversity of opinions and viewpoints and the ambivalence of the evaluations of the precongress

documents, the collective opinion of Belorussia's communists may be clearly traced—to firmly defend the socialist choice and the communist perspective and prevent a split in the CPSU.

At the same time, however, the views of many party members concurred in respect of certain theoretical propositions of the draft platform lacking sound arguments and depth of analysis and suffering from abstractness and slogan-mongering.

The essence of the present transitional period is not revealed, and a fundamental evaluation of the mistakes and miscalculations which have been made even in the perestroyka years is not made. Each of us has seen for himself how dangerous experiments in such a country as ours and the absence of a well considered and balanced action program are.

It is particularly important to clearly formulate the strategic goal for whose achievement the party is struggling. It has been determined, it would seem—humane, democratic socialism. However, the essence of this concept is not revealed either. Since there is a call for the achievement of a particular ideal, not only an idea but also, as far as possible, an integral characterization of the ideal should have been provided.

The question of new approaches to socialism and a new vision of its basic features is of fundamental significance for perestroyka. And there has to be substantive scientific study here. It is necessary here to emphatically rid ourselves both of the prejudices of dead dogma and of the illusions of pseudo-innovation.

Many communists have been puzzled by the fact that the authors of the draft avoided the word "communism." What is this—incomprehension or a renunciation of the communist perspective and, perhaps, the Communist Party even?

The propositions concerning the CPSU's renunciation of the monopoly of power and the need for struggle to preserve the position of ruling party under real multiparty conditions are in need of in-depth scientific substantiation. This is required by the practice of the work of the party organizations under the actual conditions of competitive struggle with the emergent social and political forces for power and influence in the masses.

We share the aspiration to be saved from the inordinate ideologization of society and the party. But can we agree with the proposition that the need for the ideological strengthening of the party being absent from the draft? And this at a time when fundamental ideological differences not corresponding to the understanding of the CPSU as a voluntary alliance of fellow-thinkers are being revealed in some communists.

It is impermissible for a person who has linked his life with the party to find himself merely a spectator under conditions of an exacerbation of the ideological and political struggle. It is necessary in the party's program document and in its rules to strengthen two key points.

First, it needs to be said clearly that the party unites people true to the creative spirit of the materialist world outlook and dialectical methodology of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and all who have made the socialist choice and share the principle of the state arrangement of the USSR on a renewed federal basis.

And the second fundamental addition. The communists proceed from recognition of the international unity of the Soviet people, given the inalienable rights of the nations to self-determination.

The vast majority of the republic's communists believes that the CPSU, as a political party, cannot renounce the struggle for power and influence of the masses. But they see success only in alliance, in a bloc with all forces and public movements which adhere to the positions of the socialist choice and democratic renewal.

It would seem expedient in this connection to make an evaluation of the alternative draft precongress documents, primarily the "Democratic" and "Marxist" Platforms. They contain many attractive points, which should be considered when the final touches are being put to the documents.

The "Marxist Platform" quite convincingly sets forth criticism of the so-called bourgeois-liberal school oriented toward capitalism. Formulation of questions concerning the democratization of intraparty life, the genuine power of the people and concerning the party's orientation toward political work in the work force, according to the place of residence and in the mass organizations is perfectly legitimate here. At the same time, however, the authors avoid even a mention of the name of Lenin and Leninism, as the theory and practice of socialist building in our country. An attempt to erode the ideological-theoretical positions of the CPSU clearly shows through.

Concern at the slow pace of radical changes in public life, the call for a fundamental restructuring of dogmatic views and recognition of the fact that we have taken only the first steps on the path of revolutionary transformations and that strenuous work lies ahead merit attention in the "Democratic Platform". But a desire to undermine the party from within, pull it apart by faction and destroy the current organizational structure, and seize the property of the CPSU shows though unambiguously in the "Democratic Platform."

Both documents fail to reveal in-depth problems connected with the national movement. Their authors fail to take account of the mortal danger to the existence of socialism from chauvinism and nationalism and do not attempt even to make a distinction between the aspiration of the peoples to their national-cultural renewal and the activity of extremist, nationalist, and separatist groups, which are not stopping short at mass terror and bloodshed.

What drives the authors of the alternative drafts? Not so much a search for ideals and ways of solving life's urgent problems, evidently, as political ambition. The opinion that were such democrats to come to power, the sacrificing of all so-called reformers and conservatives on the altar of "democracy" would be inevitable is not unfounded. And unless we wish to find ourselves on the sidelines of political history, we need to learn the lessons from the experience of our neighbors.

II.

Comrades! I believe that the 28th congress will make very serious adjustments to the CPSU's nationality policy at the current stage. A number of its propositions needs to be extended appreciably. Specifically, the proposition that the republics' real sovereignty is impossible without their economic independence. But can we confine ourselves merely to economic independence? And the second question—should we be speaking of Union republics or sovereign states?

To sum up the observations and proposals on this score which have been received from the party organizations and individual communists, it may be concluded that the Belorussian Communist Party is for an appreciable expansion of this proposition.

While confirming our devotion to the Leninist principle of the right of the nations to self-determination up to and including separation, supporting the law on the mechanism for realizing this right and emphatically opposing a weakening and severance of mutual ties and any separatist hankerings, we at the same time believe that questions of the political and economic sovereignty of the republics (states within the USSR) should be elaborated in the platform in greater depth and more clearly, without reservations and vagueness.

It is necessary to proceed here from the fact that their sovereignty means the right to make decisions determining the fate of the people and the methods and means of their political, socioeconomic, and cultural development independently, in self-sufficient manner and without any pressure from anyone.

Sovereignty means the action of legislative instruments on the territory of a republic merely within the limits and framework determined by its people. This proposition should be considered fundamental. The republic (state) concludes with the center a treaty, clearly specifying the authority which it voluntarily transfers to it. If, however, one or another enactment of Union authorities conflicts with the legitimate interests of the republic, the supreme organs of its state power should suspend them.

An analysis of the results of the precongress debate in the Belorussian Communist Party shows that our priority task in this area is the republic's acquisition of economic sovereignty. The Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers has already drawn up a concept of this and will shortly submit it for examination by the Supreme Soviet.

Briefly, it is based on principles, the most important of which are self-government, self-financing, self-support, self-regulation, and self-control.

The building of relations with the center and other regions of the country on the basis of mutually profitable and equal cooperation and regulating them by bilateral and multilateral agreements, including as regards facilities of all-Union significance, is anticipated. The point of departure should be the proposition to the effect that the natural resources and all facilities of the national economy located on the territory of a republic are the property of its people.

The republic (state) will have preference also on matters of the financial-budget and banking system, tax and pricing policy, material-technical supply, foreign economic activity, and the structure of state and economic management.

In a word, it is a question of creating a qualitatively new mechanism for economic, social, and cultural development. It must provide for the introduction of structures which will contribute to the dynamics and efficiency of production and its accelerated social reorientation, the preservation and recuperation of the natural environment, the better use of national-cultural and spiritual potential, the harmonious development of all nations and national groups residing on republic territory, and its independence in relations with the center, the other republics, and foreign countries.

Of course, another aspect has to be mentioned also: Acquisition of economic sovereignty means the emphatic abandonment of dependent sentiments. As we work, so we will live. At the same time the meaning contained in this formula should be analyzed in the context also of the transition to the market economy.

How to accomplish this transition? By what path? Within what period of time? There is no clarity here. And it is obvious that there cannot now be such since each of us in answering these questions proceeds from his own understanding of the problem.

But it would be an unforgivable mistake to succumb to market euphoria as new ideological support for perestroyka. But precisely thus is this mechanism conceived of by some of its supporters in their endeavor to persuade society of its all-purpose nature: This step needs to be taken, allegedly, without a second thought and without regulation, and our life will be fine. It will not! Each of us can name dozens of countries where neither the market nor private ownership have spared people poverty and starvation, where social relations have been dehumanized and society polarized, and where the social protection of the population has been weakened.

A direct consequence of the spread of opinions on this issue in society is the ambivalence of the perception of the measures proposed by the USSR Government.

In many of the letters to the party committees and the editors of newspapers and journals at this time communists are posing roughly the questions: Why were they not consulted, why was the party virtually bypassed when such an important decision was being drawn up?

We have a right today to readdress these questions to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Conferring with the communists is part of the tradition of party leadership. It is incomprehensible, therefore, why has this tradition been breached and why was so serious a step taken without consulting the party.

Yes, Article 6 of the country's constitution has been altered, and the CPSU is renouncing its legislatively enshrined leading role in society. But it is not abandoning its vanguard role. And, consequently, there should be no problems which wittingly or unwittingly "slip" from the party's field of vision and its influence. After all, we all realize that responsibility for the outcome of this step will be borne primarily by the party.

We believe that this will be plainly discussed at the 28th CPSU Congress. In our view, the party should speak in its platform more specifically on the aspects of the market economy which are connected with the social and political condition of the population and formulate, if only in most general outline, its principal directions and salient features for our country.

This transition will not be easy since the essential conditions for this have not been created. And, primarily, the independence and economic responsibility of the enterprises have not been secured. Flexible systems of pricing and taxation have not been devised. The management structure has not been changed.

And the moral and psychological atmosphere? People are rightly asking: How will this be reflected in our well-being? They are experiencing concern and uncertainty in connection with a possible increase in prices, unemployment, private enterprise and the impending sale to foreign citizens of the stock of enterprises built thanks to public money and the Soviet people's enthusiasm. They are asking whether a capitalist from overseas will really be investing money in our economy without a guarantee against the exploitation of wage labor and the acquisition of superprofits.

You, comrades, are familiar with the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet decree on this issue, whose adoption was sponsored by communist people's deputies. I would remind you that, as distinct from the Union Government program set forth at the USSR Supreme Soviet session, it deals with sure guarantees of the social protection of the population by way of compensation in full—we emphasize—in full for the citizens' growing expenditure thanks to the reduction by this amount of the fixed Union budget payments.

It would seem to us that we would be doing the right thing if at today's plenum, expressing the wishes of the vast majority of communists of the Belorussian SSR, we firmly declared to the republic's working people that the Belorussian Communist Party will not permit the introduction of market relations without the elaboration and adoption of measures for the comprehensive protection of the population.

The Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers is already working on the creation of a program of transition to a controlled market economy. But it is important that we specify today, if only briefly, the main directions toward which the communists participating in this work should be oriented.

We need primarily bills and prescriptive enactments providing for the sure social protection of the population and the domestic market of the republic. This means laws on property, land, business, the enterprise, joint-stock companies, foreign economic activity, the rights of the consumer, employment, and so forth. It means also financial, budget, credit, tax, and price control systems maintaining a balance of supply and demand and the consumption and accumulation of the commodity and money supply.

Alleviating and averting unpleasant consequences of the transition to the market is possible only by stability in the economy. The results of work even in the five months of the current year show that we have not lost it yet. But we must not flatter ourselves.

The disrupted economic relations with a number of regions of the country and the shortfalls in the supply of a considerable quantity of raw material, intermediate products, and components have made their mark on the dynamism of the development of individual sectors. In the period that has elapsed industrial production has increased only 3.7 percent, which is lower than the average for the preceding years.

Nor are the measures pertaining to the financial recovery of the economy producing results. Negative phenomena are on the rise. In the current year the increase in monetary income has out paced the increase in national income more than fourfold and has amounted to 16.8 percent, but the manufacture of consumer goods, on the other hand, only 7.3 percent. And this, you understand, is leading to even greater imbalance on the consumer market.

And some people are already prepared to provide this with a "theoretical" base: Let us prepare for the market, things could get even worse.

Things will get worse, of course, if we await this with our arms folded. Our primary duty is to provide for possible alternatives of the development of events. We cannot allow a recession, particularly in the sectors determining technical progress and connected with provision of the economy with raw material and fuel and power resources.

It is important to create conditions for the direct control of certain material flows with the aid of the government

order and to stimulate the manufacture of foodstuffs and industrial commodities and an increase in services thanks to an acceleration of conversion processes, leasing, and other forms of management. The possibilities of the defense sectors are indicated by the following fact: This year alone they will manufacture more than R2.2 billion of consumer goods.

A process of strengthening the domestic market thanks to a redistribution of supplies of commodities for non-centrally allocated requirements and for export and a reduction in the movement of products over and above the plan outside of Belorussia has begun in the republic. Last year this made it possible to sell to the population additionally tens of thousands of refrigerators and television and radio receivers and tens of millions of rubles' worth of women's and children's fur coats and other merchandise. But this work needs to be performed more assertively.

A strategic assignment of the Belorussian Communist Party should be to improve investment policy and reorient it toward the assured dynamics of science-intensive, resource-saving, and ecologically safe works, the speediest surmounting of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station and the solution of social questions.

Particularly balanced decisions are required by the transition of the agrarian sector to a market track. Policy here should be based on the principles of the republic's self-sufficiency in ecologically clean food, a consistent improvement in the structure of the population's diet, and the creation of reserves for commodity exchange with other regions.

While supporting the CPSU's policy of the multistructural nature of the agricultural sector, we have to see that the actual basis for a solution of the food problem under the republic's conditions is social production.

It is a question of imparting to it new impetus through strengthening its material-technical facilities, through the transformation in the countryside of economic relations—the development of leasing, cooperatives, associations, and private subsidiary plots—through the modernization of the processing sectors and the creation of modern product-storage facilities, and through the accelerated solution of social questions in the countryside.

In a word, it is necessary in all spheres of the economy to ensure receptivity to innovations.

It is necessary to emphatically avoid what impedes forward progress and more boldly unite enterprises in associations which might contribute to the speediest retooling of production and an improvement in the product itself and its increased competitiveness.

Under the conditions of self-government we are also squarely faced with the problem of self-sufficiency in material-technical resources in short supply. It is not a question of ourselves producing everything—from matches through intricate production equipment—and creating all-purpose industries. This would be contrary to the very idea of the market, which cannot be isolated within the framework of one republic.

Market relations will inevitably lead to the release of part of the able-bodied population, and the communists working in the soviets and organs of administration must be prepared to tackle tasks pertaining to a redistribution of manpower, the creation of new jobs and a reorientation of the entire personnel training and retraining system.

Management on the basis of the laws of a controlled market will inevitably bring about changes in the current system of the organs of administration. But we cannot let this process take its own course and passively wait while it itself leads to a fundamentally new model of the economy.

It is necessary, on the basis of advanced economic thought and world practice, to predetermine the new structures and accelerate their formation. For this, in our view, it is necessary to create in the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers a special commission incorporating the leading scientists of the republic and the country.

Life insistently demands a radicalization of the foreign economic sphere.

And since we have come to speak about this, it is appropriate to broach here also a problem of great foreign policy significance.

As you know, active processes connected with German unification are under way. Negotiations are being conducted according to the "two plus four" formula. But why per this formula precisely? We believe that the procedure and terms of unification of the two German states should be determined on the basis of an arrangement of all the parties concerned, primarily those which were the victims of the fascist aggression.

There is no need today to talk about the dimensions of the damage caused Belorussia in the years of the Great Patriotic War. Everyone is well aware of this. Formulation of the question of compensation to the republic for the losses inflicted on it may therefore be considered perfectly justified. The Belorussian SSR, as a founder and member of the United Nations, not only has the right but is also duty bound to take advantage of the appropriate international procedures for the solution of this question.

III.

Comrades! A decisive condition of the assurance of Belorussia's state, political, and economic sovereignty should be the real independence, not in words but in deeds, of its Communist Party. This is one further conclusion which ensues from the discussion of the draft

CPSU Platform and Rules and which accumulates within it the opinions of many communists and party organizations.

But it is important today, if only generally, to answer the question: What is our vision and how do we conceive of this independence? In terms of the type of communist parties of the Baltic republics? The communists reject such a version as unacceptable for it leads to a split in the CPSU and ultimately to political impasse. We are for an independent Belorussian Communist Party on a Marxist-Leninist platform.

It is our conviction that the independence of the Belorussian Communist Party should be ensured by the independent formulation and pursuit of a policy line in keeping with the republic's conditions and the people's national particularities and by the solution of a whole set of questions of their day-to-day activity.

A most important question connected with the future status of the Belorussian Communist Party pertains to the type of party. Of course, this means a reformed, renewed party capable of meeting in practice Lenin's demands on the political vanguard of the people.

Not a parliamentary-type party acting as an organizational structure only in the period of an election struggle but a party operating in all spheres of society and offering it its program goals, struggling for them, and working with the masses to secure the socialist choice.

It is politically responsible to the working people for the state of affairs in the economy and the social and spiritual spheres, for the security and social protection of the citizens and for the assurance of their rights and liberties.

And, finally, the Belorussian Communist Party operates within the framework of the Belorussian SSR Constitution and constructs its relations with other social and political organizations devoted to the socialist choice on the principles of ideological unity, dialogue, cooperation, and partnership.

And now about program and prescriptive documents. As you understand, this was discussed at the 15th Plenum of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee last October. Telling arguments ensuing from very important, as we believed and continue to believe now, aspects of a state, economic, political, national, legal and international nature were expressed in support of the adoption of its program.

This document should be a guide to action for the party committees and organizations, a sure reference point in political and educational work and the basis for the consolidation of the communists and non-party people. In V.I. Lenin's words, it should be a concise and accurate statement of everything for which the party is striving and struggling.

The Belorussian Communist Party Rules should reflect the autonomy of the Belorussian Communist Party in the organization of its activity in determination of party membership and its structure and the place and role of the party organizations and committees in the social and political organism of the work force and the republic as a whole. The principles of personnel policy and the interaction of the elective bodies with their apparatus should be reflected here.

We have approached the creation of such documents for the first time in the history of the Belorussian Communist Party. Working groups have been set up in the Central Committee to prepare drafts of them. Alternative proposals are being prepared in parallel by scholars of the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, the V.I. Lenin Belorussian State University, Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Party History Institute, and the Minsk Higher Party School. They are studying closely and collating the proposals and observations received in the course of discussion of the draft CPSU Platform and Rules.

After the finishing touches have been put to these documents, they will be examined at a plenum of the Central Committee and published in the press. But I would like the members of the Central Committee to express their vision of them today even.

This is important also because the communists' attitude toward a number of program and statutory propositions is ambiguous. In addition, there have been attempts to erode the ideological and organizational foundations of the party.

In some party organizations the communists, not submitting constructive proposals in respect of the precongress documents, have lauded the "Democratic Platform" to the skies, forgetting their party duty here.

The supporters of the "Democratic Platform" would like to convert the party into a shapeless association with complete freedom for factions and groupings, that is, in practice pull it down. They are calling not for the existing structure of the CPSU to be reformed but destroyed and for the abandonment of the Leninist principles of its composition, of the principle of democratic centralism primarily. It is around this pivotal question that the keenest debate has developed. The dispute here has shifted from the organizational to the political sphere.

Each of us understands that a renunciation of democratic centralism means a choice in favor of the conversion of the party into an amorphous, diffuse organization in which no one is bound by anything to anyone. In today's situation of an unconcealed, tough struggle for power such a path is tantamount to the party's loss of political face and ultimately its role as influential political force.

It was an understanding of this fact which dictated the support by the majority of the republic's communists for the preservation of democratic centralism as a fundamental principle of the organizational composition and vital activity of the party, provided that it rids itself of all

that implants barracks discipline, enslaves the communists, and fetters their initiative.

We are for a revival in the party of genuine democracy and intra-party relations whereby the communist may be at the center of party life and have the broadest opportunities for participation in the formulation and realization of party policy, the shaping of the party authorities, and the supervision of their activity. A reliable mechanism must be created to assure the independence of the party organizations, the primary organizations first and foremost, and the strengthening of their role in molding and realizing party policy at all levels. They must independently decide questions of determination of their structure and forms and methods of activity and the periodicity and procedure of holding meetings, membership in the CPSU, and political actions.

I would like to confer with you also on the question of shaping party composition. Many proposals were received in the course of the debate concerning the party organizations, with party committees and party bureaus being accorded the right to make the final decision on admittance to the CPSU.

As regards small party organizations, however, it is proposed to preserve the former procedure, that is, approval of their decisions by the gorkoms [city party committees] or raykoms [rayon party committees]. The reason given for this is that otherwise the fate of some communists could prove to be dependent on group interests, pressure from which some small organizations are subjected.

Numerous wishes are also being expressed concerning the preservation in one form or another of the institution of sponsors and the candidate's term of probation. There is logic in this, in our view.

The question of the social basis of the party and its ties to the people is different under present conditions. Whose interests should it accumulate, express, and defend? The attempt to speak and act on behalf of the whole people would hardly be fruitful today. The interests of individual groups and strata of society differ greatly. And these differences will inevitably intensify under the conditions of the market economy, political pluralism, and a multiparty system. I believe that the problem of the social protection of various groups of the population should occupy a most important place in the party's program goals.

Proceeding from this, for the immediate future a most important task for us is the pursuit of a particular policy oriented toward the working class, peasantry, working intelligentsia, and all working people who are devoted to the socialist choice and the communist perspective.

This task is all the more pertinent in that as yet workers and peasants are not always given preference to the proper extent in practice in our practical steps. This was manifested, particularly, in the inadequate support for worker candidates in the course of the elections to the soviets of people's deputies. Neither have enough of them been elected delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress. The influx of workers into the party has declined.

The republic Communist Party will be in a position to seek the accomplishment of the goals and tasks of perestroyka and be in the vanguard of society if it relies on the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia. Our common socialist cause can only benefit from this.

IV.

Comrades! The frustration of the majority of the original and even some subsequent plans of perestroyka, unfulfilled promises, and empty shelves are evoking the people's exasperation and discontent, which are being rained down primarily on the party.

A wide-ranging attack on the party committees and personnel is being conducted under the flag of struggle against the bureaucracy. Many party media have joined actively here in the campaign of defamation of the party (defamation precisely, not criticism, as some people are attempting to portray matters). This is an unprecedented phenomenon in world political practice.

It is clear even today that "firing on headquarters" is introducing to our social life a spirit of bitter cold war and dividing the people into "ours" and "theirs."

I would like here to make a short digression.

We receive increasing confirmation with every passing day that the so-called "people's movements" in certain East European countries, which are affecting many of our home-grown politicians and commentators, are in fact of a strikingly expressed anticommunist nature. We are witnessing how "democratic forces" which have come to power are initiating a persecution of communists of unprecedented proportions and an all-embracing campaign of moral terror, infringement of rights, and actual measures of punishment in respect of former party leaders and the party's rank and file.

Why do we dwell on this issue? Because calls are being heard increasingly often in the country and the republic for use to be made of the East European scenario. The intent is not, as you can see, distinguished by any particular originality, nor, for that matter, is the choice of means of realizing it.

Pride of place, as has been the case repeatedly, is given to disparagement of the party and state leadership. Everything is being put to use: fact-juggling, deception, slander. A particular place in the plans is assigned to accusations of incompetence, betrayal of national interests, and so forth. Both overseas mass media and our own "independent" press are being used to this end. A variety of emigre centers is being summoned to assist.

There is no need to go on, evidently. It needs only to be emphasized that the implementation of these plans has already begun. There is much confirmation of this.

Consequently, it is necessary to make serious adjustments to all our work immediately.

Unless we wish to share the fate of the communists of the East European countries and find ourselves on the sidelines of political life or in the ditch of history altogether, we must courageously tell one another that the party is being seriously threatened by destructive forces.

There are in the republic as yet no political parties other than the Belorussian Communist Party. But we if consider the presence of implacable political opponents and the keenness of the political struggle, we are essentially living under real multiparty conditions.

The work force primary party organizations have recently been an object of the attention and actions of our opponents.

A trial of strength posited on the ideas of the "Democratic Platform" and a kind of reconnoitering of the battle were conducted recently at Gomel's "Korall" association. The conference of this association, provoked by a group of persons, passed a resolution demanding the removal of the party committee from the enterprise.

What, however, did this extremely disturbing fact reveal? The passiveness and spinelessness of the party committee and its inability to respond to unusual situations and the lack of involvement of the Zheleznodorozhnyy Raykom and the Gomel Gorkom. It would not, perhaps, have been worth publicizing this instance if we did not understand that such things will arise more frequently and with greater insistence under multi-party conditions.

This persuades us yet again that the communists' opinion concerning preservation in the CPSU Rules of the territorial-production principle of the party's composition is correct. On the other hand, we must be able to forecast the future.

It is perfectly obvious that the present structure of the party organizations should be supplemented by an equal and full-fledged component—associations of communists according to the place of residence. In our view, whoever today adopts a serious attitude toward this problem will be the beneficiary. From amateurishness in this matter and "if you like" we must switch to professional work according to the place of residence, reorient a certain part of the party apparatus in this direction, and, possibly, set up the dual registration of communists.

In order to preserve vanguard positions it is necessary to reexamine and reinterpret a good deal in the style of the party committees and in personnel policy. A vigorous search for modern forms of organizing and political work is required of the party committees today.

However, the brakes have clearly been applied to these processes. The cadres' mentality is not being restructured quickly enough, and an incapacity for persuading people of the soundness of one's viewpoint and skillfully conducting a dialogue with them is being manifested. Much energy and time are being spent on debate and arguments which are sometimes very far removed from real life. None of this is in any way strengthening the party.

The ideological and organizational vacillation in its ranks which have emerged represent a great danger for the party. This has been shown as clearly as could be by the situation involving the "Democratic Platform" and also its supporters in the Belorussian Communist Party. You are aware of the open letter of the CPSU Central Committee "For Consolidation on a Basis of Principle" and the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau decision in connection with their activity. The time that has elapsed since the publication of these documents has confirmed the validity of the evaluations and conclusions contained in them.

Our position here is unequivocal: hampering in every possible way the attempts which are being made to "bore through" the party from within for the purpose of converting it from a vanguard political organization into a debating club with every possible parallel structure.

I would like each of us to leave this plenum firm in the conviction that the Communist Party has no more important task than to ensure ideological unity, party comradeship, and cohesion.

Today each communist should understand that the fate of the party and the fate of our society depend on his personal position, the cohesion of the party ranks, and unity of action.

While allowing for complete freedom of debate and platforms and a comparison of views, we are at the same time opposed, and we are supported by the vast majority of the republic's communists here, to factions with an internal structure. For this is nothing other than an action aimed at the party's disintegration.

However distressing, it has to be acknowledged that, despite the entire complexity of the situation, the tremendous intellectual potential of the Communist Party has not been called up and mobilized. We are more often falling back than attacking and are losing the initiative and dynamism in both the theoretical interpretation of social and political processes and in practical action.

A lack of ability to analyze and forecast the development of trends, catch people's mood and exert an anticipatory influence on their formation is reflected in many party organizations and committees. And this is a consequence of the underestimation of the theoretical training and retraining of party personnel.

A radical restructuring is required in the work of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Party History Institute, the Minsk Higher Party School, the obkom political education centers, the universities of

Marxism-Leninism and the oblast courses for the improvement of the qualifications of party, soviet, and ideological workers.

It is a question not simply of another reorganization but of the creation of fundamentally new educational institutions of the party which will become centers of the flexible ideological and political training of the personnel and arming them with contemporary knowledge for work under the conditions of the transformation of the economic and political structures.

The Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has instructed the Central Committee departments and the leadership of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Party History Institute and Minsk Higher Party School to submit proposals pertaining to the creation of a single scientific and educational party establishment.

We deem it expedient also to shortly convert the political education centers, universities of Marxism-Leninism, and improvement courses into single social and political centers of the obkoms. Study of these matters has already begun in the Minsk, Vitebsk, and Grodno Obkoms.

It is necessary to restore and impart new meaning to the "party comradeship" concept. Relations between communists must be built on profound trust, support, and exactingness and complete equality of rights and duties and be verified by devotion to the party's cause and communist ideals.

However deplorable, egotism in relations has begun to surface, and in certain people personal motives have begun to predominate over public interests. One has the impression that some members of the CPSU are thinking only of whom to go over to and how to insure that they, as it were, are on top in any situation. No one can in this way paralyze and demoralize the party and strike a treacherous blow at it, like double-dealers and degenerates and time-servers in our ranks.

The renewal of all spheres of the life of society is acutely in need of scientific analysis and a revelation of the regularities of its development. Unfortunately, even today we are having to speak about the estrangement of the social sciences from reality, their insufficient influence on the public consciousness and of the crisis in social science even.

The decline in the authority of the social sciences is particularly noticeable in the student environment. The negative attitude of the youth toward socioeconomic disciplines is connected primarily with the low scientific and methods level of their teaching, the unthinking quoting of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, and the slow riddance of dogmatism and pedantry.

But nor can we fail to see another aspect of the problem also. The leadership of certain VUZ's [higher educational institutions] is being led around by those who are relegating liberal arts disciplines to the background and underestimating their significance for the spiritual development of the personality of the specialist.

This is happening with the tacit consent of the communists in the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education. Under the guise of the democratization of administration here everything is being farmed out to the leadership of the VUZ's, but not everywhere is it on top of the solution of questions concerning the teaching of socioeconomic disciplines. This negative process needs to be halted.

The enactment this January of the Languages in the Belorussian SSR Act contributed to an easing of the tension which had accumulated in the republic's spiritual sphere throughout the 1960's and through the 1980's. This legislative instrument has imparted new impetus to the processes of developing national self-awareness and a renewal of spiritual life.

But this is merely the first step toward a revival of national culture. Today the Belorussian Communist Party is prepared for the next step—the elaboration and adoption of a scientifically substantiated and materially and technically buttressed concept for the development of national culture for the immediate and distant future.

The Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau deems it fundamentally important also to entrust to the communist people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR, by way of legislative initiative, the raising in the republic Supreme Soviet of questions concerning the elaboration and enactment of laws on science and culture in the Belorussian SSR.

It is essential to approve new, modern principles of the development of science, literature, art, and the population's aesthetic education, and provide for nonstandard approaches to questions of spiritual development. The consolidation of all intellectual forces and their joint work on the solution of problems of the national-cultural development of the peoples of Soviet Belorussia are needed.

Journalists are called upon to play an important part in the renewal of the party and the improvement of its strategy and tactics in the present social and political situation. Today the relations of the party committees and the mass media are built on complete trust. And this trust should be mutual.

However, we see something else in practice. Recently individual journalists, of the party and Komsomol [Communist Youth League] press included, have begun to display a weather-vane position. They are not averse to winning celebrity for their name by distorting the meaning and nature of the activity of the Belorussian Communist Party in our publications, in foreign radio broadcasts, and in samizdat sheets, whose main content are malice and slander of the Soviet system and the work of the hands of all generations of Soviet people from 1917 onward. And this is being done by those who have

been unable to accomplish anything useful even for themselves, let alone society.

The time has come for journalists, primarily communist journalists, and editorial boards to clearly determine their positions. The party press must be just that.

We cannot permit ourselves the luxury of making its pages over to our political opponents for attacks on the party and its policy. We can no longer put up with journalists who are paid by party funds indulging in vacillation, flirting with our political opponents, and sliding into positions of unscrupulousness and conformism.

If a journalist cleaves to a different line, he should cross over to work for that organ of mass information whose position coincides with his own.

I believe that the introduction of contract principles between the founders of publications and journalists, and their certification, improvement of the structure and permanent staff of the editorial offices, and the enhanced role and responsibility of the party organizations and communist leaders should contribute to the correct implementation of personnel policy in the party press.

The interests of perestroyka require also a thorough change in our relations with other public organizations, political currents and all who adhere to positions of socialism and who are sincerely interested in radical transformations. Understandably, confrontation leads to nothing good. It is necessary to change tactics, seek compromises, and consolidate all healthy forces. The party organizations should have the initiative.

The more so in that an analysis of the platforms of the currents which have emerged in the party testifies that it is possible to find concord among their supporters. Granted all the differences, we are, as a rule, united by what is most important—the attitude toward our fundamental values.

It is essential to organize effective work with the people's deputies and achieve mutual understanding with them. After all, the majority of deputies are communists. Some of them have their own viewpoint on one process and phenomenon or another. The main thing, however, is an honest endeavor to solve accumulated problems quicker and better. Consequently, we need to look for concord and unite efforts in the interests of the cause.

It is necessary to change fundamentally relations with the unions and the Komsomol. It is no secret that our influence there has weakened considerably. It is a question not of a revival of party leadership in the former concept. Relations of superior and subordinate will no longer work here. A strengthening of the ideological and spiritual sphere will help us find and unite real allies.

Such, comrades, is our political vision of the precongress documents of the CPSU Central Committee, problems of the present social and political situation, urgent questions of the political, economic and spiritual development of the republic and ways of solving them. The Belorussian Communist Party has sufficient ideological and creative potential to prove its fidelity to the Leninist course and the socialist choice. And despite the complexity of present conditions, it has preserved its positions of consolidating social force.

The basis of this conclusion are the evaluations of party meetings and conferences and the more than 15,000 proposals and observations expressed in the course of the precongress debate.

Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from our party organizations are taking part in the plenum. They will undoubtedly convey to the highest forum of the country's communists the collectively formulated position of the Belorussian Communist Party and do everything to ensure that the congress and its decisions are a powerful stimulus to the unification of the communists and all to whom democracy, the country's stability and socialism are dear.

Comrades! Summing up, we consider it necessary to repeat in most generalized form the fundamental points which, with regard for the communists' observations and proposals expressed in the course of the precongress debate, constitute the basis of the Belorussian Communist Party's position for the 28th CPSU Congress.

First, we confirm our adherence to the socialist choice and the communist outlook and advocate civil concord and the consolidation of all political forces in the struggle for the creation of a society, whose center is man and which ensures for him worthy living and work conditions, social justice, and political freedom and opportunities for the all-around development and spiritual burgeoning of the personality.

Second, we confirm fidelity to internationalism as a fundamental principle of the community of all peoples of the country in a single multinational socialist state. While supporting the processes of renewal of the Soviet federation, the Belorussian Communist Party will strive persistently for the republic's acquisition of state, political, and economic sovereignty.

Third, a principal cause of the crisis phenomena in various walks of life is the instability of the development of the economy. While understanding that there is no alternative to transition to a controlled market economy, we believe that this transition should be accomplished only following nationwide discussion. The Belorussian Communist Party gives firm assurances that it will not permit the introduction of a market as the basic regulator of the economy without reliable measures pertaining to people's comprehensive social protection.

Fourth, the republic's communists advocate an acceleration of the radical reform of the party and its conversion into a modern, efficient political force possessing real social authority and a theoretical source of modern

ideology represented by the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and other achievements of the human intellect.

We say for all to hear: No to division in the party, yes to unity!

We are for the independence of the Belorussian Communist Party on a Marxist-Leninist platform.

In the course of the precongress debate the communists and party organizations of the republic have expressed a resolve to multiply their efforts to consolidate the working people and their mobilize them to strength organization and discipline and increase labor and social and political assertiveness in the name of the speediest surmounting of the difficulties of the pivotal stage of perestroyka.

Program of Moldavian People's Front Criticized

PM2507130590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Eduard Kondratov under the rubric "Direct Line": "Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau Statement"]

[Text] Kishinev—Republican newspapers have published a statement by the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau sharply rejecting the political program of the People's Front.

This is probably the first time the party leadership has recognized the MPF [Moldovan People's Front] as its ideological opponent, for hitherto the Central Committee's attitude toward it was characterized by a persistent search for compromises. However, the statement says that the People's Front, which was born on the crest of the democratic movement in support of perestroyka, has now abruptly changed its orientation. Its program documents no longer mention either perestroyka itself or the possibility of a Union treaty. Nor do they contain constructive ideas on extricating Moldova from the economic and social crisis, which attests to the MPF's reluctance to assume any responsibility for the life and destiny of its own people. On the other hand, they contain calls to dismantle "the communist regime, annul the existing structures of management throughout the territory, and create new ones"—which, in the opinion of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, is a virtual appeal to overthrow the existing state system.

Special mention is made of the fact that the idea of renaming the republic the Romanian Republic of Moldova is being foisted on the Moldavian people—which has already caused a serious exacerbation of interethnic discord. The Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau regards this as a show of disrespect for the Supreme Soviet which quite recently approved the republic's new name—the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. The statement says that the people have not empowered the leaders of the People's Front to speak in their name.

Tough criticism is also leveled at the People's Front leaders for attempts to confer upon themselves the winner's laurels in the struggle to restructure society and thus remove the republic Communist Party from the political arena in order themselves to appear in the role of the sole expressers of the people's interests. The Communist Party does not intend to yield here, for it was the first to advocate recognizing the priority of panhuman over class values, renouncing the monopoly on power, and asserting the multiparty principle.

Despite the very tough assessments of the People's Front platform, the statement's authors still express the hope that common sense and the desire to resolve Moldova's most acute problems in an atmosphere of civil peace will still prevail in the activity of the popular public movement.

Caucasus

Coverage Continues on Samtredia Station Blockade

Commentary on 'Tense' Situation

LD3107135190 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Commentary by Vyacheslav Terekhov—read by announcer]

[Excerpts] The political situation in Georgia, one of the Transcaucasian republics, has lately become tense. A commentary by our observer Vyacheslav Terekhov:

The tension has been caused by protests of the opposition organizations against the authorities' inaction in passing a law on democratic elections. To back their demands the opposition organizations have resorted to a blockade of the Transcaucasian railway. [passage omitted]

The situation is sadly familiar. The opposition is demanding political decisions. The authorities are baulking at them. That always produces tension, affecting the already faulty economy. In this particular case, since the beginning of the blockade on 26 July, over 200 freight trains with various cargoes have been detained. That includes consumer goods, medicines, petrol, and wheat. People in passenger trains are left without food or medical aid. The first to respond to the blockade was the USSR Transport Ministry by deciding to stop sending all cargoes to Georgia. It has detained 46 trains in various parts of the Soviet Union en route to the republic. It is proposed that the central government should consign some of the cargoes to other regions. The deputy minister, Vladimir Ginko, said in a television interview: This is a bitter measure, but we have no choice.

It is unlikely that such measures can solve the problem. The political issue should be tackled politically, but a meeting expected yesterday between the chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet and the Communist Party leader, Givi Gumbaridze, with opposition spokesmen was not held. Reluctance to seek a compromise led to a tragedy in Tbilisi last year. Wasn't that a lesson for political leaders, both in the government and in the opposition, that problems of this kind should be settled at the negotiating table?

'Emergency' Continues

LD3107160890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1339 GMT on 31 July carries a seven-minute report on the Georgian railway blockade. The Panorama announcer links up with correspondent Anatoliy Koldin at the Central Control Room at the Ministry of Railways for information on the blockade in the Transcaucasus.

Koldin says he was just in contact with Tbilisi and "for the moment the emergency situation continues; it is perhaps even worse than it was 24 hours ago." Koldin notes that the only part of the Transcaucasus network not affected is the Yerevan section. He notes further that even local electric services, which were still running on the Tbilisi-Samtredia line as of 1300 GMT on 30 July, have now been cut. He notes that the only passenger train to leave Tbilisi for Kutaisi yesterday was stopped en route. "In a word," Koldin continues, "everything is at a standstill." Between 1,000 and 2,000 cargo trucks are stranded, which is especially affecting grain transport, Koldin reports.

"I know that at noon today Georgia's President Gumbaridze was engaged in talks, as were other organizations involved in one way or another in this conflict. As far as one can judge, however, such talks have not yet brought the desired success, at least up to 1740 Moscow time [1340 GMT]. It would seem that the situation is indeed out of the ordinary and could go one way or the other," Koldin says.

Koldin then hands over to chief controller (?Zheleztsov) who says he hopes common sense will prevail because traffic movement is the criterion against which railwaymen's work is assessed and this situation "therefore hits the pockets of our railway workers, who are not to blame for any of it."

Blockade Affects Armenia

NC0108103790 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Report by Radik Grigoryan from Yerevan railway station entitled "Blockaded Again"; date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Grigoryan] When the railroads were under the blockade that affected our people and the republic greatly, we we reported almost daily from the railroad station on the movement of the trains, freight unloading, and transportation. When the blockade was over our reports became less frequent [words indistinct]. Now after almost a month and a half since our last report from the train station we asked Sergey Bagdasaryan, senior engineer at the Yerevan railroad station, to tell us about the situation.

[Bagdasaryan] Our republic is facing an even graver situation, for large numbers of freight and passenger cars hve started to pile up on the Georgian side. No trains have come from Samtredia station in Georgia for the last three days. [passage omitted]

[Grigoryan] Are there no trains at all arriving from Georgia, or are they arriving with interruptions?

[Bagdasaryan] No trains at all are arriving in Armenia from Georgia and none are going from Armenia to Georgia. The only exception is the Yerevan-Tbilisi train which is operating with considerable disruptions. [passage omitted]

Blockade Intensified by Strike

LD3107220790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 31 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The blockade at the railway station of Samtredia by a group of members of informal organizations is continuing for the sixth day. They are trying to get an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia convened to secure and legalize a multiparty system in the republic.

The strike by engine drivers and Georgian workers at the Sukhumi station depot also continues. There, as well, freight and passenger trains are standing idle. At the same time, the railwaymen are undertaking every measure to send passengers from the stranded trains in the required directions, to their destinations, either in a roundabout way or by air. Take a look at the reportage of our correspondents from Adler station and from the USSR Ministry of Railways.

[Correspondent] In these days Adler station has become the terminal station for all trains heading south. Here passengers made to alight onto the platform at someone's wish are deciding an agonizing issue for themselves, how to get to their destination? Some people rush to the booking offices at the airport. But they are not lucky here either. Owing to fuel [shortages] the aircraft have not been taking off for a day now, and it was only with difficulty that several thousand passengers had been sent off by today.

The workers of Sochi sea port have come to the aid of the residents of Sukhumi, Poti, and Batumi, transporting them on motor launches, but what is to be done about the rest who are heading, let us say for Tbilisi or Yerevan. Adults are troubled by it, but naturally in such situation it is particularly children who suffer.

[Railway official] One train like this stood for three days at Veseloye station. Sochi motor transport workers had to organize a special run to Tbilisi to take this group of children away.

[Correspondent] I know the fuel situation on the journey is a very difficult one.

[Railway official] This was all provided for. They sent their own fuel tanker together with the convoy. Unfortunately, what astounds one this year is the Olympian calm of the central departments. Briefings and conferences are being conducted, but no effective measures are being taken at all. The strike is continuing. Today Tbilisi is already blockaded. Thus the situation is even further exacerbated.

[Correspondent] All in all, over these days approximately 70 passenger trains have been forced to interrupt their journey at Sochi's stations. Approximately 40,000 passengers have not reached their destinations. [video shows passengers sitting on the platform at Adler station, scenes at Sochi airport, children stranded and interview with railway official on the platform]

Georgian Popular Front Halts Protest Actions

AU3107143990 Paris AFP in English 1149 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, July 31 (AFP)—The nationalist popular front in Georgia Tuesday called off protest actions in the republic after negotiations with local authorities on holding multiparty elections in the autumn.

One of the leaders of the popular front, Aftandil Minadze [name as received], reached by telephone in Tbilisi, said parliamentary elections would go ahead on October 28 and that the local parliament would be meeting on August 17 to draft a new electoral law.

Three draft bills would be published in the press, including that of the popular front which suggests that elections to the 420-strong parliament be held partly on a proportional and partly on a first-past-the-post basis. This would allow newly-formed small parties to win representation in parliament.

Following the talks, the popular front called for an end to the protest actions, including the six-day blockade of the Transcaucasian railway near the town of Samtredia. Several hundred protesters have held up more than 200 trains by blocking the railway line there. The Soviet railways ministry had earlier announced it was suspending all freight shipments to Georgia and re-routing some supplies to other regions.

Georgian President Givi Gumbaridze, for his part, had warned that the opposition protest could spell "anarchy" and degenerate into "armed confrontation".

The Georgian parliament, at the instigation of the the popular front, last March had voted to postpone spring elections till autumn to allow for the introduction of a multiparty system.

The Soviet parliament had earlier scrapped the Communist Party's constitutional monopoly on power.

Armenian Supreme Soviet Deliberates 31 Jul

NC0108100790 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Report by Stepan (?Marukyan) and Mavr Danielyan from the Armenian Supreme Soviet Session on 31 July—recorded]

[Excerpts] [(?Marukyan)] Levon Galstyan, the republic's internal affairs minister, delivered a report at this morning's session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet on the situation in our republic and in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. He also briefed the Supreme Soviet on his Moscow visit and the results of his talks with USSR Internal Affairs Minister Bakatin concerning President Gorbachev's decree.

That was followed by the credentials commission's report on the five okrugs where there have been irregularities. [passage omitted]

We interviewed the people's deputies again, asking for their views on various issues under discussion. Listen to what they said:

[Danielyan] During the recess I spoke with people's deputies Valeriy Mirzoyan and Hamlet Nahatakyan. Mr. Mirzoyan and Mr. Nahatakyan, it appears that emotions flare up during the reports of the credentials commission. A (?similar) situation arose today. What provoked that (?emotional outburst)?

[Mirzoyan] To begin with, emotional outbursts are unseemly, even moreso because, strangely enough, the upper echelon of the party took little part in the debate about what to do with the president's ultimatum-decree. It is clear that this threat from Gorbachev will consolidate the position of the existing higher echelon. They realize that the armed formations basically support the democratic forces, reforms, and national reformations, though there are also criminal groups among them. You made a good observation, Mr. Danielyan. The emotional outburst was both expected and unexpected. It was unexpected in that only yesterday we were discussing national issues and apparently we have already forgotten them today. [passage indistinct]

[Nahatakyan] I think it is very insulting that the upper echelons, the nomenklatura, are so active when it comes to their personal interests. Yet with national issues they [words indistinct]. I doubt if we could achieve a national and independent statehood with such a parliament. We are (?involved) in a national struggle and yet are fighting with each other. The struggle is virtually against each other. [passage omitted]

Armenia's 'Far From Stable' Situation Viewed

PM3107120390 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jul 90 p 1

[Report by correspondent V. Aloyan: "Armenia: The Week's Chronicle"]

[Text] The past seven days have undoubtedly passed in the shadow of the first session of the republic's new parliament that is now being held, and preliminary results may already be summed up.

So what did the parliament do during these seven days?

A decision was adopted confirming the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] citizenship of Paruyr Ayrikyan, a dissident evicted from the country two years ago in one of A. Gromyko's last decrees, and ratifying his status as an Armenian people's deputy.

A parliamentary commission was formed in connection with the USSR president's decree on disarming and disbanding illegally created formations. Its chairman, Deputy G. Khachatryan, noted that even if there had been no such decree, parliament would have had to concern itself with this question anyway.

It is a fact that the situation in the republic is far from stable. And no one doubts that it is urgently necessary to start restoring order. But this must be done through the forces of the republic itself and its law-enforcement organs. The opinion of practically all deputies and their electorate coincide on this matter, regardless of party membership.

In the past few days a social organization that calls itself the Armenian National Army [ANA] has been frequently mentioned in the central press and television in connection with the presidential decree.

During these past few months, ANA leaders have repeatedly announced that they are ready to place themselves under the authority of the new, democratically elected republic parliament and defense council.

"The parliament has been elected and it is democratic," the republic newspaper KOMMUNIST writes in its latest edition. "The ANA cannot continue to be independent. Independent of whom? Of the people and those whom they have elected? Should Vasilyan have told the whole world (I have in mind the ANA leader's telephone interview with REUTER) about his "special" position at a time when only parliament had the right to hold talks with the center and the army?"

Public opinion is clear: Formations of this kind can exist only on a legal basis and only under the authority of the republic government. They must help the Armenian SSR law enforcement organs in their struggle against gun-toting bandits.

As was noted at the session, the past two years have shown that the Army and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] troops have not always managed to come to the assistance of the peaceful population. Voluntary armed formations can be eliminated only if the factors that caused them to emerge disappear. The following conditions, inter alia, were listed at the session: removing the blockade on the Goris-Lachin-Stepanakert highway, restoring the obkom [oblast party committee] and oblast soviet in the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], and withdrawing troops from Stepanakert and concentrating them on the borders between NKAO and Azerbaijani regions.

Armenian Called 'Language of Deliberations'

NC3007115590 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0500 GMT 29 Jul 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Excerpts] The republic's Supreme Soviet continued its deliberations yesterday [28 July].

The paper has published a report on the debates at the 27 July evening session of the Supreme Soviet. The report says: At the 27 July evening session the republic's people's deputies continued to debate the interim standing orders of the republic's Supreme Soviet. Article 16 took up much of the deputies' time. They unequivocally endorsed the proposal that Armenian is the language of deliberations at the Supreme Soviet. However, they differed on the remaining paragraphs of the article and presented various proposals. It was finally decided that the speeches made in other languages must be translated simultaneously into Armenian.

A draft resolution on conducting preliminary negotiations with the Russian Federation and the (?composition) of the commission to conduct the preliminary negotiations was submitted to the session for debate.

During yesterday's session the Supreme Soviet heard a report by Khachatryan, chairman of the interim commission for operative control of the situation in the republic, on the work of the commission and the problems it faces. He specifically noted that the Supreme Soviet had created this commission but had not empowered it with specific mandates and this is hindering its operative and effective functioning. [passage omitted]

At Deputy Telman Gdlyan's suggestion the Supreme Soviet decided to set up a daily shift group to pave the way for speedy and productive response to citizens' protests and complaints. The deputies on shift will meet citizens to hear complaints. [passage omitted]

Armenian Army Deputy Commander Interviewed

NC3107124590 Yerevan KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN in Armenian 14 Jul 90 p 4

[Interview with Vladimir Vardanyan, deputy commander in chief of the Armenian National Army, by Khachik Mkhitaryan: "Salvation Rests in Race-Devotion"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Mkhitaryan] The 6 July issue of URBAT weekly printed ANA's [Armenian National Army] program which touched upon a wide variety of subjects. Do you consider that a national program?

[Vardanyan] Not as a comprehensive national program, but as an axis of a national program, yes. The entire nation must understand the need for a national army. Our physical condition compels us to take that step. Each Armenian must also regard himself a soldier as well as a citizen. The nation-army, based on the ideology of devotion to Armenianism or of race-devotion [tsegakronutyun], will be the foundation for the survival of our people.

[Mkhitaryan] The preamble to ANA's program professes a certain ideological principle, a viewpoint according to which there are no classes in Armenia and hence there cannot be parties. [passage omitted]

Is the class interest the only criterion on which parties could be formed? Could the problems of national revival and the struggle for its survival also not form the foundations for the formation of the parties?

[Vardanyan] The existence of parties presupposes minimum conditions for a peaceful life when there are stratas with differing interests, in particular socially oriented interests. Today's Armenia and Armenian people have a single-point agenda: physical survival. If we call things by their names, today our people are living in conditions of war. And do the parties even in the most civilized countries not unite to defend the survival of the nation? What we need is a national concordance around our supreme problem. [passage omitted].

[Mkhitaryan] Do you think that the army is an instrument of defense at the hands of the nation and its government, or vice versa?

[Vardanyan] At present most of the armed formations in Armenia have no allegience to any political movement. Proceeding from the present grave situation in the republic those formations and the political forces representing them have come together and have created a military-political (defense) council. Its main task is to ensure the survival of the nation, not submission to the control of the parties. Anyway, a multiparty system and divergence of opinions will not be ensured, considering the fact that the Armenian Pan-national Movement and the communists will have influence in the newly evolving parliament. I am not trying to equate the Communist Party and the Armenian Pan-national Movement in terms of premises of principle and ideology. Yet, as the future holders of power with certain ideas about what that power will be, I think they are two sides of the same coin. For that reason I find the full submission of the defense council to such a parliament dangerous. Therefore, it would be correct to vest the defense council with constitutional and executive functions. I doubt that this will lead two a dichotomy of powers which is unnatural and would be dangerous for our people.

We are aiming at creating a national authority, a parliament composed of the representatives expressing the political, economic, and cultural interests of all the strata. Only then could the defense council, as military-political force, be restructured and transformed into an Army fully and unequivocally subservient to the parliament. This should be so because from times long past the army has been an instrument of defense at the hands of a national state.

[Mkhitaryan] Anyone reading your program comes to the conclusion that ANA is not merely an army but also a militarized party. Do you reject the accuracy of such a conclusion?

[Vardanyan] The ANA is a political force to the extent that its objective is the protection of the physical survival of the nation. ANA's present mission is the creation of a genuine national political authority. In a word, ANA's objective is to ensure free activity for parties upholding national interests and devoted to the nation. ANA is not a party and cannot be one. [passage omitted]

Armenian Komsomol Cites Unity With NKAO

NC2807120890 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 26 Jul 90

[Text] Yerevan, 26 Jul (ARMENPRES)—A plenum of the Armenian All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol] Central Committee has deemed unconstitutional the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee plenum's decision to suspend the activities of the Komsomol oblast committtee in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the Stepanakert city Komsomol, and rayon Komsomols in Askeranskiy, Gadrutskiy, Martuninskiy, and Mardakertskiy. The Armenian Komsomol Central Committee plenum regarded this decision as an attempt to provoke the youth of the oblast so as to further aggravate the situation in the autonomous oblast.

The Armenian Komsomol Central Committee plenum reiterated the 20 October 1989 decison of the Armenian Komsomol Central Committee bureau to include the NKAO Komsomol oblast organization in the organizational structure of the Armenian Komsomol. It also assumed full financial responsibility for the oblast komsomol organization which had thus far been borne by the (?union) komsomol.

The plenum noted that for the past two years the Armenian Komsomol Central Committee and its city and rayon organizations have been directly involved in organizing summer holidays and foreign tours for the youth of the oblast and in training, selecting, and financing the Komsomol cadres. It has now become a

tradition to organize construction teams from the Yerevan institutes and send them to the oblast.

Armenian Groups Continue Armed Attacks

LD3007122990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] On the situation in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, Information from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs press center. Despite the publication of a presidential decree on the prohibition of the creation of armed formations not envisaged by USSR legislation, and the confiscation of weapons which are being kept illegally, Armenian armed formations have not begun submitting their weapons. Moreover, armed attacks aimed at taking possession of weapons are continuing. Thus, in the town of Kirovokan on 29 July, six armed guerillas [boyeviki] got into the Rubin factory and the paramilitary security forces room, threatened the use of weapons, and seized a rifle, a pistol, two revolvers, and a large quantity of cartridges. In the settlement of Sarnakul, Sisianskiy rayon, a group of individuals armed with automatic weapons and grenades attacked a highway patrol car in which there were militia workers returning from the summer fields where they had been serving, and seized a carbine and two pistols. Altogether, more than 70 incidents of attacks on the internal affairs bodies aimed at appropriating weapons have been registered in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1990.

'Armenian Bandits' Kill Azerbaijani Shepherds

NC3007094390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] An AZERINFORM correspondent has been informed by the press center of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic's Committee for State Security [KGB] that the employees of the republic's KGB discovered and defused two handmade explosives in the vicinity of Kedabekskiy Rayon's (?Yeli) town, which is near the Armenian border, on 26 July.

Meanwhile, Armenian bandits killed three Azerbaijani shepherds and kidnapped a local resident in [name indistinct] town. An investigation is under way.

Paper Shortage Disrupts Publications in Armenia

NC0108111190 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0500 GMT 1 Aug 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] According to ARMENPRES, beginning 1 August the central publications PRAVDA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and RABOCHIYA TRIBUNA, printed in Yerevan at the printing house of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, will not be available to subscribers or at the (?newsstands). This is because PRAVDA publications, which provides the paper, has used up it stock in Yerevan. Because of the situation on the Transcaucasian railroad, no one knows when the freight trains of paper will arrive in Yerevan.

Armenian Trade Banks Form Association

NC0108105190 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Yerevan, 31 Jul (ARMENPRES)—The founding conference of the republican association of the trade banks in Armenia took place. The conference confirmed the bylaws of the association and elected M. Akobyan as the president of the association.

Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet's 14th Session Concludes

NC0108085590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] The 14th session of the 11th convocation of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet convened today. Deputy El'mira Kafarova, chairwoman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, opened the meeting. The agenda and the work schedule of the session were decided. The agenda was as follows:

1. Changes and additions to be made to the election law governing the election of the Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies and the deputies of the republic's local people's deputies soviets.

2. Changes to be effected in a number of laws in the Azerbaijan SSR.

3. Changes to be effected in the criminal code of the Azerbaijan SSR.

4. Changes to be effected in the civil service law of the Azerbaijan SSR.

5. Protection of the historical inventory in the Azerbaijan SSR.

The session heard and debated a report by deputy El'mira Kafarova on the first two items of the agenda. The Supreme Soviet adopted decisions on the matters that were debated. The session decided that the election of the Azerbaijan SSR deputies and the deputies of the local people's deputies soviets which was scheduled to be held on 2 September 1990 should be held on 30 September 1990.

The session then heard a report by Deputy Naim Fataliyev, deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, on the third and fourth agenda items. The Supreme Soviet adopted a number of laws on the two matters after debate.

Deputy Ziyad Samed-zade addressed the session on the fifth topic, the draft law for protecting the historical inventory in the republic. The Supreme Soviet endorsed the draft law after it was read for the first time in the session. It also decided that a popular debate should be held on the document.

With this, the 14th session of the 11th convocation of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet concluded its work.

Central Asia

Ryzhkov Visits Farms in Saratov, Uralsk Oblasts

LD3107191790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] As we have already reported, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, is in Saratov Oblast. Our correspondent Oleg Shomer reports:

[Shomer] The Komintern kolkhoz, which Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov visited today, is situated on the left bank of the Volga in the so-called risk farming zone. Hot, dry winds, droughts, and hot weather above 30 degrees Celsius are ordinary phenomena here. This year, it is true, is an exception. Six million tonnes: such is a very rare yield for Saratov Oblast. The main thing is to harvest and store without losses everything that has been grown. This and increasing the glory of the Saratov kalatch [fancy bread], increasing the production of hard and strong wheat varieties, and introducing new technologies were discussed at the meeting between Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov and the workers of the state experimental plant breeding station which he also visited. He also visited the Krasnyy Put state pedigree poultry factory and the Kushunskiy sovkhoz in Yershovskiy rayon. The program for the first day of the USSR Council of Ministers chairman's stay in Saratov was extremely packed.

Here is a brief interview for All-Union Radio after one of the meetings with rural workers:

[Begin recording] [Shomer] Nikolay Ivanovich.

[Ryzhkov] Yes?

[Shomer] What is the aim of your tour? What are your first impressions, and to what extent have they coincided with what you expected to see?

[Ryzhkov] Well, the tour's visit is to see with my own eyes how the harvest is progressing. Indeed, all of us in the country are concerned at how this harvest should be gathered in. What is my first impression? You know, it is good. Well, I very much like the people's optimistic mood. You know, it seems to me that people are delighted with this grain. There are problems: problems with spare parts, problems with equipment. I am not speaking of our long-term problems, which are well known to us: construction materials, which do not allow us to really get down to building, building up the countryside, and consumer goods, which arise very much during meetings. Well, these are long-term problems. Our task now is to resolve those questions which are worrying us right now in order to gather in the harvest.

[Shomer] Saratov Oblast is known as a supplier of high-quality grain. But, unfortunately, this former glory has recently somehow started to be lost. In order to revive it, what needs to be done? What incentives are needed, economic incentives in the first place? And here too, one cannot do without the market.

[Ryzhkov] It is very, well, to some extent it is satisfying that the specialists whom we are meeting today are starting, or they are thinking not only as agronomists but are thinking very strongly as economists. They are beginning to calculate what is advantageous, what wheat it is advantageous to sow. This is encouraging. People are beginning to reason, people are beginning to be masters. The decisions that we made, including that of raising purchasing prices for grain: I have satisfied myself once again that we acted correctly. This is precisely what the market is about: That a person should show that is advantageous to him, that he should sell it for his benefit to earn money so that he can tackle his problems.

We have just been in a settlement. Well, you have seen that this director, or this sovkhoz, has 3.5 million rubles in his account. He is tackling social problems: they have built an excellent kindergarten. May God grant, as they say, any major works or any town such kindergartens. Why is that? He has money. He is earning money. He is a good master. That is what the market is about.

[Shomer] Given such a harvest on the Saratov grain field and that the harvest is no worse also in many other regions in the country, in this connection will we be purchasing less grain abroad, or wil our policy in this respect remain the same?

[Ryzhkov] I am dreaming of purchasing less grain. It is necessary that we should provide ourselves fully with grain, and the hard currency which our people, the people, are earning must be used more rationally.

[Shomer] Thank you very much, Nikolay Ivanovich.

I will just apologize to our radio listeners for a recording that is maybe not very clear. We have recorded this interview with Nikolay Ryzhkov directly in a field. [end recording]

At midday Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov arrived in Uralsk Oblast of the Kazakh SSR. He visited a number of farms. At one, the Lenin sovkhoz in Kamenskiy rayon, Comrade Ryzhkov conversed with machine operators about working and living conditions and listened to proposals to speed up reaping and dispatching the grain of the new harvest, which is quite plentiful here this year.

In his tour of the oblast Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov is accompanied by Isk aliyev, first secretary of Uralsk Oblast party committee, and Gartman, chairman of the oblast soviet executive committee.

Osh 'Gradually Returning to Normal'

LD3107150190 Frunze Domestic Service in Kirghiz 1200 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Life in the town of Osh and the oblast rayons is gradually returning to normal. In the past 24 hours all consumer services, communications, trade, and public catering workers have been working in the oblast center. About 95.6 percent of the construction workers and 87 percent of the industrial workforces are working. On the night of 30-31 July, an unknown man wounded a serviceman in the vicinity of a brick factory in Osh. The victim was taken to the hospital. Measures are being taken to arrest the offender. The situation in Uzgen rayon has improved considerably. During the past 24 hours a total of 35 crimes were registered, including two cases of hooliganism, five bodily injuries, 12 thefts, and others. Since the beginning of the mass disturbance the number of deaths, injuries, and hospitalizations has not changed. Eighty-seven persons are being sought, and three new announcements have come in. In the past 24 hours 10 firearms were confiscated in the oblast.

Uzgen City Soviet Holds First Session

LD0108081290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 1 Aug 90

[Text] Here is some information from the Osh Oblast of Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic, where the process of stabilization is approaching a new stage this week. A newspaper correspondent reported that in the town of Uzgen the first session of the city soviet of people's deputies took place. Calling the session has been one of the conditions put forward by the Uzbek population. Deputies have elected in a democratic way chairmen of the city soviet and city executive committee. Specific measures in order to construct in the town new industrial enterprises and to develop municipal services, to strengthen the basis for the health service and public education have been elaborated. Special attention has been paid to the liquidation of unemployment, especially with regard to young people.

Turkmen Decree Seen as 'Diktat by Top Officials'

PM2607145590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jul 90 p 1

[Report by I. Zhukov: "Law But No Order"]

[Text] Ashkhabad—There is a legislation boom in Turkmenistan. The republic's Supreme Soviet deputies have already adopted, among others, a law "On the Introduction of Order in the Activity of Video Libraries...", which is already familiar to readers of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, imposing a ban on the rebroadcasting of a number of Central Television programs. The republic prosecutor has been subordinated to the local leadership. And a few days ago a decree by the chairman of the Turkmen SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet "On Amendments to the Procedure for the Sale of Cars" was published.

There is actually very little order in the trade in this extremely scarce commodity. In Ashkhabad alone the number of people wishing to acquire cars is close to 30,000. Many people have been waiting for decades. This long wait is due not only to the small quota of cars allotted to the republic on a centralized basis, but also to obvious malpractices during their sale. How does the decree combat these malpractices?

Simple. In the name of the law, the single waiting list of Ashkhabad City Trade Department is eliminated, and a mass of new ones are created at rayispolkoms [rayon soviet executive committees] and at the workplaces of those on the lists. But what are people who have already waited decades to do? No one has any idea. Moreover, those wishing to acquire cars are being made directly dependent not on their financial abilities but on the opinion of "the labor collective council, with the participation of social organizations."

Translated from bureaucratese, this formula signifies a return to the diktat by top officials in the administration, the party committee, and the trade union committee. The signatures of the "big three" are once again acquiring their frighteningly familiar power. They make people keep their heads down for years for fear of being thrown out of the waiting line at the wave of the chief's finger. They make people flatter and fawn, demonstrate a daily loyalty against their will, and put up with work they despise...

Perhaps someone will say that cars are not bread. Therefore no one will break lances over them. But the precedent, and not the cause, is important. For the umpteenth time the lawmaking process in the republic is turned into restriction of the personal rights of its citizens.